CA Unpub Decisions

A.B. (Mother) has made no less than six appeals/writs[1] in the dependency case involving her son, J.B. In the present one, she appeals the November 26, 2012, order terminating parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[2] She contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that J.B. was adoptable and she challenges the holding in Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242 (Cynthia D.) that California’s dependency system comports with federal due process standards.

Plaintiff Wellness and Pain Management Center (Wellness) appeals from an order of the trial court granting the request of defendant City of Riverside (City) for a preliminary injunction enjoining Wellness from operating a medical marijuana collective dispensary. Wellness contends: (1) the City’s ordinance that bans medical marijuana collectives is invalid because it conflicts with or is preempted by state law, specifically the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5) and the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.7 et seq.); (2) the City’s ordinance is void under Government Code section 65008; and (3) the City’s ordinance violates Civil Code section 54. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction, and we affirm.

Defendant Harmonic Health Alternatives (HHA) appeals from the trial court’s grant of the request of plaintiff City of Corona (City) for a preliminary injunction enjoining HHA from conducting activities or operations related to the distribution of marijuana. HHA contends that (1) the City’s ordinance that bans medical marijuana collectives is invalid because it conflicts with or is preempted by state law, specifically, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5) and the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.7 et seq.), and (2) the City’s ban on medical marijuana collectives violated HHA’s constitutional right to equal protection of the law. We affirm.

Cross-defendant R Side Medical, LLC (R Side) appeals from the trial court’s grant of the request of plaintiff City of Lake Elsinore (City) for a preliminary injunction enjoining R Side from conducting activities or operations related to the distribution of marijuana. R Side contends that the City’s municipal code provisions prohibiting the operation of medical marijuana dispensaries in the City were preempted by state law, specifically the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5) and the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.7 et seq.) and deprived R Side of equal protection of the law. We disagree, and we affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Sandra Crouch is the mother of Terry Lee Green (decedent), who died from a gunshot wound while shopping. Defendant and respondent Rio Rancho Discount Mall, Inc. (the Mall) owns the shopping mall, and defendant and respondent Lucio Del Valle, dba Rio Rancho In House Security (Del Valle) provided security for the Mall where the killing took place. Plaintiff sued the Mall and Del Valle for the wrongful death of decedent, including claims for negligence and premises liability. Defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging an absence of a duty. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

L.R., the half-sister of Stanley C., appeals a judgment terminating the father's parental rights over Stanley and selecting adoption as his preferred plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] The sole issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the court's finding the sibling relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)) is inapplicable. We affirm the judgment.

In November 2012, Adalberto Coronado entered a negotiated guilty plea to a felony, being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)),[1] and a misdemeanor, resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). As part of the plea bargain, Coronado admitted having suffered a strike prior conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). In January 2013, Coronado stated that he wished to withdraw his plea because his attorney had pressured him to enter into the plea bargain. The court granted Coronado's Marsden motion (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118) and appointed new counsel. New counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea. In February, the court denied the motion. The court sentenced Coronado to a stipulated four-year prison term: twice the two-year middle term for firearm possession, with credit for time served for resisting an officer. Coronado appeals. We affirm.

Antoine C. appeals following the summary denial of his modification petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388)[1] in the juvenile dependency case of his daughter, M.C. Antoine contends that the court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on his petition, in which he requested reunification services. Antoine also contends that the delay in establishing his paternity deprived him of the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the case. We affirm.

Steven Allen Koski was charged with one count of grand theft of personal property and ten counts of burglary. Koski pleaded guilty to grand theft and the remaining burglary charges were dismissed. The plea agreement specified that any time served would be concurrent with a separate case against Koski and that the sentence would "stipulate to 3 years local prison." Koski moved for an alternative or "split" sentence under the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011. (Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011–2012, ch. 15, § 1.) After reviewing the change of plea form, the trial court denied the motion finding the parties had stipulated to a three-year prison commitment. It noted, however, that even if it had the discretion to impose a split sentence, it would decline to do so because Koski's criminal history revealed he was not an appropriate candidate for probation monitoring. Specifically, the court noted that the matter involved two separate cases, Koski had been to prison at least once before and the cases involved great monetary loss to the victims.
The court sentenced Koski to three years in county jail, concurrent with his other case. The trial court imposed several fines and fees and gave Koski credit for time served.

After we filed an opinion in a prior appeal in this case (P.O.P. Enterprises, Inc. v. Lively (Feb. 25, 2010, D051710) [nonpub. opn.] 2010 Cal.App.Unpub. Lexis 1365 (P.O.P. I)), the original defendant in this action, Riley J. Lively (Riley), died. Upon issuance of the remittitur, respondents John S. Lively and Onie O. Lively, Riley's son and wife, filed a motion in the trial court to continue the action as Riley's personal representatives, and a motion to dismiss the action. The trial court granted both motions. A few weeks later, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal. In the ensuing months, the trial court entered several postjudgment orders, including awarding respondents $211,185 in attorney fees, amending the judgment to name Phillip O. Paccione as the alter ego of P.O.P. Enterprises, Inc. (P.O.P.) (collectively appellants), and denying appellants' motion to vacate the judgment.
Appellants appealed the trial court's order denying their motion to vacate the judgment and Paccione appealed the order amending the judgment.[1] On appeal, appellants contend that the underlying judgment, and all subsequent orders made after the entry of that judgment, are void because John and Onie Lively filed their motion to dismiss prior to becoming parties to the case. Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in amending the judgment to include Paccione as P.O.P.'s alter ego.
We conclude that the underlying judgment is not void, and that this conclusion mandates that we dismiss appellants' appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion to vacate the judgment. We further conclude that the court did not err in amending the judgment to include Paccione as a judgment debtor.

The juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that minor W.E. took part in a robbery, and then declared him a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) The court placed the minor on probation at home, but also set a maximum term of confinement of five years. Minor contends the maximum term of confinement may not be imposed because he was placed on probation and was not removed from parental custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (c) [court must specify maximum term of confinement when minor is removed from parental custody].) He asks that we modify the juvenile court’s order to delete the term of confinement. Respondent contends we need do nothing because the term of confinement was erroneous and has no legal effect. However, as this court has already held, the reference to a term of confinement should be stricken under these circumstances. (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541.) We shall do so here.

The mother in this juvenile dependency proceeding seeks reversal of all jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders, contending the evidence was insufficient to permit a finding that her 17-year-old daughter, Y.A., was at substantial risk of suffering “serious physical harm or illness,” as a result of mother’s failure or inability “to adequately supervise or protect the child,” or by mother’s “negligent failure . . . to provide the child with adequate . . . medical treatment . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b).)[1] We affirm the orders.

Defendant and appellant Clayton Garnett was charged in 2012 with one count of kidnapping to commit another crime, specifically a sex crime (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1))[1], one count of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), and one count of sodomy by use of force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)). It was specially alleged as to counts 2 and 3 that defendant kidnapped the victim and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in the commission of the rape and sodomy within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivisions (a) through (d).

Jose Pequeno appeals from the judgment entered after he was convicted of attempted murder, possession of a firearm by a minor, assault with a firearm, and shooting at an occupied vehicle. We reject his contentions that the trial court erred by denying his motion to either release juror contact information or conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding juror misconduct. We also reject his contentions that the trial court erred by admitting certain gang evidence and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore affirm the judgment.