CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Robert Rufus Thomas appeals from a conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant contends that he informed the trial court that he desired substitution of counsel, and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). We conclude that a Marsden hearing was not required, and we accordingly will affirm the judgment.

J.H. (mother) appealed from a February 2013 juvenile court order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her 16-month-old daughter, S.[1] This court previously upheld the juvenile court’s decision to remove S. from parental custody, deny mother reunification services, and set the termination hearing. (J.H. v. Superior Court (Jan. 15, 2013, F065695 [nonpub. opn.].)
After reviewing the entire record, mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court he could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. Counsel requested and this court granted leave for mother to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error did exist. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Mother has now submitted a letter asking that S. either be placed with her or with mother’s family. Mother’s letter neither addresses the termination proceedings nor sets forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error at the termination hearing does exist. (In re Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.)

In 2009, appellants Steven Simon, Michael Kallok, and Alexey Terskikh filed a putative class action on behalf of themselves and the other common shareholders of respondent Reliant Technologies, Inc. (RTI). They alleged that the defendants, including RTI and certain of the company’s officers and directors (respondents Eric Stang, president; Len DeBenedictis, chief technology officer; and Hank Gauthier, director), had unlawfully entered into a merger agreement with Thermage, Inc. (Thermage) that was not in the best interest of RTI’s common shareholders.

Defendant Robert Rufus Thomas appeals from a conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant contends that he informed the trial court that he desired substitution of counsel, and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). We conclude that a Marsden hearing was not required, and we accordingly will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Brent Melton Collier appeals from a trial court order extending his involuntary commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). He argues the order must be reversed because an expert witness testified regarding the content of inadmissible hearsay documents when opining that defendant was unsuitable for release from Patton State Hospital (Patton). Defendant alternatively argues the trial court erred in refusing placement in an outpatient treatment program. We will affirm.

In 2009, appellants Steven Simon, Michael Kallok, and Alexey Terskikh filed a putative class action on behalf of themselves and the other common shareholders of respondent Reliant Technologies, Inc. (RTI). They alleged that the defendants, including RTI and certain of the company’s officers and directors (respondents Eric Stang, president; Len DeBenedictis, chief technology officer; and Hank Gauthier, director), had unlawfully entered into a merger agreement with Thermage, Inc. (Thermage) that was not in the best interest of RTI’s common shareholders.

Defendant Eliseo Barajas was convicted of infliction of corporal injury on the mother of his children. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court’s calculation of the restitution fine violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws, and he therefore requests that we reduce the restitution fine and the corresponding parole revocation fine. As set forth below, we will modify the restitution and parole revocation fines and affirm the judgment as modified.

Thomas Gribovszki, proceeding in pro per, appeals a judgment entered following the trial court’s denial of his motion for leave to amend and dismissal of his complaint against defendant Stanford University (Stanford) with prejudice.

Defendant Raymond Jerome Walker was sentenced to prison after a jury found him guilty of simple possession of cocaine base and transportation of cocaine base. On appeal he contends that the trial court erred in denying Proposition 36 treatment based upon a refusal to find that defendant did not possess the cocaine for personal use. Defendant contends in effect that such a finding was compelled by his acquittal on charges of possession for sale. We reject the contention, and will affirm.

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress (Pen. Code, § 1538.5)[1], defendant Tony Adam Gonzalez pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted having served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court struck the prior prison term allegations and sentenced defendant to a 16-month prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue meritorious grounds for the motion to suppress; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing a booking fee pursuant to Government Code section 29550.1 without finding that he had the ability to pay.
We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Devon John Farber appeals after a jury convicted him of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))[1] and found that he personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances of domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). After finding that defendant had a prior felony conviction that qualified as a strike (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and that he had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), the trial court imposed a seven-year prison sentence.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and the great bodily injury enhancement; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct during argument to the jury; and (3) the trial court erred by staying, rather than striking, the prior prison term enhancement.
For reasons explained below, we reject defendant’s challenges to his conviction and the great bodily injury enhancement. However, we will reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for sentencing proceedings on the prior prison term enhancement, which was improperly stayed.

A jury convicted Roberto Duarte, Jr., of discharging a firearm with gross negligence (count 1-Pen. Code, § 246.3, subd. (a)),[1] being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 2-§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), street terrorism (count 3-§ 186.22, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor brandishing a firearm (count 4-§ 417, subd. (a)(2)(A)). Additionally, the jury found true he committed two of the felonies for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and he had previously suffered a strike and a serious felony prior (§§ 667, subds. (a), (d) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)(1)). The trial court denied Duarte’s new trial motion and sentenced him to a total term of 15 years, four months in state prison.

Jessica J., mother, appeals from the juvenile court’s orders pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her parental rights to Chloe J. and Phillip J.[1] Mother argues that the Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (agency) failed to make a proper inquiry of her children’s Indian ancestry pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We reject mother’s contention and affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

A jury convicted appellant/defendant Erick Joel Head (defendant) of multiple crimes after he crashed his vehicle while evading police, killing three people. Defendant seeks reversal of his felony evasion convictions. He contends that no substantial evidence supported a common element of those offenses: that the pursuing peace officer’s vehicle exhibits “at least one lighted red lamp.” (See Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a)(1), bold print and italics added. See also Veh. Code, §§ 2800.3, subd. (b) [referring to § 2800.1] & 2800.2, subd. (a) [referring to § 2800.1].) Respondent concedes that the felony evasion convictions (counts IV, V, VI, and VII) must be reversed. We agree.[1]