CA Unpub Decisions

Salvador C. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order declaring his minor sons, D. and Mitchell, dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (d).[1] He also appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing both boys from his custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1). We affirm the orders.

In November 1990, defendant and appellant Gilbert Cisneros (defendant) pleaded nolo contendere to one count of possession of cocaine for sale and was placed on probation.[1] Almost twenty-two years later, in August 2012, defendant filed a motion to vacate his judgment of conviction and withdraw his plea (motion to vacate) under Penal Code section 1016.5 (section 1016.5). The trial court denied the motion. On appeal from the order denying the motion to vacate, defendant contends that the immigration advisement language in the minute order memorializing his plea was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 1016.5.
Because the record on appeal did not include the reporter’s transcript for the proceeding at which defendant pleaded nolo contendere, following briefing on this appeal, we obtained the reporter’s transcript from defendant’s earlier appeal from the trial court’s order revoking his probation and, on our own motion, we took judicial notice of that transcript. The reporter’s transcript from the earlier appeal included the transcript from the November 1990 proceeding at which defendant pleaded nolo contendere, which transcript affirmatively demonstrates that defendant was adequately advised of the immigration consequences of his plea.
We hold that because the oral immigration advisement given at the proceeding at which defendant pleaded nolo contendere adequately advised defendant of the immigration consequences of his plea, as required under section 1016.5, subdivision (a), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate on the grounds that defendant was adequately advised. We therefore affirm the order denying that motion.

Plaintiffs and appellants Kum Man Jhae and Kun Chin Jhae appeal from a judgment denying their administrative mandate petition filed against defendants and respondents City of Pasadena and City Council of the City of Pasadena (the City or the City Council). The petition requested modification of four of 20 conditions imposed on their business, Super Liquor, after it was found to be a public nuisance. Because substantial evidence supports respondents’ refusal to modify the conditions, the judgment is affirmed.

Objector and appellant One Colorado Investments LLC appeals from the order approving a settlement that effectively gave priority to a lien in favor of counsel for plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent Agora Concepts, Inc. (Agora) and cross-defendant and respondent Randy Raynak (Raynak). We affirm. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to conclude the evidence showed that the attorney’s lien was neither collusive nor in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and therefore took priority over appellant’s judgment lien.

Defendant and appellant Rigoberto Raul Mandujano was convicted by jury of the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Michael Johnson. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187.)[1] The jury found true allegations that defendant used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury on Johnson (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 7 years to life for the attempted murder, enhanced by 25 years to life for the firearm use under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).[2]
In his timely appeal from the judgment, defendant contends: (1) the trial court failed to properly evaluate whether the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges for improper racial or ethnic purposes under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Batson/Wheeler); and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial after testimony indicating defendant was believed to be a member of a street gang. We affirm. Defendant has failed to demonstrate error under Batson/Wheeler, and denial of the motion for mistrial was not prejudicial error.

Plaintiff, Carlos Escamilla, Sr., appeals from a July 31, 2012 order sustaining a demurrer by defendant, Carlos Escamilla, Jr. The order dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The trial court found plaintiff released all claims in this action in a prior lawsuit. Plaintiff contends he never agreed to the settlement and the terms are unconscionable. We affirm the order.

Rogelio Garcia appeals from a judgment that sentences him to 11 years in state prison for making criminal threats, inflicting corporal injury on his girlfriend of six years and committing second degree robbery. Garcia contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for those crimes. We affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises out of a shooting on April 11, 2009, in which two young men were killed and four others were injured. The shooter, Vincent Casio, who was the subject of a separate appeal, was convicted of two counts of murder (Penal Code § 187, subd. (a)),[1] four counts of premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). In the same trial, defendant and appellant Sean Matthew Martinez was convicted as an aider and abettor of two counts of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and four counts of premeditated attempted murder.[2] The jury found true allegations that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)). Defendant was sentenced to 40 years to life in state prison.

Plaintiff and appellant Martha Angol (plaintiff) appeals from the trial court’s order sustaining demurrers to some, but not all, of the causes of action against most, but not all, of the defendants and respondents. [1] In response to the appeal, defendants argue, inter alia, that because a judgment or order of dismissal has not been entered, plaintiff has appealed from a nonappealable order.
We hold that as to the two institutional defendants, Community College and Trade Technical, the appeal must be dismissed as taken from a nonappealable order because no judgment of dismissal has been entered in favor of those defendants. As to the individual defendants, the appeal must be dismissed because no judgment of dismissal can be entered in their favor until all pending causes of action against them have been resolved.

An installer of equipment for Charter Communications, Inc. (“Charter”) was injured when the pole he was working on broke and he fell to the ground. The injured party sued Verizon California, Inc. (“Verizon”) because, although Charter was leasing the pole, it was owned by Verizon. Verizon settled the lawsuit and sought indemnification from Charter.
The trial court ruled Verizon was entitled to indemnification because Verizon was at most passively negligent. Charter has appealed the judgment. We affirm.

Father appeals the denial of a petition to modify an order terminating his parental rights filed after this court issued a limited reversal and remanded so the juvenile court could require compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (See In re A.G. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1390 (A.G.)). Father contends the juvenile court was incorrect when it ruled that our disposition in A.G. precluded it from exercising jurisdiction over his modification petition. We agree with the juvenile court that our remand was for the limited purpose of complying with ICWA and affirm.

Plaintiff and attorney William Gwire sued his former clients, defendants Elliot Blumberg, Vigilant Investors’ L.P., and Vigilant Investors’ Asset Management LLC (collectively defendants) after Blumberg, an unhappy former client, posted disparaging comments about Gwire on complaintsboard.com, a web site providing a forum for the public to comment on and complain about consumer issues (complaintsboard.com or the web site).
The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)[1] as to four causes of action in the operative complaint, but denied the motion as to Gwire’s two defamation claims. The court concluded Gwire established a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims because Blumberg’s statement that Gwire committed a “horrific fraud” against Blumberg that “irreparably damaged every aspect of [Blumberg’s] life” was a false statement of fact, not opinion.
Blumberg appeals. We affirm. We conclude Blumberg’s comments on complaintsboard.com, a consumer complaint web site, are protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3): they are written statements made in a “public forum in connection with an issue of public interest[.]” We also conclude, however, that Gwire established a probability of prevailing on the merits of his defamation claims because Blumberg’s post, in part, is susceptible to being read as containing false factual assertions. Gwire submitted sufficient evidence to satisfy his minimal burden to show a probability of prevailing on at least some aspect of his defamation claims.

A jury convicted defendants Eddie James Sample and Daniel Miller of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),[1] and the trial court sentenced both to 25 years to life in prison. On appeal, Sample claims the trial court (1) prejudicially abused its discretion in failing to suppress evidence obtained by unlawful and unconstitutional wiretaps and (2) prejudicially erred in failing to suppress pre-arrest statements obtained from him in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). He further contends that the cumulative effect of these errors denied him due process.
Miller adopts Sample’s arguments to the extent they apply to him. Miller further contends that (1) the trial court’s refusal to admit the second part of his post-arrest interview violated Evidence Code section 356 and his right to present a complete defense; (2) the trial court’s refusal to admit Sample’s post-arrest statements exculpating Miller and inculpating Sample and another person violated Miller’s right to present a complete defense; and (3) the admission of cause-of-death testimony by a pathologist who did not attend the autopsy violated Miller’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the coroner who performed the autopsy. Sample adopts Miller’s third argument. We affirm the judgments.

C.C. and his mother, Christina C. (mother), appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the County of Orange, its Social Services Agency (SSA), and several of SSA’s social workers.[1] Plaintiffs complain the trial court erred in concluding public employee immunity (Gov. Code, § 820.2) barred their claims arising from SSA’s decision to remove 10-year-old C.C. from mother’s care and place him with father, only to return C.C. to his mother when he fared poorly in father’s care. As we explain, plaintiffs’ claims for reversal have no merit, and we therefore affirm the judgment.