CA Unpub Decisions

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Lisa Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
J.J. (Mother) appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders in dependency proceedings for her minor daughter, D.B. The sole issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court erred by finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) did not apply, before the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) completed its initial inquiry under ICWA and Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2. We conclude that the court did err in this regard. We reverse the court’s ICWA finding, remand for the limited purpose of ICWA compliance, and otherwis

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael Imhoff, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Office of County Counsel, Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Amy Z. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent L.M.
Emily Uhre, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor A.M.
Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent W.H.
INTRODUCTION
At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court found A.M. was likely to be adopted but L.M. (Mother) had established the parental-benefit exception and declined to terminate her parental rights. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) appeals. The Agency concedes Mother met the first two elements of the parental-benefit exception; that is, Mother regularly and consistently visited A.M. and A.M. had a significant,

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Rohanee Zapanta, Judge. Dismissed.
Suzanne M. Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.P.
Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.R.
Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Emily Harlan, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
K.R. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order sustaining the petition of the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) and assuming jurisdiction over her minor child, K.P. Mother contends there was no substantial evidence to support the true jurisdictional finding. Both Mother and K.P. also appeal from the juvenile court’s dispositional order declaring K.P. a dependent of the juvenile court and ordering family maintenance services. Mother and K.P. contend t

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Steven G. Counelis, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Charles C. Ragland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Marcus Ray Rowland and an accomplice committed a series of armed robberies in San Bernardino and Riverside counties on June 18, 2018. A jury in Riverside County found Rowland guilty of three counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and found true the allegation that Rowland was a principal in the robberies and that one or more principals was armed with a firearm (id., § 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Rowland admitted two prior strike convictions and received a third-strike sentence of 75 years to life plus a determinate consecutive sentence of three years. Rowland testified at trial and denied par

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Tony Raphael, John M. Tomberlin, Eric M. Nakata, Judges. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Hamilton Law and Ryan A. Hamilton for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting, Warren J. Williams and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
An information charged defendant Stephen James Lattin with 10 counts, including four counts of assault with a firearm (see Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)), arising from an incident in April 2017. The jury convicted Lattin on the assault counts (and on two other counts), and made a true finding on each of the personal gun-use enhancements. (See § 12022.5, subd. (a).) The jury found him not guilty on four counts of making a criminal threat and rejected the allegations he committed the assault counts as hate crimes. The court s

This case comes to us following defendant Joseph Ray Brooks’s appeal from the trial court’s postjudgment order summarily denying his Penal Code section 1170.126 petition for resentencing. Defendant’s appellate counsel has requested that we review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Given the procedural stance of this case, defendant is not entitled to a Wende review; further, his appeal has been abandoned by his failure to raise any claim of error. Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal.

Appointed counsel for defendant Jake Anthony Lovdal asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
I
In July 2021, defendant walked out of a store holding several items with a total value of $83 that he did not purchase. When a store employee confronted him, defendant pushed the employee and left the scene. An October 2021 complaint alleged one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and one count of misdemeanor petty theft (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a); count 2).

In October 2020, a jury found defendant Akeim Rashad McFadden guilty of first degree murder of George Nixon (count 1) and two counts of possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a felony (counts 3-4). On count 2, the jury found defendant not guilty of attempted murder of Eric, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The jury found that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)) in the commission of count 1 and that he had personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in the commission of count 2.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction.

Defendant Alonzo Bishop appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95. He argues the trial court erred when it denied his petition at the prima facie stage after finding substantial evidence in his codefendants’ pleas that could theoretically support a murder conviction under current law. The People concede the trial court erred. We accept the People’s concession and will remand the case for further proceedings.

The California State Labor Commissioner filed an action against Everlasting Gifts, Inc., alleging Everlasting Gifts committed unlawful retaliation when it filed a trade secrets complaint against one of its former employees. Everlasting Gifts responded with a special motion to strike the complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation under Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP motion). The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, and Everlasting Gifts now appeals that denial.
Everlasting Gifts contends the trial court erred by (1) finding that the Labor Commissioner successfully carried its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on the merits, (2) concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to an owner of Everlasting Gifts because the owner is not a party to the trade secrets action and, therefore, did not engage in protected activity, and (3) declining to consider evidence provided by Everlasting Gifts.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robin R. Kesler, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Mother Ashley S. appeals after the juvenile court terminated her parental rights to son A.S. (born 2019). She does not challenge the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her rights. Following up on her claim of Mayan heritage through Mexican ancestors, Mother’s sole contention is that the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b) in that DCFS failed to ask maternal extended family members whether A.S. is an “Indian child” within the meaning of section 1903 of the federal Indian

In two separate jury trials, defendant and appellant Aaron Anthony Vigil was convicted of various crimes, including mayhem and assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him to an upper term on the mayhem count and stayed sentencing on the assault count under Penal Code section 654. On appeal, this court concluded the trial court prejudicially erred by relying on improper aggravating factors in imposing the upper term on the mayhem count. We remanded the matter to the trial court for a resentencing hearing. At the resentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Vigil to a middle term on the mayhem count. Vigil now raises one contention on appeal – that the matter should be remanded to allow the trial court to reconsider his sentence in light of recently-enacted Assembly Bill 518 (AB 518). AB 518 amended section 654 by removing the requirement that a defendant be punished for the offense with the longest term of imprisonment (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats 2021, Ch. 441). F

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Nichelle L. Blackwell, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Father B.C. appeals after the juvenile court terminated his parental rights to sons S.C. (born 2015) and Alexis C. (born 2016). He does not challenge the basis of the termination of his rights. His sole contention is that the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b) in that DCFS failed to ask maternal and paternal extended family members whether the children had Indian ancestry within the meaning of Section 1903 of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Suzette Clover, Judge. Affirmed.
William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In 1995, Stephen Snow, a military veteran, was sentenced to an indeterminate term. Years later, he petitioned to recall his sentence under new legislation categorizing trauma-related conditions caused by military service as a mitigating factor. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the legislation did not apply to indeterminate sentences. Snow appeals. Agreeing with the trial court, we affirm.