CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Igor Chepel, representing himself on appeal as he did in the trial court, urges us to reverse a jury verdict in which he lost each of the three causes of action he asserted against his ex-wife’s boyfriend, defendant Chris Swinney. Plaintiff asks us to disregard defendant’s appellate brief for violating filing deadlines. Even if we were to grant plaintiff’s request, it would not solve the fatal deficiency in his appeal—the absence of a sufficient record to support his claims. Without a reporter’s transcript and with only a skeletal clerk’s transcript, we must affirm the judgment.

Defendant appeals the trial court’s finding that his 1987 prior conviction for aggravated battery, sustained in Illinois, qualified as a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).[1] He contends his plea was an Alford plea[2] that did not provide an independent factual basis to prove the underlying conduct, because he did not admit the conduct and he asserted an affirmative defense. We disagree. Defendant did not put forth an affirmative defense and did not maintain his innocence. Thus, we find defendant’s plea admitted the conduct required to establish the Illinois offense was a serious felony. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Jennifer M. (Mother) has a long history of drug use and failed rehabilitations. As a result, her older children were permanently placed with other families. Last year, Mother’s son Lincoln M. was born with methamphetamine in his bloodstream. Mother asks us to ignore her history and focus on the possibility of a brighter future. Like the juvenile court, we see evidence of changing circumstances, not changed circumstances. Mother’s recently renewed effort to attain sobriety does not outweigh Lincoln’s need for permanency. We affirm the orders denying Mother’s petition for a modification and terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 366.26.)[1]

Lisa G. (Mother) appeals from the dependency court’s summary denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition[1] and order terminating her parental rights. Because we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition and that substantial evidence supported the order terminating parental rights, we affirm.

Appellant mother seeks to reverse the dependency court’s order terminating her parental rights with respect to her two children. She contends that there was insufficient evidence that her children were adoptable.[1] We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff Raul Gamboa appeals from orders denying his request for a civil harassment restraining order against defendant Pedro Anastacio Molina, plaintiff’s brother-in-law, and denying his motion for reconsideration. We affirm the orders.

Omar C. was a dependent of the juvenile court when he was charged with two separate felonies. As part of a plea agreement, Omar admitted to the felonies in exchange for deferred entry of judgment which would put him in the care of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The plea agreement was approved by a referee sitting as a temporary judge. Subsequently, a judge of the juvenile court ordered a rehearing of the referee’s orders and placed Omar into the custody of the probation department instead. Because the referee’s orders were not subject to rehearing, we reverse and remand to reinstate the referee’s dispositional orders.

While several of defendants’ motions were pending, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her complaint with prejudice. Following the dismissal, the trial court ruled on defendants’ motions.
Plaintiff attempts to appeal from the order granting the motions. Although the order is not appealable, we exercise our discretion to treat plaintiff’s appeal as a petition for an extraordinary writ. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motions. We therefore vacate the order and direct that the action be dismissed with prejudice.

A jury convicted defendant Titus Francisco of one count of second degree commercial burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459.[1] In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found 11 prior prison term allegations to be true but subsequently struck one of the allegations on the court’s own motion. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 12 years in state prison. The sentence consisted of the midterm of two years in count 1, plus one year each for the 10 prior prison term enhancements.
Defendant appeals on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support certain of the trial court’s findings on the prior prison term allegations, resulting in a violation of his right to due process.

A jury convicted defendant David Dwayne Anderson of mayhem in violation of Penal Code section 203[1] in count 1, assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) in count 2, and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) in count 3. The jury found in counts 2 and 3 that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). The jury also found that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) in count 1.[2]
The trial court sentenced defendant to the high term of eight years in count 1 and struck the enhancement for personal use of a deadly weapon in that count. The trial court imposed the midterm of three years in counts 2 and 3 and three years for the great bodily injury enhancements for a total of six years in each of those counts. The court ordered the sentences for counts 2 and 3 to be stayed under section 654.
Defendant appeals on the grounds that: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (b)) as a lesser included offense to mayhem in count 1; and (2) defendant’s conviction in count 3 must be vacated because it is duplicative of his conviction in count 2.

Omari Hill appeals from his conviction of two counts of second degree robbery and one count of grand theft person. Our independent review of the record reveals no arguable issue that would aid him. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Plaintiff Rosa Banuelos appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants 218 Properties, LLC (218 Properties), LA Investment, LLC (LA Investment), R22, Inc. (R22), doing business as Star Management, and Peter Starflinger (Starflinger) (collectively, defendants). Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in (1) sustaining defendants’ demurrer to her causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, retaliation and bad faith, (2) granting defendants’ motion to strike the complaint’s alter ego allegations, and (3) granting summary judgment as to her remaining causes of action. We disagree and affirm.

Marcelino Palomera appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(4)), and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). The jury found true the allegation that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury in committing the assault (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that appellant had suffered three prior serious or violent felony convictions that qualified as strikes (§§ 667, subds. (a) - (i), 1170.12, subds. (a) - (d)). Appellant was sentenced to a total term of 26 years in state prison. He contends the evidence is insufficient to support the findings that he inflicted great bodily injury in committing the assault, and serious bodily injury in committing the battery. We affirm.

Ronnail Deon George and Jotis Freeman were tried before separate juries on 15 felony counts in connection with commercial burglaries and robberies that took place a few days apart at an IHOP restaurant, a Blockbuster video store and a Ralphs grocery store. George’s jury convicted him on all counts and found special allegations of gun use by a principal and gang enhancements true. Freeman’s jury convicted him of the counts relating to the IHOP and Ralphs crimes, and found allegations of personal use of a firearm true, but found the gang allegations not true and could not reach a verdict on the nine counts relating to the Blockbuster crimes. The court sentenced George to state prison for 23 years 8 months, and sentenced Freeman to prison for 27 years 8 months.