CA Unpub Decisions

James Karty sued his employer, Richard DePhilippis, seeking to recover for a burn injury sustained while Karty was at work. After Karty presented his case to a jury, DePhilippis moved for a nonsuit on the basis that Karty's tort action was barred by the exclusive workers' compensation remedy. (See Lab. Code,[1] § 3600.) The trial court agreed and granted the motion. Karty appeals. We affirm.

In November 2011, defendant Earl Robert Backman argued with his nephew about the possible theft of a car belonging to defendant’s father. Defendant retrieved a shotgun and fired it at the nephew, striking him in the leg.[1]

Mother’s live-in girlfriend, L.L., was determined to be a presumed parent[1] under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d) (undesignated statutory references are to this code). Mother’s husband, F.C., was later determined to be a presumed parent under section 7611, subdivision (a). Faced with competing parentage presumptions, a contested hearing was held, after which the juvenile court determined “the weightier considerations of policy and logic lean in favor of” declaring F.C. the presumed parent. L.L. appeals this order, contending (1) since F.C. and mother had been separated for several years prior to the minor’s birth, the juvenile court erred in finding the presumption under section 7611, subdivision (a) applied to F.C.; and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding F.C. was the presumed parent. We find the propriety of F.C. being declared a presumed parent was forfeited by L.L.’s failure to raise her objection in the juvenile court. Moreover, even if the claim were not forfeited, following the plain language of the statute, the court properly applied it to F.C. Lastly, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s weighing of the considerations underlying the parentage presumptions. Finding no error, we shall affirm the order of the juvenile court.

Following his guilty pleas in these two cases, defendant Bryan Paul McLain was granted five years of probation. At that time, the trial court imposed in each case a $200 restitution fund fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)),[1] and a stayed $200 probation revocation fine (§ 1202.44). Later, upon probation being revoked, the trial court imposed an $800 restitution fine in case No. 07NCR04820. Defendant appeals the imposition of this second restitution fine as an unauthorized sentence. We agree with defendant and shall amend the judgment.

As John Huston’s character in the film Chinatown (Paramount Pictures 1974) observed: “Either you bring the water to L.A. or you bring L.A. to the water.” Water means growth; growth necessitates access to water. The pull between this thirst for water and its limited supply has resulted in a tsunami of litigation over the distribution of this precious resource among competing interests. This is our second foray into a deep well of litigation between various entities over water, the commodity sometimes referred to as the “oil of the 21st century.”[1]
Real parties in interest Imperial Irrigation District (Imperial) and San Diego County Water Authority (San Diego) sought to enter into an agreement to transfer 300,000 acre feet of water per year (afy) from Imperial to San Diego. Ultimately, the parties agreed to transfer 200,000 afy and conserve 100,000 afy for possible future acquisition by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (Metropolitan) and Coachella Valley Water District (Coachella).

The mother, Irene R., appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning her two children, S.R. and B.R., who are 16 and 10 years old respectively. The Department of Children and Family Services (the department) argues we should remand the case to permit compliance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act as to B.R.. (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.) We reject the mother’s contentions and agree with the department.

The minor, Jonathan S., appeals from a wardship order based upon a finding he committed an assault by means of force likely to inflict great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) We affirm the wardship order.
First, the minor contends the evidence was insufficient because he acted in self-defense. This contention has no merit. We review this contention for substantial evidence. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318; In Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.) The minor and several friends precipitated an incident which resulted in a bottle of water being thrown on a high school gym floor. The minor’s skateboard was taken from him. This was because the minor was threatening to strike another minor with the skateboard. The victim began walking towards the high school gym. The minor approached the victim from behind. The victim was placed in a “naked choke hold” for “about 20 seconds. The choking continued until a band instructor physically removed the minor’s hands from the victim’s throat. The victim was having a “lot of trouble” breathing. Neither the minor nor any other person was in jeopardy when the victim was choked. This constitutes substantial evidence the minor was not in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury. This supports the juvenile court’s rejection of the minor’s self-defense contention. (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064; People v. Lee (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1427.)

Defendant and appellant, Tana Colonial Daniels, appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of the willful infliction of corporal injury on a “spouse/cohabitant/child’s parent” (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))[1] and his admission he previously had been convicted of a serious and violent felony, assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), within the meaning of section 1170, subdivision (a)(3) and the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Daniels to four years in state prison. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Robert Lamar Warnock (defendant) appeals from a judgment entered upon a plea of no contest to second degree robbery. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. On February 14, 2013, we notified defendant of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file a supplemental brief. Defendant has filed a supplemental brief in which he contends that his sentence contained an unauthorized enhancement and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Upon reviewing the entire record, we have determined that we lack jurisdiction and thus we dismiss the appeal.

Appellants Mark and Anna Didak appeal from the judgment entered upon the trial court’s order sustaining respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend. On October 13, 2011, appellants filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. (“MLMI”), HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. (“HSBC”), Merrill Lynch Investors Trust, purportedly a real estate mortgage investment conduit (“REMIC”), Merrill Lynch Mortgage Lending, Inc. (“MLML”), Citimortgage, Inc. (“Citi”), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Stewart Title of California, Inc., and Cal-Western Reconveyance Corporation (collectively, “respondents”). Appellants’ FAC alleged claims for fraud, quiet title, cancellation of deed of trust, declaratory relief, and wrongful credit reporting. Appellants also sought a temporary restraining order, a temporary injunction, and a permanent injunction against respondents.
Here appellants argue that respondents lack authority to service their mortgage.[1] Primarily, appellants allege respondents never received legal title to their mortgage due to a failed securitization of the mortgage under the governing pooling and servicing agreement (“PSA”). For the reasons set forth below, the trial court’s order sustaining respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend is affirmed.

Appellant Sean Laverty appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on count 3 – possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), count 4 – transportation of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)), count 5 – possession of hydrocone for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), count 6 – possession of oxycodone for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), and count 7 – possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), with court findings that he had suffered prior felony narcotics convictions (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a)) and prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for 10 years. We modify the judgment and, as modified, affirm it with directions.

Plaintiff and Appellant Erin Beaumont-Jacques (Appellant) sued various entities. After demurrers below, the remaining defendants are five affiliated insurers (Signatory Defendants) and Farmers Group, Inc. (collectively, Respondents).
This appeal challenges the granting of Respondents’ motion for summary judgment. Appellant claims the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that she was an independent contractor, and that she presented no triable issues of fact regarding her causes of action. Appellant also claims that her district manager classification was a “scheme” to avoid tax and Labor Code obligations.

Sergio C. appeals from a judgment declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. We affirm the judgment.

Ahmadi Mehdi appeals from the issuance of a restraining order against him. Because Mehdi failed to provide this court with a record sufficient to review this matter, we affirm.