CA Unpub Decisions

M.L. (mother) seeks writ relief (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452)[1] from the juvenile court’s order, made at the 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)), terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to consider selection and implementation of a permanent plan for her son J.L. (son) (born 1999). She challenges the juvenile court’s conclusion that she was provided reasonable services and order terminating visitation. We reject the challenges and deny the petition.

Defendant Berry Williams Barrera Bahena pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation. The court later terminated probation, imposed a 16-month sentence, and granted defendant 43 days of presentence custody credit and an additional 20 of conduct credit. On appeal, defendant claims he was entitled to an additional 23 days of conduct credit.
We agree and modify the judgment to reflect the additional credit.

Defendant James Allen O’Day appeals the Superior Court’s order extending his civil commitment pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b).[1] On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred by failing to: (1) personally advise defendant of his statutory right to a jury trial; and (2) obtain defendant’s personal waiver of that right. Defendant contends these errors were prejudicial because it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred if the extension proceeding took place before a jury. For the reasons stated here, we will affirm the trial court’s order extending defendant’s commitment.

Defendant Dennis Malcolm Allison pled no contest to a charge of failing to register as a sex offender. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to additional credit for presentence confinement by virtue of amendments to the governing statute which took effect on October 1, 2011, 30 days before defendant was sentenced. He contends that despite the statute’s declaration that it applies to crimes occurring after its effective date, it must be construed to apply to all confinement occurring after that date, whenever the underlying crime occurred. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the trial court overstated defendant’s credits by including time during which defendant was at large on his own recognizance. We reject both contentions and affirm the judgment.

Parents Sheila M. (Mother) and Fernando L. (Father) appeal from the judgment terminating their parental rights to Aaron L. and Leah L. Mother’s primary contention is that the court erred by failing to apply the sibling bond exception to adoption as the preferred disposition when parents are unable to reunify with their children, and also argues the court abused its discretion by refusing to order the children placed with family members who were interested in adoption, rather than with strangers. Father’s primary argument is that the court abused its discretion in denying his petitions for reinstatement of services and for an order placing the children with family members. Both Mother and Father join in each other’s arguments.
We affirm the judgment.

We appointed counsel to represent Shawn G. on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against her client but advised the court no issues were found to argue on his behalf. We gave Shawn 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from him.

Jose Manuel Lopez appeals from an order denying his petition made under Penal Code section 851.8, to seal and destroy records and to find him factually innocent. The decision made by the trial court was based on conflicting evidence. It is the trial court’s duty, not ours, to decide credibility issues. We therefore affirm the order.
Defendant admittedly engaged in a sexual encounter with a woman he had picked up at a bus stop. He claimed it was consensual; she denied consent. The trial court reviewed extensive documentation, permitted defendant, who appeared in pro. per., to give an extensive unsworn statement, heard testimony of defendant’s brother, and thereafter ruled “there is reasonable cause that you were arrested and reasonable cause that you are not factually innocent in the matter. So your motion is denied.” The fact the district attorney declined to prosecute him does not establish his factual innocence.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Dwain Johnson of a single count of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c).) He was sentenced to a prison term of three years.
On appeal, defendant contends the court prejudicially erred by admitting testimony of an out-of-court identification by the robbery victim. The victim picked defendant out of a six-person photographic lineup, but said she could only “estimate” defendant was the robber, as the victim never got a clear look at defendant’s face. Finding neither error nor prejudice, we affirm.

After a jury found defendant Dougal Samuels to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.; all statutory references are to this code), the trial court ordered defendant committed to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health for an indeterminate term. Defendant challenges the denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss the petition and claims his commitment under the current SVPA violates his constitutional rights. He also has moved for judicial notice of the statement of decision issued by the superior court in People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325. We deny defendant’s motion and, finding no error, affirm the judgment.

The mother of C.C. challenges the decision of the juvenile court to terminate reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] She contends that there was not sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that returning her daughter to her custody would create a substantial risk of harm to the child. We disagree and so we deny the petition.

District Attorney (DA) investigators detained defendant, Carlos Frankie Sauceda, Jr., and another man at night in a parking lot in a high-crime neighborhood. Defendant admitted that he was on parole. The investigators searched defendant and found a gun in his pocket. The People appeal from the superior court’s order setting aside the information under Penal Code section 995[1] after it found the magistrate erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the detention. As discussed below, we find the detention to be unconstitutional and affirm the superior court’s ruling.

Defendant Elizabeth Lucille Warren woke up, still drunk from the night before, and found her infant son Jared dying or dead. According to an expert forensic pathologist, the pattern of redness on the baby’s body indicated that something heavy was compressing it when he died. Had the pathologist known that an intoxicated adult was sleeping in the same bed with the baby, he would have concluded that the baby died because the adult lay on him, and he was unable to breathe. Defendant insisted, however, that she had put the baby to sleep in a reclining stroller.
A jury found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)) and felony child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), with an enhancement for causing harm resulting in death (Pen. Code, § 12022.95). As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total of eight years in prison, along with the usual fines and fees.
Defendant’s sole appellate contention is that there was insufficient evidence that she caused the death of her son. Defendant’s adult daughter, however, testified that defendant habitually slept in the same bed with her infant children. This, along with the pathologist’s testimony, plus other evidence showing defendant’s consciousness of guilt, constituted sufficient evidence that defendant caused the baby’s death.

Michelle R. appeals juvenile court orders made at a six-month review hearing and Welfare and Institutions Code,[1] section 388 hearing concerning her children, Joey H. and Kylie H. She contends insufficient evidence supports the court's finding that she was provided reasonable reunification services; the court abused its discretion by granting a 388, subdivision (c) petition by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) to terminate her reunification services; and the court abused its discretion and violated her due process rights by denying her request for a continuance of the hearing. We affirm the orders.

Andrew Dang Warren appeals an order involuntarily committing him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the California Department of Mental Health (DMH) after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the amended Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 6600 et seq. Warren contends the order must be reversed because (1) the court erroneously denied him an opportunity to question the prosecution's psychological experts in order to reveal their bias because they overdiagnosed SVP's; (2) the court erroneously refused to instruct the jury with a pinpoint instruction modifying CALCRIM No. 3454; (3) the SVPA violates state and federal due process guarantees by imposing an indeterminate term on SVP's and requiring them to prove they no longer qualify as SVP's; (4) the SVPA violates equal protection guarantees under the state and federal Constitutions; and (5) the SVPA violates ex post facto and double jeopardy state and federal constitutional prohibitions. We affirm the order of commitment.