CA Unpub Decisions

In 2008, defendant pled no contest to possession of a destructive device (a Molotov cocktail) and admitted previously being convicted of a strike offense and serving a term in prison. Consistent with his plea, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of two years and eight months in state prison.

Appointed counsel for defendant Eugene Alex Piert has asked this court to review the record to determine whether there exist any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Joe Taylor was convicted of possessing a sharpened instrument in a state prison in violation of Penal Code[1] section 4502, subdivision (a). Before trial, the trial court precluded defendant from offering evidence of a necessity defense. Also, at trial the court permitted defendant to be shackled in the presence of the jury. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in: (1) refusing to allow him to present evidence and refusing to instruct the jury on the necessity defense; and (2) permitting him to be shackled in the presence of the jury. We disagree with defendant on both points and affirm.

Following an unsuccessful "Penal Code section 1538.5" Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence essential to his conviction, defendant Donald Ray Brown pled no contest to driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or higher ( "Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)" Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b))[1] and admitted he had five prior convictions for driving under the influence. On appeal, he claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, we find the officer reasonably suspected defendant had violated the Vehicle Code.

L.G. (mother) appeals following the juvenile court’s order terminating her reunification services and visitation as to minors Miguel G. and C.G. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.)[1] She contends the court erred by failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for her sua sponte on the ground that she was incompetent. Concluding this contention is forfeited, we shall affirm the orders.

Peter Paul Aguiar, charged with illegally cultivating marijuana and possessing marijuana for sale, seeks a writ of mandate compelling respondent superior court to suppress evidence of incriminating text messages found on his wife’s cell phone. Police officers had removed the phone from a purse belonging to Claudia Paola Villarroel, Aguiar’s wife, while they were attempting to serve an arrest warrant for Aguiar at the couple’s home. The superior court denied the motion, finding Aguiar had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his wife’s belongings.
The court’s analysis was incomplete. If the officers saw the purse in plain view while lawfully in Aguiar’s house or pursuant to a lawful search of the house, the search of the purse did not invade any protected privacy interest of Aguiar’s. However, if the purse and cell phone were discovered only as a result of an unlawful search of his home, the fruits of that search should have been suppressed. Because the court erroneously ruled Aguiar did not suffer a Fourth Amendment violation whether or not the purse was the product of an illegal search of his home, we grant Aguiar’s petition for writ of mandate and direct the superior court to vacate its order denying his motion to suppress and to determine in the first instance whether the cell phone was discovered lawfully or as part of an illegal search of Aguiar’s home.

Defendant and appellant, Terry Buchanan, appeals from the judgment entered following revocation of probation previously granted after his pleas of no contest to presenting a forged prescription (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4324, subd. (a)), and second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, § 459),[1] and his admissions that he previously suffered a conviction for a serious or violent felony, first degree burglary (§ 459), within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served nine separate prison terms for various felony convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Buchanan to 12 years in prison. Although Buchanan filed a timely notice of appeal, he failed to obtain from the trial court a certificate of probable cause. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.

In this complex insurance litigation, OneBeacon America Insurance Company petitions this court for a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its ruling granting a motion for summary adjudication filed by Rockwell Automation, Inc., Meritor, Inc., and Invensys, Inc. We issued an order to show cause why the trial court should not be compelled to vacate its order and enter a new order denying the motion for summary adjudication, and we now grant the petition for writ of mandate.

Defendant Eduardo Navarette challenges his conviction for oral copulation of a child under 10 and child molestation. His sole claim on appeal is that Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and its progeny required excluding his statements made to officers during custodial questioning. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Eduardo Navarette challenges his conviction for oral copulation of a child under 10 and child molestation. His sole claim on appeal is that Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and its progeny required excluding his statements made to officers during custodial questioning. We disagree and affirm.

In February of 2011, the juvenile court declared five-year-old David W. a dependent pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and ordered the parents to share custody of the child.[1] Approximately one year later, David’s therapist reported that the parents’ ongoing, combative relationship had caused the child severe emotional distress, ultimately culminating in a psychiatric hospitalization. Based on this new information, the juvenile court ordered the child detained and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a section 342 petition; following a contested adjudication and disposition hearing, the court sustained the petition and detained the child.
Father appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and disposition orders, arguing that: (1) the court’s orders were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the court exceeded its authorities by ordering DCFS to file a section 342 petition; and (3) the juvenile court violated the time limitations set forth in section 352, subdivision (b). We affirm the court’s orders, concluding that although the juvenile court violated section 352, father suffered no prejudice.

Deana S., the mother of 11-year-old Daniel G., nine-year-old Damian G. and four-year-old D.G., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order removing the children from her custody and placing them with their maternal aunt under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department). Deana contends the court’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Purvis Holloway, a self-represented litigant, appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his lawsuit against Talia Quetel and Antonio McDaniels for failure to file proofs of service and failure to prosecute. We reverse.

Earl A. Clampett, Jr. appeals from an order entered after the probate court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to his petition seeking to compel trustees Joel W. Heger and Christian M. Heger to make a distribution under the terms of a trust. The probate court ruled Clampett, the holder of a durable power attorney conveyed to him by the trust beneficiary, had no standing as a matter of law to demand distribution on his principal’s behalf and, in any event, his request did not conform to the requirements in the trust. We reverse.