CA Unpub Decisions

After pleading guilty to one count of grand theft in exchange for time served and 24 months’ probation, Corey Alphonso Jones appealed his sentence. His attorney has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende and Anders v. California informing this court they were unable to identify any errors and asking us to perform an independent review of the record. Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error and affirm.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant and appellant Rogelio Omar Casco pled guilty to two felony counts. He admitted two counts of violating California Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), lewd or lascivious acts with a child under age 14 (counts 1 and 4). In exchange for Casco’s plea, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss three additional counts of violating section 288, subdivision (a), and one count of section 289, subdivision (j), sexual penetration of a person under 14. Additionally, the parties agreed that Casco would serve a 10-year prison term, consisting of the upper eight-year term for count 1, and a consecutive two-year term for count 2.
At his plea hearing, Casco confirmed that he understood the agreement and its particular terms. He agreed that he had enough time to review his rights, the evidence against him, and any possible defenses with his attorney.

Defendant and appellant, Dennis Lamar Reed, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, which the court summarily denied by memorandum of decision. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying his petition. We reverse and remand the matter for reconsideration.

Defendant and appellant Jorge Dagoberto Gilbert was convicted of torturing and attempting to murder his girlfriend. In this appeal, he asks that we review the sealed transcript of the trial court’s in camera proceeding conducted under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) to determine whether the trial court erred in ruling on his request to disclose the personnel records of a law enforcement officer. He further argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon during the course of the attempted murder; (2) the trial court erred in responding to a question from the jury; (3) there is an error in the abstract of judgment; and (4) the matter should be remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion under the newly enacted Assembly Bill No. 518 (Assembly Bill 518).

Stephanie Ortiz pleaded guilty in this case to unlawful taking and driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The plea agreement included a stipulation that Ortiz would be sentenced to the low term of 16 months to be served concurrently with the sentence in another case. She was sentenced to the stipulated term of imprisonment.
The court held a subsequent restitution hearing. At the completion of the hearing, the court ordered Ortiz to pay restitution for items taken from the stolen car. Restitution was set in the amount of $2,469.
Ortiz filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), indicating counsel has not been able to identify any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks the court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Ortiz the opportunity to file her own brief on appeal, but she has not responded.

Darius Lake appeals the judgment imposed on resentencing after remand following a prior appeal to allow the sentencing court to exercise its discretion to strike five-year enhancements for a prior serious felony conviction. Lake contends the trial court erred by striking the enhancements and resentencing him in his absence and by refusing to consider his eligibility for a diversion program for defendants with qualifying mental disorders that became available after he was initially sentenced. Lake also contends legislation that went into effect after he was resentenced entitles him to a full resentencing hearing and asks us to remand the matter with a direction that further proceedings be conducted by a different judge. We conditionally reverse the judgment and remand the matter to allow the trial court to consider whether to grant diversion.

Father, M.H., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders removing minor S.H. from his custody, after the minor had been removed from mother’s care and placed with him at disposition. Father contends the juvenile court had no authority to remove the minor from his care without first sustaining a petition for removal under Welfare and Institutions Code section 387. We shall affirm.

Folsom State Prison inmate Rey Coronel Lopez filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a decision by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) adjudicating him guilty of a prison disciplinary violation for refusing to accept assigned housing on February 26, 2019. The violation was classified as serious, and Lopez was assessed a 61-day credit forfeiture.
The discipline arises from Lopez’s refusal to sign an “Informational Chrono” acknowledging he was “willing to program on a Non Designated Programming Facility [(NDPF)].” Lopez claims the disciplinary decision must be vacated because: (1) the decision to assign him to an NDPF was not made by a classification committee as required by CDCR’s own regulations (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3375, subd. (c)); (2) CDCR’s NDPF rules were not properly promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) there is not “some evidence” Lopez refused a housing assignment.

Appellant K.C. is married to the half-brother of the minor’s mother, S.K. (mother). Mother had an extensive child welfare history and reportedly did not feel she could provide for the minor. Because K.C. was willing to care for the minor, mother stated she intended for the minor to live with K.C. and the half-brother. K.C. arrived at the hospital shortly after the minor was born and was permitted to take the minor pursuant to a safety plan prohibiting the half-brother from living in the family home due to his substance abuse, mental health concerns, and criminal history. The probate court subsequently issued an ex parte order appointing K.C. the temporary guardian of the minor, but a social worker informed K.C. that the Agency would not support K.C.’s request for guardianship and would be seeking to place the minor into protective custody.
At a detention hearing, the juvenile court appointed counsel for K.C.

After simultaneous but separate jury trials, defendants Amoura Dominique Dawson and Adrienne Marquis Boulware were convicted of second degree murder and torture for beating Audie Hogue to death. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life in prison. Defendant did not appeal her judgment. Boulware appealed and we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Boulware (March 3, 2015, C075063) [nonpub. opn.] (Boulware).) We have granted defendant’s request to incorporate by reference the record in Boulware, (case No. C075063) in the instant appeal.
In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. (Statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code.) The trial court denied the petition, finding that because the jury was never instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequence doctrine, defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing.

On May 21, 2010, a jury found defendant James Washington guilty of first degree felony murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) (statutory section citations that follow are to the Penal Code), second degree robbery (§ 211), and torture (§ 206). The jury also found true the special circumstances allegations that defendant used a deadly weapon in connection with the murder and torture (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and that the murder happened during the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).
In pertinent part, defendant received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the murder, plus one year. We affirmed this judgment on appeal. (People v. Washington (Jan. 3, 2013, C065636) [nonpub. opn.] (Washington).)
We have granted defendant’s request to incorporate the record of this prior appeal by reference here.

In 2006, a jury found defendant Jeffrey D. Ward guilty of first degree murder. It also found true the special circumstance the intentional murder was perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle intentionally at a person outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict death. Defendant appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. He contends the trial court erred by summarily denying his petition without issuing an order to show cause. We affirm.

Defendant Nue Daniel Thao appeals from his conviction for first degree murder after he shot and killed Jonathan Lee. Defendant contends the trial court instructed the jury with legally incorrect definitions of self-defense and involuntary manslaughter and violated his constitutional rights to due process and to be free from excessive fines by imposing various fees, fines, and assessments without first determining his ability to pay (see People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas)). Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendants Patricia G. Olson and Jimmy Dastur (defendants) appeal from an order disqualifying Steven G. Bailey, a former El Dorado County Superior Court judge, from representing them in this lawsuit filed by plaintiff Robert J. Hassett. The trial court relied on rule 1.12 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides in relevant part that “a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge . . . unless all parties to the proceeding give informed written consent.” (Rule 1.12(a).) The court found that Bailey’s participation as a judge was personal and substantial in rendering decisions in two other cases involving the validity of options and a purchase agreement for the same real property at issue in the action brought by Hassett.