CA Unpub Decisions

The primary issue in this case is the intersection of the civil harassment statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, and the anti-SLAPP statute, section 425.16. Respondent C.S. filed requests for civil harassment restraining orders under section 527.6 against appellants R.M. and J.M. The requests alleged several instances of harassment including the filing of a false complaint about her dogs with animal control. After the trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), appellants filed a section 425.16 motion to strike, asserting the anti-SLAPP statute applied due to the allegation regarding the complaint to animal control. The trial court denied the motion and, without a hearing, granted a protective order for two years.
Appellants contend the trial court erred in denying the motion to strike and extending the TRO without an additional hearing.

In August 2018, plaintiff Kristin Berkery began providing services as an independent contractor to defendant Visit Elk Grove (VEG), pursuant to a written contract signed by Berkery and defendant John Joseph Thompson (VEG’s executive director at the time). Over the next few months, Berkery rejected Thompson’s romantic advances. Berkery later sued defendants, raising claims of sexual harassment (Civ. Code, § 51.9) and failure to prevent sexual harassment (Gov. Code, § 12940), among other claims.
Civil Code section 51.9 addresses sexual harassment in relationships often arising outside of workplace environments. The statute provides a nonexclusive list of providers of professional services in connection with which sexual harassment may exist, including physicians, attorneys, and teachers. The statute also contemplates liability for sexual harassment in a “relationship that is substantially similar to” those listed.

A jury convicted defendant Patrick Andrew Tenerelli of contracting without a license in a declared disaster area in violation of Business and Professions Code section 7028.16. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years eight months in state prison.
Defendant now contends (1) the trial court should have instructed the jury that under section 7053, an employee does not need a contractor’s license, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the instruction actually given and failing to request an instruction on section 7053; (2) the trial court erred in excluding evidence that defendant said he was not a licensed contractor; and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 358 [evidence of defendant’s statements].
Finding no merit in defendant’s contentions, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Rana Sadhra of stalking, vandalism, and contempt of court, and found true a prior prison term enhancement. Defendant appeals the judgment, contending the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by summarily denying his timely motion to represent himself at trial. In the alternative, defendant argues that if his motion was untimely the trial court erred by denying the motion without engaging in analysis of the factors required by People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 (Windham). Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.

In 2017, a jury convicted defendants Jose Orlando Luna, Felix Ruben Ayala (born in 1971), and Felix Ruben Ayala (born in 1979) of conspiracy to commit robbery on four separate dates in October 2015 (counts 2, 7, 21, 32) and additional charges related to each conspiracy:
With respect to their October 4, 2015 conspiracy (count 2), defendants were also convicted of the murder of Bradley (count 1), robbery in concert of Bradley (count 3), first-degree residential burglary (count 4), assault with a firearm on Bradley (count 5), and false imprisonment by violence of Bradley (count 6).

Shawn Helmuth petitioned the trial court under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhood and Schools Act, for an order reclassifying a conviction for vehicle theft from a felony to a misdemeanor because, the petition alleged, the vehicle was worth less than $950. Based on the fact that there was no evidence in the petition (other than Helmuth’s assertion) about the value of the stolen vehicle and its own guess about the value of the vehicle at the time Helmuth stole it, the trial court denied Helmuth’s petition.
Helmuth contends, and the People agree, that the trial court erred when it denied Helmuth’s petition without allowing Helmuth to produce evidence regarding the value of the vehicle. We agree, and will reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from the denial of appellant Kirell Francis Taylor’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. In 2001, appellant was convicted of nine substantive offenses, including one count of special circumstance murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1), the only offense at issue in this appeal. As to that count, the jury found true that the murder was committed in the commission of burglary, robbery, carjacking, and kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).
In 2002, this court modified appellant’s sentence and affirmed his conviction in all other respects. (See People v. Taylor (Aug. 29, 2002, B153903) [nonpub. opn.] (Taylor I)).

Appellant Peter C. Chung rented a piece of commercial property from respondent 1412 Alameda, LLC (Alameda). Seven months into the lease, Alameda sued Chung for breaching the lease. At Alameda’s request, the trial court eventually dismissed the original complaint against Chung without prejudice. Alameda then quickly filed an amended complaint seeking approximately $100,000 in back rent and repair costs. When Chung did not timely respond to the amended pleading, the trial court issued a default judgment against him.
Chung argues that the trial court’s default judgment is void. Despite having had ample time and opportunity to file a response, Alameda has failed to submit any appellate papers and is now unrepresented by counsel. We will therefore resolve the matter based solely on Chung’s arguments and the record presented.

The People appeal a trial court order finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to decide alleged probation violations by defendant Joel Robert Hart. Hart was convicted of violating Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a) and was placed on probation for five years.
We conclude, among other things, that the retroactive application of Assembly Bill No. 1950 (Assem. Bill No. 1950) that shortened probation terms does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to decide whether Hart committed probation violations occurring during the period when he was on probation. We reverse.

Appellant Andrea Neal and respondent Stephen Proulx divorced in 2018. Their judgment of dissolution provided for joint physical and legal custody of their son. A dispute arose over where they would enroll him in kindergarten for the 2020-2021 academic year. Proulx requested an order from the trial court selecting a school near his house in Goleta; Neal requested a school near her house in Ojai. Both presented modified custody schedules attempting to split custodial time fairly. The dispute culminated in a four-day evidentiary hearing, after which the court selected the Goleta school and adopted Proulx’s proposed custody schedule. Neal appeals the decision’s new custody schedule as well as a subsequent order denying her requests for attorney’s fees and increased child support.
We affirm the judgment in full.

This is the second appeal by plaintiff BFCAP Investments, LLC (BFCAP) arising out of a contractual dispute over the sale of a nursing facility. We previously affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the sellers, defendants and respondents Lifehouse Parkview Properties, LLC (PropCo) and Lifehouse Parkview Operations, LLC (OpCo).
On remand, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for attorney fees, finding that defendants were the prevailing parties and therefore entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to the applicable contract. BFCAP appeals that fee award. It argues that the trial court erred in finding the contractual fee provision applied to the litigation here. We agree and therefore reverse the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion.

Canyon Vineyard Estates I, LLC (CVE) appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Mountains Restoration Trust (MRT), John Paul DeJoria, the County of Los Angeles, and the California State Attorney General. CVE also appeals from an injunction in favor of MRT and from an award of attorney fees and costs in favor of MRT and the Attorney General.
This case concerns over 400 acres of undeveloped land along the Pacific coastline in Malibu. The trial court, in a ruling challenged on appeal by CVE, determined that the land is subject to a conservation easement that prohibits development. The trial court enjoined CVE from violating the easement.
We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the property is subject to a valid conservation easement and therefore affirm the judgment.

Appellant Farahnaz Shaham brought this action against respondent Judith Douglas for injuries allegedly caused by Douglas’s dog during an incident in August 2016. After the case proceeded to trial on theories of negligence and strict liability, the jury returned a defense verdict, finding, inter alia, that Douglas’s dog did not cause Shaham injury. On appeal from the judgment entered on the verdict, Shaham contends: (1) the superior court (Judge Jon R. Takasugi) abused its discretion in denying her ex parte application to reopen discovery after the discovery cut-off date; (2) the trial court (Judge Cary H. Nishimoto) erred in excluding the proffered testimony of her expert and treating physician about his most recent, midtrial examination of Shaham, on the ground that the testimony exceeded the scope of his deposition testimony; (3) the court erred in failing to deliver strict liability instructions premised on Civil Code section 3342 and Beverly Hills Municipal Code section 5-2-111

In 2001, a jury convicted Paul Devlin of attempted murder, residential robbery, criminal threats, and unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, and the trial court found he had committed two prior serious or violent felonies. He was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. On February 13, 2019, Devlin filed a petition in the superior court for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, which offers resentencing to those convicted of murder under specified theories, and requested the appointment of counsel. The trial court summarily denied the petition without appointing counsel, finding Devlin was ineligible for relief because he had been convicted of attempted murder, not murder.
We affirmed the court’s order.