CA Unpub Decisions

On August 12, 2012, defendant Otto Ray Victor McKnight was caught driving a stolen Jeep. The Jeep owner knew defendant but had not given him permission to drive it. On September 28, 2012, while released on bail, defendant hit his live-in girlfriend, resulting in a cut above her eye and scratches on her face. On May 12, 2006, defendant had been convicted of first degree burglary.
Defendant pled no contest to cohabitant abuse and admitted a strike in one case (case No. CRF12563). Defendant pled no contest to unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle in the other case (case No. CRF12465). The parties agreed that the strike prior would be stricken at sentencing provided defendant complied with the terms of a waiver pursuant to People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247 while he was released on his own recognizance pending sentencing.
Defendant failed to meet with the probation officer at a scheduled interview, a violation of a condition of the Cruz waiver.
After denying defendant’s motion to strike the strike prior, the court found defendant was in violation of the Cruz waiver, denied probation, and sentenced him to state prison for an aggregate term of eight years eight months, that is, the upper term of four years, doubled for the strike prior, for the cohabitant abuse offense, plus one-third the midterm or eight months for the vehicle offense.

A modification decision.

Defendant Michael Anthony Williams pled no contest to charges of abusing the mother of his child. In accordance with the terms of his plea agreement, defendant was granted probation, the terms of which he later violated. After revoking defendant’s probation, the trial court doubled his prison sentence because of a strike prior he admitted as part of his plea agreement.
Defendant argues that under the terms of his plea agreement he admitted the strike prior only conditionally because the mention of the strike prior on the first page of the plea agreement includes the words “conditional admission upon proof only.” He argues that the prosecutor failed to meet that condition by failing to adequately prove his strike prior. Since the condition was allegedly not met, defendant believes the trial court erred in doubling his sentence.
Having reviewed the plea agreement, we conclude the only reasonable construction of the entire agreement is that defendant made an unconditional admission of the strike prior. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal after remand for a hearing on whether defendant Raymond Garduno Obregon is entitled to additional custody credit for time spent in residential treatment and for time spent in custody as a sentenced prisoner. In People v. Obregon (Jan. 12, 2012, C066722) [nonpub. opn.] (Obregon I), after defense appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), defendant filed a supplemental brief.[1] He contended, inter alia, that he was entitled to additional presentence custody credit, the same claims which were then pending a hearing in the trial court at the time the opinion in Obregon I was written. Because the record on appeal in Obregon I did not reflect that the trial court had determined whether defendant was entitled to custody credit for time spent in residential treatment, we remanded for a hearing on the issue. We also noted that defendant appeared to be correct in his assertion that he was entitled to additional credit for time spent in custody prior to resentencing.

In March 2011, 20-year-old Khalil A. was shot in the chest with a silver revolver in Chico. The shooting occurred toward the end of a party in a parking lot outside a club at around 1:00 a.m. The shooter came up to Khalil A., started “acting tough,” and claimed to be a Blood gang member from Compton. Khalil A. asked the shooter, “ ‘How you going to act tough with a church shirt on?’ ” The shooter responded by firing at Khalil A., hitting him in the chest. The shooter was facing him, with nobody in between, from about six to 10 feet away. The shooter then took off running. Khalil A. identified defendant Anchalla Andre Zeigler as the shooter in a photographic lineup and in court. So did a friend of his who saw the shooting. When police searched defendant’s home, they found a revolver that looked similar to the one used in the shooting that had one spent casing inside, indicating the gun had been fired once. A jury found defendant guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter (which was a lesser included offense of charged murder), assault with a firearm, and felon in possession of a firearm.

Defendant Rocky Windsor was convicted by jury of eight counts of committing a forcible lewd or lascivious act on a minor under the age of 14 years. With respect to each count, the jury also found defendant engaged in substantial sexual conduct with the victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve an aggregate determinate term of 64 years in state prison and imposed other orders.
On appeal, defendant contends his trial counsel rendered constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to properly admit into evidence several out-of-court statements made by the victim that were purportedly inconsistent with her testimony at trial. Assuming, without deciding, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, we conclude there is no reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different had these statements been admitted into evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Dennis Joseph Pietromonaco appeals from an extension of his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). The order in question, granted on April 1, 2011, extended Pietromonaco’s commitment to April 1, 2012, and retroactively extended his commitment from April 1, 2009 to April 1, 2010, and April 1, 2010 to April 1, 2011. Although the district attorney timely filed petitions to extend Pietromonaco’s commitment, there were numerous continuances, primarily requested by Pietromonaco, and the hearing was not held until April 1, 2011.
He argues the court had no jurisdiction to extend his commitment after the 2008‑2009 commitment expired. We shall affirm.

Plaintiffs Rafael Perez (Rafael), Pedro Perez (Pedro), and David Hurley (Hurley) (sometimes collectively, plaintiffs) appeal the trial court’s order granting defendant James Kouretas’s special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 (hereafter § 425.16)). We conclude the court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion and reverse the order and judgment of dismissal as well as the attorney’s fee award in Kouretas’s favor.

Appellant Jose O. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders removing his son Geovanny from his custody and denying him family reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12).[1] Father contends he was denied his statutory and due process right to receive notice of the recommendation of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) that he be denied reunification services because of his conviction for robbery. Father, who was incarcerated throughout the proceedings below, who was absent from the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, and who did not submit a waiver of his right to attend the hearing, further contends the juvenile court committed prejudicial error by refusing to continue the hearing so that father could be transported to the hearing. Finally, father contends the juvenile court erred by failing to consider placing Geovanny in his care pursuant to section 361.2.
The record shows that father received notice of the Department’s recommendation that reunification services be denied; that through his counsel, father was given the opportunity to be heard on that issue; and that father was not prejudiced by the juvenile court’s refusal to continue the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Father never requested custody of Geovanny under section 361.2 in the juvenile court below and he therefore forfeited consideration of that issue on appeal. For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Jerardo Z. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional orders establishing dependency jurisdiction over two of his children, Jemely (born April 2009) and Antonio (born October 2012), pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.[1] Father also challenges the dispositional orders requiring him to attend anger management and parenting classes. Father contends that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as to him, and that the juvenile court erred in ordering him to attend anger management and parenting classes. We find father’s contentions unavailing and affirm.

Appellant Jerone Shell contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike one or more of his prior strike convictions. We affirm.

Appellant, Selvin C. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders with respect to his stepdaughter, Kimberlim (born October 1997), and biological sons, David (born October 2005) and Jerryn (born June 2010). Father contends that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order declaring Kimberlim a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (d),[1] and David and Jerryn dependents under subdivision (j). Father also challenges the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services as to David and Jerryn under section 361.5, subdivision (c). We affirm.

Defendants and appellants Sanford Coggins (Coggins) and The Coggins Company (Coggins Company) (collectively, defendants) appeal from an order denying their petition to compel arbitration of claims brought against them by plaintiffs and respondents Stephen Goldberg (Goldberg) and Victoria Pynchon (collectively, plaintiffs). Because plaintiffs’ claims do not come within the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, we affirm the order denying the petition.

Youngsoo Lee filed a three-page opening brief in which he says he appeals from the dismissal of his complaint against Bank of America, N.A. (successor by merger of BAC Home Loan Services, L.P. (erroneously sued as BAC Home Loan Services)) and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (erroneously sued as MERSCORP) (hereafter Bank of America), relating to a non-judicial foreclosure sale of his real property, apparently after its demurrer to his complaint was sustained without leave to amend, but argues the trial court erred in rejecting his motion for new trial predicated on new evidence.[1] Without explanation or any citations to the record, he sets out a number of provisions of Title 15, section 77 (but no other authorities), mentions “security-based swaps” and says he had a federally secured loan so “the matter is precluded from a State Court, wherein they lack subject jurisdiction” as a matter of “preemption of State law.” He says he seeks “[r]emand[] to the District Court.” The brief is otherwise unintelligible.
According to the clerk’s transcript, the trial court issued a tentative ruling on Bank of America’s demurrer to Lee’s complaint (filed in May 2012), indicating the court had granted Bank of America’s request for judicial notice of “Exhibits A-S,” which established that Lee had previously filed a complaint in federal court (in July 2011), predicated on identical allegations regarding predatory lending, improper securitization and wrongful foreclosure, and in February 2012, the federal court had dismissed Lee’s claims with prejudice.[2] The trial court concluded the doctrine of res judicata barred Lee’s May 2012 complaint. Although Lee had failed to address the res judicata bar in his opposition to Bank of America’s demurrer, the trial court indicated the court would hear from Lee regarding whether leave to amend was warranted.
According to the trial court’s order, after reading and considering all papers filed and after hearing and considering oral argument, the request for judicial notice was granted, Bank of America’s demurrer to Lee’s complaint was sustained without leave to amend on the ground all claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata (among other grounds) and Lee’s complaint was dismissed with prejudice.[3]