CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Joel Leal Cardoso was convicted by a jury of attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of an assault weapon, and possession of methamphetamine for sale. The jury also found true allegations that the attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate and defendant personally used and discharged a firearm. The trial court imposed an aggregate term of life in prison plus 20 years.
Following the People’s case-in-chief, defendant moved to dismiss the attempted premeditated murder allegation pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.1.[1] Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to show that he acted with premeditation and deliberation. Finding sufficient evidence, the trial court denied the motion.

Defendant and appellant U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank) appeals from an order granting a preliminary injunction (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6)) against U.S. Bank’s foreclosure on deeds of trust securing about $40 million in construction loans made by a predecessor bank, PFF Loan & Trust (PFF), and assumed by U.S. Bank. Plaintiffs and respondents, La Paz Investments (La Paz) and the Maurer Development Co. Money Purchase Pension Plan (the Maurer Plan), are junior lienholders who contend U.S. Bank adversely modified their subordination agreements, causing U.S. Bank to lose its senior priority.
In an action for declaratory relief, La Paz and the Maurer Plan (collectively Maurer) seek permanently to enjoin U.S. Bank from foreclosing on real property in Riverside County and for a declaration that U.S. Bank’s senior deeds of trust on the properties should not maintain priority over Maurer’s junior deeds. In a separate action, U.S. Bank seeks to quiet title and declaratory relief.
After a thorough review of the record, we do not find any material modifications to the subordination agreements which increased the risk of default by Osborne Development Corporation (Osborne), the obligor under U.S. Bank’s construction loans. Based on the record before us, U.S. Bank is entitled to maintain its senior priority over any subordinated junior lienors. Because respondents have not established the likelihood of success in prevailing in the underlying proceedings, the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion for preliminary injunction. We reverse and remand.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted Ralph Montecino Ryan of murdering James Ramirez and found true several enhancements. This court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to allow Ryan's newly retained or appointed counsel a reasonable opportunity to fully investigate and present a new trial motion. (People v. Ryan (May 27, 2009, D054601) [nonpub. opn.] (Prior Opinion).) After the trial court denied Ryan's new trial motion, Ryan sought relief in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting he received ineffective assistance because his counsel filed the motion without reviewing the trial transcripts. (People v. Ryan (June 20, 2011, D057179) [nonpub. opn.].) We granted relief and directed the trial court to appoint new counsel and allow counsel to present a new trial motion. (Ibid.) Ryan subsequently requested release of personal juror identifying information and moved for a new trial. The trial court denied both motions.
Ryan appeals, contending (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for juror information and in failing to order an evidentiary hearing, (2) the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion because there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome based upon newly discovered evidence, (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's methamphetamine impairment, and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Paul Kenneth Williams pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of violating a court order (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a)), and a felony charge of possession of a controlled substance (Health and Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). In exchange, the People dismissed charges that he made a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422), and committed cruelty to three different children by endangering their health (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)). Under People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247 (Cruz), Williams agreed to waive his right to withdraw his guilty plea if he was arrested for another crime. At a hearing, the court questioned Williams regarding the factual basis for the plea, and he pleaded guilty as noted on the plea form.
The court declined Williams's request to reduce the felony count to a misdemeanor, noting that in the interim period between the plea bargain hearing and sentencing, Williams was arrested "on another domestic violence type charge," thus implicating Williams's Cruz waiver. The court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Williams probation for three years on condition that he serve 365 days in jail and pay certain fines. Williams appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a February 2012 stay order issued in the dissolution action between appellant Shahin Djawadian (Appellant) and respondent Mohammad Djawadian (Respondent), on the grounds that "it appears there are proceedings in Iran." At that time, the issues pending before the family court were a request for spousal support brought by Appellant, and related fees and sanctions motions. (Fam. Code, § 4320 et seq.; all further statutory references are to the Fam. Code unless noted.) The matter had been continued from a previous hearing, when the court requested that the parties provide further information concerning any ongoing marital proceedings in Iran.

Ponani Sukumar (Ponani) appeals from an order granting the special motion of James R. Ballard and Schwartz Semerdjian Ballard & Cauley LLP (collectively Ballard) to strike his defamation complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,[1] commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57, fn 1.) Ponani contends the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to his complaints because the alleged defamatory statements were commercial speech. He also contends the trial court erred by determining his claims were time-barred, by weighing evidence to find the alleged defamatory statements were true, and by sustaining Ballard's objections to the declaration of his linguistics expert.
We conclude the anti-SLAPP statute applies and Ponani's claims are time-barred. We, therefore, affirm the order.

Plaintiffs and appellants Rhonda Murphy and Ronnie Murphy[1] appeal from a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of defendant and respondent Northwest Pump & Equipment Co. on the Murphys' causes of action for negligence and loss of consortium based on allegations that Rhonda Murphy was hit by a falling aluminum retractor pole at a gasoline station where defendant sometimes provided repair services. The Murphys contend there is no substantial evidence to support the jury's special verdict finding that defendant was not negligent, particularly because safety experts for both parties assertedly agreed the pole could only have fallen if defendant's service technicians failed to properly maintain and repair the pump. The Murphys also appeal from the trial court's denial of their new trial motion, arguing the court erred in finding no jury misconduct. We conclude sufficient evidence supports the verdict; further, there was no basis for finding the jury committed misconduct. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Emily Letuyen Tran of the attempted murder of Marissa Vilaysouk ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 21 s HPIZAX000001 xpl 1 l "Pen. Code, §§ 664/187" Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187 subd. (a); count one)[1] and two counts of assault upon Vilaysouk with a deadly weapon, to wit, a car ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 19 s HPIZAX000012 xpl 1 l "§ 245, subd. (a)(1)" § 245, subd. (a)(1); counts two [in the dirt lot] and six [on Martin Luther King (MLK) Boulevard]). The jury acquitted defendant on additional counts charging assault with a deadly weapon (counts three, four, and five) and criminal threats (count seven).
Sentenced to state prison, defendant appeals. She contends insufficient evidence supports counts one and two. We conclude more than sufficient evidence supports counts one and two. Defendant also contends the trial court erroneously imposed a concurrent term for count two since it was indivisible conduct from that in count one. The People concede. We agree and will modify the judgment accordingly.

Defendant Peter Shelton stabbed Joseph Davidson in front of the Stockman Club in Fair Oaks. Finding defendant not guilty of attempted murder, the jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter on an imperfect self-defense theory. The jury also convicted defendant of assault with a deadly weapon. With respect to both convictions, the jury found defendant inflicted great bodily injury on Davidson. With respect to the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction, the jury found defendant personally used a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve an aggregate term of seven years in state prison and imposed other orders.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right to a fair trial by admitting into evidence testimony concerning specific instances of violent conduct engaged in by defendant about 10 years before the incident at the Stockman Club; and (2) assuming the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior violent conduct, his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by opening the door to the admission of this evidence. As we explain, while the trial court abused its discretion by ruling defense counsel opened the door to evidence of defendant’s prior violent conduct, introduction of the challenged evidence was harmless.[1] Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Norman Thomas Salazar appeals from a 32-month state prison sentence entered after he pled guilty to felony evading an officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2., subd. (a)), admitted a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c)(1) & (e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1)),[1] and admitted two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a Romero motion (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) to strike his prior strike conviction for attempted carjacking. (§§ 664/215, subd. (a).) We affirm.

Father Salvador J. (father) appeals the dependency court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding his children Karen J. and Salvador J., Jr., contending the dependency court’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence of his ongoing substance abuse, physical abuse of his wife and children, or a substantial risk of harm to the children. We affirm as modified to strike the allegations based on father’s marijuana use.

Donald Monroe Offerman appeals an order denying his petitions for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon, commonly known as a "certificate of rehabilitation." (Pen. Code, § 4852.03; see People v. Blacker (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 438, 440, fn. 2.)[1] The trial court impliedly found that appellant had not demonstrated good moral character over a sustained rehabilitation period but could refile the petitions in 2015. We affirm. (§§ 4852.11; 4852.13, subd. (a); People v. Failla (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1522.)

Jimmy Lee Butler appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1))[1] and stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a).) Appellant admitted suffering two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d) - (i); 1170.12, subds. (a) - (d)) and four prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court struck three of the prior prison term enhancements and found that one of the prior strikes did not apply because the prosecution "did not proceed in this matter as a third strike case." The trial court denied probation and sentenced appellant as a second strike defendant to seven years state prison.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a Pitchess motion for discovery of the arresting officers' confidential personnel files. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.) We affirm.