CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Alma Rosa Davis argues, and the People agree, that her felony petty theft conviction should be reduced to a misdemeanor because the law changed before her conviction became final. As discussed below, we modify the judgment to reflect that the petty theft conviction is a misdemeanor, vacate the sentence as to that conviction, and remand to the trial court with directions to resentence defendant as to the petty theft conviction only.

A jury found defendant and appellant Andrew William Clark guilty of making criminal threats. (Pen. Code, § 422.)[1] The trial court found true the allegations that defendant suffered (1) a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)); (2) a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)); and (3) a prior felony conviction for which defendant served a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of nine years.
Defendant raises three issues on appeal. First, defendant contends the trial court erred by not sua sponte instructing the jury on unanimity. Second, defendant asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure the trial court followed through with its agreement to give the jury a limiting instruction. Third, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying him the opportunity to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Fortino Montoya, pled guilty to two counts of possessing an assault weapon (Pen. Code, § 12280, subd. (b)),[1] possessing a handgun by an ex-felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and possessing ammunition by a person who may not possess a firearm (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)). He also admitted suffering two strike priors (§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A)). After the trial court dismissed one of his strikes, he was sentenced to prison for seven years, four months. Defendant appeals, claiming the trial court improperly sentenced him. We reject his contentions and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant William Steven Bunn of cultivating marijuana (Count I—Health and Saf. Code, § 11358); the lesser included misdemeanor offense of child endangerment[1] (Count II—Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b));[2] and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited to do so (Count III—Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (c)(1)). The same jury convicted defendant and appellant Mary Allison Bunn of cultivating marijuana, (Count I—Health and Saf. Code, § 11358) and the lesser included misdemeanor offense of child endangerment (Count II—Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)).[3] The trial court sentenced William to a 16-month aggregate term of imprisonment. It granted Mary probation.
On appeal, Mary contends: (1) the trial court erred by declining to quash the search warrant and exclude all evidence discovered pursuant thereto; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on possession of marijuana as a lesser included offense of cultivation; and (3) that substantial evidence does not support her conviction for misdemeanor child endangerment. William maintains the People committed several acts of prejudicial misconduct depriving him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Defendants join in each others’ claims. We affirm the judgment.

Jason B., the biological father of Hunter B., appeals a judgment terminating his parental rights on the basis of abandonment under Family Code section 7822[1] so that Hunter can be adopted by her stepfather, Robert A. Jason contends that he did not "leave" Hunter in the care and custody of another person and did not intend to abandon her within the meaning of the statute. We affirm the judgment.

A jury found Trevor Berne Augustus guilty of two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Augustus to five years in prison.
On appeal, Augustus claims that the trial court erred in admitting statements he made to a pastor and to a member of his church, in which he admitted that he had molested the victim. Augustus also claims that the prosecutor violated his constitutional rights under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) and its progeny by failing to timely disclose a prosecution witness's prior misdemeanor conviction. Finally, Augustus claims that the trial court erred in admitting a recording of a police interview of the victim during which the victim disclosed the molestations.
We affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Richard Donald Traver II pleaded no contest to one count of second degree commercial burglary. In exchange, the agreement provided, among other things, that the remaining counts would be dismissed with a Harvey[1] waiver; that defendant would receive felony probation with up to one year in jail as a condition of probation, but if he violated probation the trial court could sentence him up to a maximum of three years in jail; and that at sentencing the trial court could withdraw approval of the plea agreement, but if it did so, defendant would be permitted to withdraw his plea.
At sentencing, the trial court found defendant ineligible for probation, sentenced him to three years in county jail, and denied defendant’s request to withdraw his plea.
Defendant now contends the trial court violated the terms of his plea agreement. The People agree, and so do we. We will remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff OMNEL, a California corporation, appeals from a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining defendant John Tanner’s demurrer to the negligence claim in OMNEL’s first amended complaint (the amended complaint) against him without leave to amend. This case involves a dispute between OMNEL and Tanner’s two companies, defendants Valpo-LLC and Tanner Industries, over a commercial lease agreement. OMNEL also sued Tanner personally. Tanner demurred to the negligence claim against him, contending that the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action because Tanner did not owe OMNEL a duty of care.
On appeal, OMNEL contends the trial court erred in sustaining Tanner’s demurrer to the amended complaint without leave to amend, arguing that corporate officers such as Tanner are personally liable for tortious conduct when they personally direct or participate in the conduct that causes economic harm to third parties. Tanner responds that OMNEL failed to allege any duty owed by him to OMNEL and that corporate officers are not personally liable for negligence when they make decisions in the course and scope of their duties to the corporation that incidentally cause economic harm to a third party but do not cause physical harm or property damage.
Thus, the central issue in this case is whether a corporate officer may be held liable for negligent acts performed in the course and scope of his duties to the corporation when those acts cause only economic harm, as opposed to physical harm or property damage. We conclude that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer because the decisions Tanner made in the course and scope of his duties to Valpo-LLC and Tanner Industries caused only incidental economic harm to OMNEL, and such decisions are protected by limited liability for corporate officers. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Allen Tarver appeals from the judgment following his no contest plea to possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5). Pursuant to the negotiated plea, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted three years probation with 180 days county jail. Appellant was ordered pay a $200 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b))[1], a $200 probation revocation fine (§ 1202.44), a $40 court security fee, a $30 conviction assessment, a $50 lab fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5), and $85 penalty assessments (§ 1464; Gov., Code, § 76000).

A modification decision.

Court have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied Webb's attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist.

James Thomas Brennan appeals from a September 18, 2012 order revoking probation and sentencing him to concurrent three-year state prison terms in case numbers BA394829 and BA399400.
In Case No. BA394829 appellant pled to guilty possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and admitted suffering two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d))[1] and three prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Pursuant to an March 15, 2012 open plea agreement, appellant was conditionally released to enroll and complete a one-year residential drug treatment program at the Los Angeles Transition Center (LATC).

Circle K Stores, Inc. (Circle K) appeals the denial of its petition for a writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) seeking to compel the City of San Buenaventura (the City) to set aside its revocation of a permit for the sale of alcoholic beverages. Circle K contends the revocation was in violation of the City's municipal code and was based on incorrect legal advice given by City staff. We affirm.

A modification decision.