CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found Gustavo Soto Quinonez guilty of making criminal threats (Pen. Code,[1] § 422) while armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) (count 2). The jury deadlocked on a charge of burglary (§ 459) (count 1), and the court declared a mistrial on that count. The court sentenced Quinonez to prison for four years four months: the 16-month lower term for the substantive offense; the three-year lower term for personal firearm use; and a stayed term for the remaining enhancement (§ 654). Quinonez appeals, contending the finding he personally used a firearm is unsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Appellants Victor Cauzza and Julie Cauzza appeal from a summary judgment in favor of respondent Julian Union High School District (District) on the Cauzzas' second amended cross-complaint for equitable indemnity filed after the Cauzzas were sued by a Julian High School student for personal injuries occurring on their property, where they were storing a junior class homecoming float. The Cauzzas also appeal from a postjudgment order awarding District costs as the prevailing party. The Cauzzas contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) they demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to whether they had recoverable indemnity damages, namely the potential recovery of attorney fees from District under Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 1021.6; and (2) triable issues of fact exist as to whether District is entitled to immunity from liability under Education Code section 44808. They further contend the trial court erred by ruling it was without discretion to deny District costs as the prevailing party under section 1032, subdivision (a).
We conclude District demonstrated its entitlement to summary judgment and the Cauzzas did not present evidence raising a triable issue of material fact for a jury. We further conclude the trial court did not err in awarding District costs as the prevailing party under section 1032. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and postjudgment order.

On August 9, 2010, a complaint was filed charging defendant Robert Alan Bacon with possession of methamphetamine. Defendant pled no contest. The trial court placed defendant on three years of formal probation under Proposition 36 and imposed various fees and fines.
According to the probation report, a law enforcement officer conducting a probation search of defendant on July 3, 2010, found 0.30 grams of methamphetamine in a bindle in defendant’s right front pocket, along with paraphernalia commonly used in injecting methamphetamine.

Appointed counsel for defendant Christopher Walter Gaugush asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We will modify the judgment to include a parole revocation fine of $240 in each of the matters from which defendant has appealed. Finding no other arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Benjamin Emmanuel McBride of two counts of receiving a stolen vehicle (counts 1 & 2; "Pen. Code" Pen. Code,[1] "§ 496d" § 496d). The offense charged in count 1 occurred on or about December 8, 2011; the offense charged in count 2 occurred on or about January 18, 2012.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that defendant had incurred one strike ( "§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12" §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and one prior prison term ( "§ 667.5, subd. (b)" § 667.5, subd. (b)).

Appointed counsel for defendant James Allen West has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal.[1] ( "People v. Wende (1979)25 Cal.3d 436" People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Diana L. Ramirez appeals following the revocation and termination of her probation. On appeal, defendant contends she is entitled to presentence custody credit for time she spent in custody as drug court sanctions, because her waiver of such custody credit was not knowing and intelligent. We disagree and shall affirm the judgment.

Does insight into one’s past actions require a complete understanding of those actions, or is remorse and regret over the results of those actions enough? In this case we consider just such a conundrum. In November 1983 22-year-old defendant Chris Fowler beat 22-month-old Aaron Miller to death. Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to 15 years to life with a minimum eligible parole date of December 23, 1993. On November 8, 2010, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) found defendant suitable for parole. However, the Governor reversed the Board’s decision, concluding that if released, defendant would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, which the court denied.
Subsequently, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court and we issued an order to show cause. Defendant contends there is no evidence supporting the Governor’s stated reasons for reversing the grant of parole. Cognizant of the rule that the Governor’s decision need only be supported by a “modicum” of evidence, we nonetheless conclude the Governor’s decision is not supported by evidence that defendant will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

Appointed counsel for defendant Joseph James Reyes asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

A jury convicted defendant Russell Alexander Buchanan of second degree robbery and found that he personally used a firearm during the offense. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found a prior prison term allegation to be true. The court sentenced defendant to state prison.
Defendant appeals. He contends the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting his confession into evidence, requiring reversal. We find no error and will affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Petitioner Angela D. (mother) seeks extraordinary writ review (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) of the juvenile court's February 19, 2013 order, terminating mother’s reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] permanency planning hearing as to her children, Daisy M., Destiny G., Danielle O., and Dominic O. Mother contends that the court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, title 25 of the United States Code section 1912(d) (ICWA), because it did not require the Santa Barbara County Child Welfare Services (CWS) to make adequate inquiry regarding the children’s Indian Ancestry; it did not comply with every rule concerning certain forms; and it failed to obtain further information concerning the claimed paternity status of the alleged father of Danielle and Dominic. We deny the petition.

An amended information filed August 15, 2012, charged Bradley with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] and criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)) and with allegations of priors. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) A jury found Bradley guilty of criminal threats. It found him not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of simple assault, in violation of section 240. Bradley waived his constitutional rights to both a jury and a court trial on his priors and admitted them as true.
On September 18, 2012, Bradley was sentenced to 11 years in state prison after the trial court denied his Romero[2] motion and his motion to reduce his criminal threats conviction to a misdemeanor. (§ 17, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court selected the upper term of three years as to the criminal threats conviction, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes Law, and imposed an additional five years pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). It struck the section 667.5, subdivision (b), priors. As to the misdemeanor assault, Bradley was sentenced to time served. He received credit of 123 days in custody and 123 days for work time, for a total of 246 days custody credit.
Timely notice of appeal was filed September 18, 2012.

Defendant Larry D. Hewitt pled no contest to carrying a dirk or dagger that was concealed upon his person and to having a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. (Pen. Code, §§ 21310, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) He filed a notice of appeal challenging the denial of his suppression motion (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) and his sentence. We affirm.