CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Darryl Chatman was convicted by jury of one count of carjacking. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying his request for substitute counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123-125 (Marsden), and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Cemetery worker Mateo Ruelas Garcia was terminated from his employment after damaging an existing gravesite with a backhoe, then covering up the damage instead of reporting it to his supervisor, as required by company policy. He made two claims against his employer for wrongful termination in violation of public policies protecting whistleblowers, which were rejected by a jury; however, the jury found an implied covenant not to terminate except for good cause, and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for the defendants. The ruling is correct. The company handbook describes employees as “at-will,” and plaintiff testified at trial to his understanding that he could be terminated at any time and for any reason. There is no evidence that plaintiff received individual promises that he would be terminated only for good cause, and mere longevity of employment does not establish a right to remain on the job indefinitely. We affirm.

In this dependency proceeding, the juvenile court ruled that A.S. was the presumed father of the child M.T. and J.R. was the de facto parent of the child. J.R. now appeals, arguing that the court abused its discretion in finding that A.S. was the presumed father of the child. We affirm.

The minor argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by refusing to enforce a prior order to evaluate a specific home for placement. At best, this argument is premature, but in any event, the minor has failed to establish error. We therefore affirm.

A jury found Joe Anthony Campos guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1))[1] for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the Santa Nita criminal street gang and active participation in the Santa Nita criminal street gang. The trial court found true allegations Campos had prior serious felony convictions and had served three prior prison terms. After exercising its discretion to dismiss one of the prior serious felony convictions for sentencing (§ 1385, subd. (a)), the trial court imposed a total prison term of 19 years.
Campos claims the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses by admitting a statement made by another Santa Nita gang member to a police officer and by prejudicially failing to give instructions on the necessity defense. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the criminal street gang enhancement. We conclude Campos’s claims are meritless and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Luis Rosales Rivera was convicted of first degree murder, having struck his roommate three or four times in the head with a sledgehammer. Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. The evidence of motive, planning, and the manner of killing, however, supports the jury’s finding that defendant committed first degree murder.
Defendant next argues the jury was incorrectly instructed regarding the ways in which it could consider evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication, both at the time the crime was committed and during defendant’s police interrogation. These arguments were forfeited because they were not raised in the trial court. We have nevertheless considered whether the failure to request additional or modified instructions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and we conclude that there was no violation of defendant’s right to effective counsel. We therefore affirm the judgment.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing an administrative fee under Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (l). We agree, and direct the trial court to amend the restitution order to delete the reference to the administrative fee.

A jury convicted Michael Contreras Gonzales of possession of methamphetamine for use and several other offenses, including active participation in a criminal street gang under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a) (section 186.22(a))[1] (count 3) and carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle while an active participant in a criminal street gang under former section 12031, subdivision (a)(1) and (2)(C) (count 5).[2] The jury found true the gang enhancement allegation under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) (section 186.22(b)(1)). The trial court vacated the verdict on and dismissed count 3 because it was a lesser included offense of count 5. The court sentenced Gonzales to an eight‑year prison term.
We affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted review of our opinion and deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue or further order. After issuing its opinion in People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125 (Rodriguez), the Supreme Court transferred this case to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Rodriguez. Following transfer, the parties submitted supplemental briefs pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b).
We have reconsidered the cause in light of Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th 1125, and have considered the parties’ supplemental briefs. Based on Rodriguez, we now reverse the conviction on count 5 and remand for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant Broderick J. Steele was committed to Atascadero State Hospital (ASH) for continued involuntary treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code section 2960 et seq.[1] Steele contends that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that his mental disorder must cause him to have serious difficulty controlling his behavior in order to commit him as an MDO. He also contends that there is insufficient evidence to recommit him as an MDO. We disagree and will affirm the order.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of J.E. (Mother) and defendant and appellant B.W. (Father) to their son, J.A. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)[1] Father raises six issues on appeal. First, Father asserts the juvenile court violated his statutory and due process rights by not honoring his request to be transported to the termination hearing. Second, Father contends the juvenile court erred by not informing Father he could request the court find him to be a presumed father. Third, Father asserts the juvenile court, and plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department), failed to timely inform him that a test revealed he was J.A.’s biological father. Fourth, Father contends the juvenile court violated Father’s opportunity to be heard when it did not respond to Father’s written request for an attorney. Fifth, Father asserts the foregoing alleged errors had the cumulative effect of denying him due process. Sixth, Father asserts the juvenile court erred by not performing a proper inquiry pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant and appellant Sean David Almendarez guilty of receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).)[1] The trial court found true the allegations that defendant suffered: (1) two prior strike convictions (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)); and (2) five prior convictions for which he served prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of 11 years. Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, defendant contends the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the law of specific intent. Second, defendant asserts the trial court erred by excluding evidence relating to the location of some of the stolen goods. We affirm the judgment.[2

Defendant and appellant Roderick Keith Dirden appeals from a judgment convicting him of three counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] and three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1).) The jury found defendant guilty of two robbery counts and associated felon-in-possession counts, and also made true findings on allegations that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the robberies. (§12022.53, subd. (b).) The jury was unable to reach a verdict on a third set of charges, but defendant eventually pleaded guilty to these charges as well. The court subsequently found true an allegation that defendant had suffered a prior “strike” conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i).[2]
Before sentencing, defendant filed a motion to have his “strike” prior stricken pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). This was denied, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 33 years 4 months.[3]
On this appeal defendant contends first that the trial court erred when it denied his Romero motion. He also contends that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because, as to him, it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree, and affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant and appellant, Luis Alberto Castro, guilty of (1) two counts of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); Counts 1 & 4); (2) two counts of possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; Counts 2 & 5); (3) two counts of being an active participant in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a); Counts 3 & 6);[1] and (4) one count of possessing not more than 28.5 grams of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b); Count 7).

R.H. appeals an order under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26 selecting adoption as the permanent plan for his son Diego H. and terminating his parental rights. He also appeals the court's denial of his requests in a petition under section 388 for reunification services, placement of Diego with his mother, and a finding that efforts by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) to locate him were inadequate. R.H. contends (1) the Agency's failure to conduct a diligent search for him to advise him of his rights violated his right to due process; (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that Diego is adoptable; and (3) the court's termination of his parental rights without a finding of parental unfitness violated his right to due process. We affirm.

Harold David Halgas appeals a sentencing order after entry of a negotiated guilty plea. He contends he is entitled to conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019[1] for the 10 days he spent in a nonpenal residential substance abuse treatment program as a court-ordered condition of probation. We conclude that the issuance of conduct credits for nonpenal residential substance abuse treatment is not statutorily authorized by section 4019 and, under the circumstances presented here, is not required by equal protection. Therefore, we affirm.