CA Unpub Decisions

Qui tam plaintiff Greg Sounhein appeals from a defense judgment on his False Claims Act cause of action ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 26 s GYOFAP000001 xpl 1 l "Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq." Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq.)[1] after the granting of a motion for judgment in a nonjury trial ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 24 s GYOFAP000002 xpl 1 l "Code Civ. Proc., § 631.8" Code Civ. Proc., § 631.8). The trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 36 s GYOFAP000029 l "section 12652, subdivision (d)(3)(A)" section 12652, former subdivision (d)(3)(A), which stated in pertinent part that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this article based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in an investigation, report, hearing, or audit conducted by or at the request of the Senate, Assembly, auditor, or governing body of a political subdivision, or by the news media, unless . . . the action is an original source of the information.”[2] Sounhein contends the trial court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction because there was no public disclosure, and even if there was, the disclosure was not made in any of the statutorily enumerated forums, and in any event, he was the original source of the information.

Defendant and appellant Philip Jenkins (defendant) appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for recall of sentence made pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126.[1] On appeal, appointed counsel for defendant filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting that this court conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any issues which if resolved in defendant’s favor would require reversal or modification of the judgment. On May 17, 2013, we gave notice to defendant that his counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and that defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. Defendant did not file a response brief or letter. After independently reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment.

Eric W. Miffin appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on three counts of residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and one count of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).)[1] On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the receiving stolen property count. He also contends the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of his ability to pay attorney fees. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the stolen property count and that appellant forfeited his challenge to the imposition of attorney fees by failing to object in the trial court. We therefore affirm.

Defendant and appellant Adrian P. Sanchez (defendant) was convicted of
two counts of a lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)[1]), kidnapping (§ 207, sub. (a)), unlawful sexual intercourse (§ 261.5, subd. (d)), aggravated sexual assault of a child (rape) (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)), sodomy in violation of (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(c)), and sexual penetration upon a child (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(C)(5)). On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 1111, 1000, 1030 and 1045; denied his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial by refusing his request for a pinpoint instruction on his propensity to act in a certain manner; and denied his constitutional due process rights by denying his motion for a new trial because law enforcement officers interfered with defense efforts to contact witnesses before trial. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

An information, filed on April 6, 2011, charged Manuel J. Castanon with one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] and specially alleged that he had used a firearm while committing the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The information also specially alleged that Castanon (1) had a prior conviction for assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) that qualified as a strike under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and subjected him to a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1); and (2) had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The jury found Castanon guilty of second degree robbery. It found not true the special allegation of firearm use. In a bifurcated proceeding, Castanon admitted that he had a prior conviction for assault with a firearm for purposes of sentencing under the Three Strikes law, section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Castanon to a state prison term of 11 years, consisting of the middle term of three years for the second degree robbery, doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus five years for the section 667, subdivision (a)(1), enhancement. The court stayed execution of a one-year term for the section 667.5, subdivision (b), prior prison term.
On appeal, Castanon contends that the trial court’s omission of CALJIC No. 2.90, the standard reasonable doubt instruction, requires reversal of the judgment. We conclude that the court’s failure to define reasonable doubt for the jury, which amounts to state law error, was not harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. We thus reverse the judgment.

Petitioner Jose G. (Jose) is the father of minor J.P., who was removed from the care of mother Michelle P. (Michelle) due to neglect. Jose, who was not married to Michelle and never had custody of his son, sought to have J.P. placed in his care. The juvenile court ordered the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) to provide reunification services to Jose. After over two years of services, the Bureau recommended that J.P. be placed with his father under a family maintenance plan. On April 11, 2013, rejecting the Bureau’s recommendation, the juvenile court terminated services to Jose, and scheduled a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] to consider a permanent plan and termination of parental rights.
Jose now petitions for extraordinary writ relief. Opposition has been filed on J.P.’s behalf. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that placing J.P. in Jose’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment to J.P.’s safety and well-being. We therefore deny the petition.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction in the Superior Court of San Mateo County following a jury trial. It is authorized pursuant to Penal Code section 1237. Counsel for defendant has reviewed the file in this case and has determined there are no meritorious issues to raise on appeal. She has complied with the relevant case authorities. (People v. Kelley (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) She has also notified defendant of his right to file a supplemental brief, but defendant has not done so. Upon independent review of the record, we conclude that no arguable issues are presented for review and affirm the judgment.

Pedro N. (appellant), a minor, appeals from a dispositional order committing him to juvenile hall for a period of 180 to 300 days after he admitted to receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) Among other things, we reject appellant’s contention the juvenile court lacked authority to impose an extended commitment to juvenile hall. We affirm the court’s order but remand for specification of the maximum length of confinement and appellant’s custody credits toward that maximum.

Denise H. (mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her son, David H., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mother claims that the Alameda County Social Services Agency (the agency) failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We conclude that any deficiency in the ICWA notice provided to the tribes was harmless error. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating mother’s parental rights.

Appellant Brendan B. was first declared a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in April 2011 and was placed on probation with various conditions, including that he not possess or consume marijuana. Since that time, appellant has violated the terms and conditions of his probation on numerous occasions. The instant appeal stems from the seventh subsequent juvenile petition filed in April 2012, alleging that then 16-year-old appellant violated conditions of his probation (count one), committed burglary (Pen. Code, § 459/460, subd. (b) [count two]), possessed stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a) [count three]), and resisted a probation officer in the course of his duties (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1) [count four]). Appellant admitted to resisting arrest (count four). On May 14, 2012, following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the remaining three counts true. On appeal, appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he committed burglary. We affirm.

Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress, a jury convicted defendant Jesus Garibay Negrete of one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) On appeal, defendant challenges the ruling on his suppression motion. He argues that the evidence implicating him was the product of an unlawful detention. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress, a jury convicted defendant Jesus Garibay Negrete of one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) On appeal, defendant challenges the ruling on his suppression motion. He argues that the evidence implicating him was the product of an unlawful detention. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Paul Westmoreland (appellant) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder, second degree robbery, and second degree burglary. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting his confession and the confession of a codefendant, erred in admitting an autopsy report authored by a nontestifying forensic pathologist, abused its discretion in discharging a juror, and abused its discretion in excluding certain impeachment evidence. We find no prejudicial error.
Procedural Background

In a negotiated disposition, defendant Jorge Rodriguez pleaded no contest to carrying a loaded firearm in a public place (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)(2))[1] and misdemeanor street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) and admitted a special allegation that he knew or reasonably should have known that the firearm was stolen (§ 25850, subd. (c)(2)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on felony probation for three years. On appeal, defendant challenges four of his probation conditions as unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad. We conclude that the “stay-away” condition is impermissibly vague but reject defendant’s other contentions. We reverse the order and remand the case to permit the trial court to clarify the stay-away condition.