CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiffs Leonard and Sandra Key (collectively plaintiffs) appeal from an order dismissing their action against defendants Mason-McDuffie Real Estate, Inc., and Mona Koussa (collectively defendants) for failure to prosecute (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 583.410, 583.420, subd. (a)(2)).[1] Plaintiffs argue the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the action.
We affirm.

Appellant Paul Curtis Dixon was committed to the custody of the Department of State Hospitals[1] for an indeterminate term in April 2011, after a jury found him to be a “sexually violent predator” (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.).[2] We rejected all but one of his challenges to the order of commitment and remanded the case “for the limited purpose of reconsidering [his] equal protection claim in light of [People v.] McKee [(2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I)]” once the proceedings in that case became final. (People v. Dixon (Apr. 11, 2012, H036874) [nonpub. opn.] (Dixon I).) The California Supreme Court denied Dixon’s petition for review. (Dixon I, review den. June 20, 2012, S202569.)
Meanwhile, the trial court on remand in McKee I held an evidentiary hearing on McKee’s equal protection claim, rejected it, and committed him as an SVP. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. (People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1347-1348, review den. Oct. 10, 2012, (McKee II).)
With the decision in McKee II final, the trial court committed Dixon to the custody of the DSH “as previously ordered.” Dixon filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s November 9, 2012 order. He contends that the amended SPVA violates his state and federal equal protection rights, and he urges us “not to accept the conclusions of McKee II.” We affirm.

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, on August 3, 2012, James Pompey pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit a crime, to wit sell cocaine (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1), Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, count nine) one count of possession of over $100,000 for purchase of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6, count 26) and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 27).[1] Defendant admitted that the narcotics involved in the conspiracy to sell cocaine exceeded 80 kilograms, 40 kilograms, and 10 kilograms in weight and that he was substantially involved in the planning, direction, execution, or financing of the offense. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4, subd. (a)(3), (5) & (6).) Further, he admitted that he had a prior conviction for possession for sale of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5) within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6.[2]
In exchange for his guilty pleas, defendant was promised a 16 year eight month prison sentence to be served concurrently with a federal sentence that had been imposed.

A jury convicted defendant Ricardo Guerra Rocha of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated; count 1); and street terrorism (§186.22, subd. (a); count 2). It further found true allegations he vicariously discharged a firearm, causing the victim’s death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)), and committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life on count 1 and 25 years to life for the enhancements but stayed his sentence on count 2.
In his appeal, defendant contends (1) the court erred in admitting his statements to a detective because they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (Miranda), (2) insufficient evidence supports the section 186.22, subdivision (b) and vicarious firearm discharge enhancements, (3) California’s mandatory sentencing scheme under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to juveniles, and (4) his 40 years to life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the California Constitution.
Defendant also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which we consolidated with the appeal for all purposes, raising the same Miranda and cruel and unusual punishment issues he asserts in his direct appeal. He also claims his trial attorney failed to provide him with effective assistance of counsel by failing to advocate on his behalf at sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment and deny the petition.

Appellant Scott Patterson and respondent Barry Hermanson entered into a joint venture involving the importation and sale of merchandise from China. They fell out, and respondent Hermanson sued Patterson in superior court. The parties settled the lawsuit, entering into a settlement agreement that required Patterson to pay off a promissory note over three years. The parties also stipulated to the entry of judgment if appellant Patterson defaulted.
As the three-year period was about to end, respondent accused appellant of defaulting on the note. Appellant disagreed. Respondent applied ex parte to the superior court for entry of his stipulated judgment, a proceeding respondent opposed. The court granted the ex parte application and entered judgment for $50,660.75, exclusive of attorney fees and costs. It later denied appellant’s request to set aside the judgment.

Plaintiffs Yan Sui and Pei-Yu Yang appeal from the judgment in this slander of title action after the court granted the Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 motion for judgment in favor of defendants Stephen D. Price, 2176 Pacific Homeowners Association, and Michelle J. Matteau.[1] We dismiss Yan Sui’s appeal. We affirm the judgment as to Pei-Yu Yang.

The plaintiff’s attorney in a now dismissed breach of contract action, Hoa Phu Truong, challenges two orders he pay sanctions to the defendant, pursuant to section 128.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.[1] We have consolidated the appeals from each of the two orders and now dismiss them. Truong filed his first appeal from an appealable order, but filed it too late. He filed his second appeal timely, but it was from a nonappealable order.

Paul Copenbarger appeals from a judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of his former business partner, Kent McNaughton. Copenbarger and McNaughton formed a limited liability company to develop a parcel of land in Hawaii. They fell out over whether McNaughton had to buy Copenbarger out and wound up suing each other in Orange County Superior Court. The trial court ordered the case to arbitration, over Copenbarger’s objection that McNaughton had waived the right to arbitrate. Copenbarger appeals from the order granting the petition to compel arbitration.

Defendant Effren Abelar Figueroa appeals following his conviction for four counts of committing a forcible lewd act on a child under 14 years old, and two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 years old. As to each count, the jury found true the enhancement allegations that Figueroa had engaged in substantial sexual conduct with his victims, who were children under 14 years of age, and had committed an offense specified in Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (c) against more than one victim. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.)

On February 16, 2008, appellant Gary Shawkey and Robert Vendrick boarded a sailboat in Dana Point Harbor bound for Catalina Island. Shawkey arrived, Vendrick did not. In fact, Vendrick was never seen or heard from again. At trial, the prosecution theorized Shawkey murdered Vendrick at sea for financial gain, and the jury agreed. Shawkey contends there is insufficient evidence he killed Vendrick, and the trial court erred in admitting certain hearsay statements into evidence. Finding these contentions unmeritorious, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant V.G., a minor, was the subject of multiple juvenile petitions filed in 2011 and 2012. On March 22, 2012, he was declared a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and placed on probation, based on a felony violation of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code,[1] § 496) and misdemeanor being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)).
In March and April 2012, he committed additional offenses and an amended petition was filed on June 29, 2012. The instant appeal is based on the proceedings that occurred as a result of that amended petition. His appellate counsel discovered errors in the calculation of credits, fines, and fees, and advised the superior court of those errors. The superior court conducted a noticed hearing and made the requested corrections.
On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We affirm.

J.O. (Father) appeals after the termination of his parental rights to C.O. at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing. Father makes one claim on appeal that the juvenile court erred by denying his section 388 petition. We affirm the juvenile court’s order denying Father’s section 388 petition.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Freddie Mercado of domestic violence (count 1—Pen. Code § 273.5, subd. (e)(1)),[1] assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury (count 2—§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), and dissuading a witness (count 3—§ 136.1). Thereafter, defendant admitted a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement.[2] The trial court sentenced defendant to five years’ incarceration consisting of the midterm of four years on count 1; the midterm of three years on count 2, stayed pursuant to section 654; the midterm of two years on count 3, to be served concurrently; and an additional year on the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jesus Albert Castillo’s original sentence required him to pay a $1,000 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4) and a $1,000 parole revocation restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.45.)[1] In a previous appeal, we modified various aspects of his conviction and remanded for resentencing. (People v. Castillo (Sept. 27, 2011, E051070 [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court sentenced defendant to pay a $2,000 restitution fine and a $2,000 parole revocation restitution fine. Defendant now contends that the increase violated state double jeopardy principles. (See People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 360-367.)
The People concede the double jeopardy violation. They merely argue that defendant’s trial counsel forfeited the issue by failing to raise it below.
If defense counsel did not forfeit the issue, we can reach it on the merits. But if she did, defendant has a slam-dunk claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Failure to object to a sentence that violates double jeopardy falls below an objective standard of reasonableness; moreover, it is manifestly prejudicial. (See generally People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 875-876.) And “[i]f, indeed, double jeopardy applied, we can conceive of no legitimate tactical reason for failing to raise it.” (People v. Morales (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1185 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
Defendant’s opening brief did not raise ineffective assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, we have discretion to reach that issue in order to head off the inevitable habeas petition. (People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 159, fn. 2.)