CA Unpub Decisions

In exchange for a stipulated sentence, defendant Alan James Moon pleaded no contest to making criminal threats and admitted previously serving a prison term.
Defendant’s only contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay a $286 supplemental probation report fee because there is insufficient evidence to support a finding he had the ability to pay that fee.
Defendant claims that because Penal Code section 1203.1b is predicated on a defendant’s ability to pay and there was no evidence before the trial court that he had such ability, the fees were improperly imposed. The People respond that defendant forfeited this issue by not objecting in the trial court to imposition of the fee. The People have the better argument.
In a recent decision, the California Supreme Court ruled that “a defendant who fails to contest the booking fee when the court imposes it forfeits the right to challenge it on appeal.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 591.) Here, defendant failed to contest the booking fee when it was imposed by the trial court. Accordingly, he has forfeited the right to challenge that fee on appeal.
We have, however, identified a clerical error on the abstract of judgment that requires correction: the abstract of judgment omits the court’s order that defendant pay a $286 supplemental probation report fee. We will direct the trial court to correct this clerical error.

A jury convicted defendant Dwayne Marlin Taplin II of second degree robbery and assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and it found true certain enhancement allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to 19 years in state prison.
Defendant now contends (1) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument by misstating the law regarding circumstantial evidence, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photos depicting defendant holding firearms. We conclude defendant’s contentions lack merit, and we will affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Raul C. (father) appeals from the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order, contending that substantial evidence did not support the court’s exercise of jurisdiction and its refusal to place his son, A.C., with father, who was the nonoffending, noncustodial parent. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) also appeals, arguing the court erred in dismissing certain allegations against Mariela G. (mother). Mother has not appealed. We affirm.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

Jose Munguia (appellant) was convicted by a jury of three counts of rape (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(1)),[1] three counts of oral copulation (§ 269, subd. (a)(4)) and three counts of sexual penetration (§ 269, subd. (a)(5)), all committed against a child under the age of 14 and more than seven years younger than appellant. Appellant was sentenced to 135 years to life in prison. He appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow testimony from the victim’s treating physicians, in allowing the prosecution’s child molestation expert to testify beyond the scope of her expertise, and in making certain evidentiary rulings. He also contend the cumulative effect of the evidentiary rulings was prejudicial. We find each of these contentions to be without merit and affirm the judgment.

C.T. and M.W., the parents of baby E., petition under rule 8.452 of the California Rules of Court to vacate an order setting a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mother contends she should have been offered additional reunification services after the 12-month review hearing, that there was insufficient evidence that E. would be at substantial risk if returned to Mother’s care, and that she was not offered adequate reunification services. She also contends the court erred when it found the child welfare agency made active efforts to reunify the family as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1912 et seq. (ICWA, or the Act)) and complied with the ICWA’s preferences for placement with an Indian family. Father, like Mother, alleges inadequate reunification services under the ICWA and violation of the ICWA’s placement preferences without good cause.
The order setting the section 366.26 hearing is supported by substantial evidence and complies with the ICWA, so we deny both petitions on their merits.

This is an appeal from a dispositional order in a juvenile matter after the juvenile court sustained findings that minor A.H. committed one felony count of second degree burglary and two felony counts of receiving or concealing stolen property. Minor challenges this order on the ground that only one count of receiving stolen property should have been sustained because, although the stolen property belonged to two separate victims, it nonetheless constituted a single criminal transaction. For reasons stated below, we agree with minor that the juvenile court erred in finding he committed two separate counts of receiving or concealing stolen property, and thus reverse.

This case is before us on appeal for the second time following a conditional reversal and remand for a new Pitchess hearing. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531; People v. Delgadillo (Mar. 29, 2012, A129750 [nonpub. opn.].) In his second appeal, appellant William Delgadillo asks this court to review the sealed record on his Pitchess motion to determine whether the trial court complied with our remand order and whether it erred by denying his request for discoverable information.

Melody Ann Queen appeals from a judgment suspending execution of a two-year prison term and placing her on felony probation after she pled guilty to a single count of transporting methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a).[1] She challenges the imposition and amount of a drug program fee and laboratory analysis fee.[2] We agree with appellant that the probation order must be amended to reflect the proper breakdown of the assessments and surcharges included in both fees and to correct a minute order that does not accurately reflect the fees imposed. We reject appellant’s argument that the court on remand must determine her ability to pay the drug program fee.

This is an appeal from the juvenile court’s denial of a petition by appellant S.S. (mother) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to modify a previous court order terminating reunification services and visitation with her minor children, S.R. and V.R. III (collectively, children). We affirm.

P.A. appeals from a dispositional order in a proceeding commenced under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. He contends: (1) the juvenile court erred by applying an incorrect standard in ruling on his motion to suppress evidence and, in particular, in deciding that his consent to a search of his vehicle was voluntary; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s denial of the motion to suppress, because there was evidence of coercive circumstances at the time P.A. consented to the search; and (3) police actions, including handcuffing P.A., converted his detention into an arrest without probable cause, and the resulting unlawfulness of the arrest vitiated his subsequent consent to the search. We will affirm the order.

We appointed counsel to represent Jose Barajas Fernandez on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client but advised the court no issues were found to argue on appeal. Defendant was given 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. Defendant subsequently filed a brief with this court.