CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Neil B. Gibson sued defendant Nick V. Fleming, Jr., for defamation and related causes of action after Fleming posted statements on the Internet asserting that Gibson was involved in financial services fraud, among other things. Fleming filed an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), asking the trial court to strike the complaint because it was directed against statements on an issue of public interest and because Gibson could not show a probability of succeeding on his claims. The court denied the motion, finding that Fleming did not establish that the allegedly defamatory statements concerned an issue of public interest. We agree.
Fleming attempts to show that the statements concerned an issue of public interest by arguing that Gibson was a public figure. Fleming argued that Gibson was a public figure primarily because Gibson claimed on his own websites that he was an international philanthropist and humanitarian. In our view, these claims do not show that he is a public figure as that term is used in the law.
Fleming also attempts to show that Gibson was a public figure by presenting evidence that people other than Fleming had posted statements on the Internet about him. The other statements, however, do not show that Gibson is a public figure. Finally, in his reply brief, Fleming makes for the first time an argument that this case is similar to two cases in which statements of public interest were found to have been made. One involved a warning to consumers about the allegedly dishonest practices of a vendor, the other a report to a group of parents about a youth counselor’s alleged molestation of a child. Since Fleming did not make this argument in the trial court and did not make it on appeal until he filed his reply brief, the argument has been forfeited.
We affirm the trial court’s order.

Appellants, Community Regional Medical Center (CRMC), Clovis Community Medical Center (Clovis Community), Craig Castro, Craig Wagoner, Mason Mathews, R.N., and Gene Kallsen, M.D., challenge the trial court’s denial of their motion to strike the complaint filed by respondent, Gloria Brough-Stevenson, M.D., as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). (Code Civ. Proc.,[1] § 425.16.) Respondent’s causes of action are based on allegedly defamatory statements made by appellants regarding respondent’s performance as an emergency room physician. Appellants contend that the subject statements are entitled to protection under section 425.16 as acts in furtherance of their right of free speech because public health and accessibility of health care are issues of widespread public interest.
The trial court’s ruling was correct. The challenged statements concern a private internal grievance that is only tangentially related to an issue of widespread public interest. Accordingly, the order will be affirmed.

In this matter we have reviewed the petition and the opposition thereto, which we conclude adequately address the issues raised by the petition. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-179; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223, disapproved on another ground in Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 724, fn. 4.)

R.N. (the mother) appeals from an order terminating parental rights to two of her children — M.N., a girl who is now four, and E.N., a boy who is now two.
The children were detained just two months after the mother brought them with her from Alabama to California. The mother therefore contends that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.), a California court did not have jurisdiction to declare the children dependents or to terminate parental rights. Alternatively, the mother also asserts defective compliance with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related federal and state law.
We will hold that the juvenile court had temporary emergency jurisdiction, which, as long as there was no conflicting custody proceeding in any other state, gave it the authority to make final custody determinations. However, we will further hold that the ICWA notice was defective. Hence, we will order a conditional limited remand.

A jury found defendant and appellant Anthony Thomas, guilty of (1) carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (former Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(4) [eff. Jan. 2009]);[1] (2) possessing a device or paraphernalia for injecting or smoking a controlled substance (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a) [eff. Jan. 2005]); and (3) willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer (former Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1) [eff. Jan. 2000]). The trial court found true the allegations that defendant suffered (1) a prior strike conviction (former Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)); and (2) a prior conviction for which he served a prison term (former Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of five years.
Defendant contends (1) substantial evidence does not support his conviction for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger because the weapon was not capable of being readily used; and (2) the trial court miscalculated defendant’s conduct credits (§ 4019). We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Jose Juan Gutierrez, Jr., pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography. (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a), count 1.)[1] A jury subsequently found him guilty of one count of sodomy with a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a), count 2), one count of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b), count 3), and 43 counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a), counts 4-46). As to counts 2 and 3, the jury made the special finding that those crimes occurred on or before the victim’s tenth birthday. A trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in state prison on count 2, a consecutive 15 years to life on count 3, a consecutive eight months on count 1, and a consecutive two-year term on each of the remaining counts (4-46), for a total of 40 years to life, plus a determinate term of 86 years eight months. The court also awarded defendant 1041 days of presentence custody credits (906 actual plus 135 conduct) under section 2933.1.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal. We affirm.

Defendant Eugene Denman targeted nine distressed properties in Riverside County by filing quitclaim deeds transferring title to himself despite having no right of ownership or title in the properties. He also filed homestead declarations for each of the properties making false statements that he was living in them.
Defendant was found guilty of 20 counts of recording false documents and nine counts of perjury. For each property, the jury found true an enhancement that he damaged the property by clouding title and an additional aggravated white collar crime enhancement that the loss for two or more of the nine properties exceeded $500,000.

After a half-day court trial, the trial court ruled that an oral settlement negotiated by the parties was a binding contract. Defendant and appellant Lawrence M. Bonnigson (Lawrence) appeals, contending that there was no binding contract because the parties had only agreed on a settlement amount but had not agreed on the other terms of the settlement agreement, including a hold harmless clause and dismissal of a cross-petition.

Mestler Construction, Inc. (Mestler) appeals following a jury verdict against it in a lawsuit brought by Roger Bielasz and Dena Bielasz (the Bielaszes) finding that Mestler breached contracts to design a residence and to perform building pad preparation work. Mestler contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by denying its motion in limine to exclude evidence of the damages that the Bielaszes suffered as a result of the contractual breaches. As we will explain, we conclude that the trial court was within its discretion to deny the motion in limine and to admit the Bielaszes' evidence of damages. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

L.A., mother of the minors, appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 34 s GTLETC000001 xpl 1 l "Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395" Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)[1] Appellant contends the court and the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 24 s GTLETC000002 xpl 1 l "25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq." 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) Appellant further asserts that the court erred in terminating her parental rights because there was insufficient evidence the minors were likely to be adopted in a reasonable time. We affirm.

Plaintiff Rebecca Dudley sought to recover possession of real property her deceased parents had jointly owned more than 50 years ago. In her second amended complaint, she alleged her father forged a quitclaim deed in 1960 to transfer title to himself in violation of a divorce decree that had awarded the property to her mother, and then in 1966 fraudulently sold the property as his separate property. She asserted that as the sole heir of her mother, she was entitled to the property under the laws of intestate succession.
The trial court sustained for a second time a demurrer filed by the property’s current owners, defendants William and Cathy Faustine, and it did so without granting leave to amend. Appearing before us pro per, plaintiff claims the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. She asserts she pleaded sufficient facts to state a cause of action and that her complaint is not time barred. She also claims the court committed various procedural errors.
We disagree with plaintiff’s contentions and affirm the trial court’s judgment. We conclude she is estopped from recovering on her cause of action by laches.

Minor C.R. appeals from an order granting the probation department’s petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 778[1] to place C.R. in a suitable placement. We appointed appellate counsel to represent her. Appointed counsel filed a brief in which no issues were raised. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) The brief included a declaration from counsel that he reviewed the record and advised C.R. of her right, under Wende, to submit a supplemental brief. C.R. did not file a supplemental brief with this court.

Appellant N.O. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to two of her minor children and finding the children adoptable. Mother argues there is no substantial evidence supporting the court’s determination the children are both generally and specifically adoptable. Mother further contends notice pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was deficient. We conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s order finding the children adoptable and affirm that finding.

Defendant Jesse Enriquez was charged by amended information with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1), and with being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 5). The information also included gang and two prior strike allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (B), § 667, subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subd. (b)).[1] The jury found defendant guilty of both counts and found all special allegations to be true. The trial court denied defendant’s Marsden[2] and Romero[3] motions. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 64 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life for count 1, plus a determinate term of 5 years under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and 5 years under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(B). He received a consecutive term of 25 years to life on count 5, plus an additional four-year term under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A).
Defendant appeals his conviction. We appointed appellate counsel to represent him. Appointed counsel filed a brief in which no issues were raised. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) The brief included a declaration from counsel that counsel reviewed the record and advised defendant of his right, under Wende, to submit a supplemental brief. Defendant did not file a supplemental brief with this court.
The facts are these: On the morning of October 29, 2011, D.A., who was confined to a wheelchair, was retrieving something from the trunk of his Volvo. The Volvo was parked in front of his wife’s grandmother’s home on Carlton Avenue in Pomona. A group of eight or nine young African-American men were gathered across the street. D.A. heard one of the young men say something, and when he looked up, they were all running. D.A. saw a car driving down the street. A gun was sticking out the driver’s side passenger window. The car stopped and two “Mexican” men got out. One of them started shooting towards the group of African-American men. Bullets hit D.A.’s truck, which was parked in front of his Volvo. D.A. was unable to identify defendant in court.