CA Unpub Decisions

Jennifer D. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her petition to reinstate reunification services as to minors D. D. and P. D. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 388.) We affirm.

Defendant Cherrie Lynn Curtis was committed to the state mental hospital pursuant to "Penal Code section 1026" Penal Code section 1026[1] in 2003 after the trial court found her not guilty by reason of insanity to the criminal charges of five counts of resisting an officer by force ( "§ 69" § 69), two counts of misdemeanor battery ( "§ 242" § 242), and one count of brandishing a deadly weapon, a misdemeanor ( "§ 417, subd. (a)(1)" § 417, subd. (a)(1)).
On August 30, 2011, the People filed a petition to extend defendant’s commitment pursuant to "section 1026.5" section 1026.5. Following a court trial, the trial court granted the motion and continued defendant’s commitment to the state mental hospital.
We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case, raising no issues, and requesting this court review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (See "People v. Wende(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436" People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Appellant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from appellant.

Defendant Lamar Duvall Mills pled guilty to infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on or about November 29, 2011, and admitted a strike prior in exchange for a stipulated state prison sentence of six years and dismissal of another count as well as a petition for probation revocation in another case. In taking defendant’s plea, the trial court advised him that he would “receive a fine of between $200 and $10,000,” and defendant said he understood.

Convicted of workers’ compensation fraud, defendant Stephen Eugene Harder appeals, claiming various errors with respect to the fees, fines, and costs the trial court imposed in granting him probation. In the event we find these claims of error forfeited for failure to raise them in the trial court, defendant contends his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to make these arguments.
We conclude defendant’s trial attorney was not ineffective, but we order the trial court to impose the $1,500 penalty assessment and the $35 processing fee as separate orders and not as conditions of defendant’s probation as the trial court did here. Otherwise, we find no error.

In December 2011, a jury found defendant Detouriantae Kymono Smallwood guilty of second degree robbery, unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, possessing a short-barreled shotgun, and concealing a short-barreled shotgun in a vehicle. The jury also found true the enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the robbery. The court sentenced defendant to a total of 13 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant claims the judgment must be reversed because the trial court unconstitutionally limited his cross-examination of Sacramento Police Officer Amy Slay. He further claims that the court prejudicially erred by failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on accomplice testimony. We disagree and affirm.

Pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act, defendant, a transient, must register within five working days of coming into or residing in a new jurisdiction (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (b))[1] and update his registration within five working days if he establishes a residence and is no longer a transient (§ 290.011, subd. (b)). A jury found defendant guilty of failing to register as a sex offender and failing to update sex offender registration and the court sentenced defendant to 32 months in state prison.

In this extraordinary writ proceeding, M.T. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s finding and order at a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.21, subdivision (f), that the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) provided her reasonable family reunification services and that mother’s reunification services would be terminated. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding, and even if there was sufficient evidence, the court abused its discretion by failing to consider ordering an additional six months of services in light of the Department’s failure to provide reasonable services during previous reporting periods. We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding, and that the court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering additional services. Accordingly, we deny the writ.

Champion Medical Group, a California Corporation doing business as Universal Psychiatric Medical Center, Inc. (Universal), was one of many lien claimants represented by Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. (Premier). Universal assigned some of its liens to Premier for purposes of collection. As part of a plea bargain that resolved criminal charges against two of Premier’s executives, Premier dismissed the lien claims of 109 entities, Universal’s included. The workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) upheld the dismissal of Universal’s claim over its objections and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) denied Universal’s petition for reconsideration without issuing an opinion of its own.
The fundamental flaw in the WCJ’s reasoning is that the WCJ analyzed and addressed issues that were common to most of the lien claimants, whom the parties have chosen to designate collectively as the Premier Providers, and that the WCJ ignored the facts that were unique to Universal’s case. That is, the WCJ validated the resolution of the global case involving over 100 Premier Providers but failed to address Universal’s case. As it turns out, there is evidence that Universal did not authorize Premier to dismiss its liens. Concomitantly, the entire body of evidence on which the WCJ relied to find that Universal did authorize Premier to dismiss its liens is irrelevant to Universal, however relevant it may be to the Premier Providers. In fact, there is evidence that Universal cannot be included in the class of Premier Providers.
If the evidence is irrelevant, and is hence inadmissible,[1] the decision of the WCAB cannot be, and is not, supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we annul the WCAB’s decision and remand with directions to vacate the dismissal of Universal’s liens. (Lab. Code, § 5952, subd. (d).)[2]

Plaintiffs appeal an order granting defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiffs argue that the statute did not apply because the complaint was based on their constitutional right to sue for forcible detainer. We conclude that the trial court correctly found that the complaint arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.[1] Plaintiffs also appeal from several interim orders by the trial court which are non-appealable. We do not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal from those orders.

Appellant Rafael Z. was found by the juvenile court to have committed a second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211, 212.5, subd. (c)).[1] He was placed at a youth ranch facility, but absconded from that facility the following day. He later admitted a probation violation resulting from that escape and was ordered detained in a different youth facility. Rafael has filed a timely notice of appeal from both the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
Assigned counsel has submitted a Wende[2] brief, certifying that counsel has been unable to identify any issues for appellate review. Counsel also has submitted a declaration confirming that Rafael has been advised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief raising any points which he wishes to call to the court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been submitted. As required, we have independently reviewed the record. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110.)
We find no arguable issues and therefore affirm.

Defendant Darryl Ronaldo Johnson II appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of attempted second degree robbery (three counts), together with true findings on firearm use allegations (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 211, 664, 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subd. (b) (§ 12022.53(b))), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). After a bench trial, the court found defendant’s juvenile adjudication for robbery qualified as a prior strike within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 211, 667, subds. (b)-(d), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 18 years in state prison on the current convictions, to run concurrently to a four-year term on a prior conviction for transporting controlled substances after revocation of probation. On appeal defendant challenges his current convictions and sentences on various grounds, as well as presentence conduct credit awarded on his prior drug conviction. We agree with defendant that he is entitled to a recalculation of his presentence conduct credit on his prior drug conviction. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant Kenneth Ray Johnson pleaded no contest to being a felon on the grounds of a custodial facility, a felony, and to possession of not more than 28.5 grams of marijuana, a misdemeanor. In April 2011, the court placed him on felony probation under various terms and conditions, including the condition that he serve 365 days in county jail. A petition to revoke defendant’s probation was later sustained in November 2011, and the court imposed an upper term sentence of three years in prison. In doing so, the court awarded defendant a total of 123 days of presentence credits (83 days of custody credits and 40 days of conduct credits).
Defendant argues that in imposing the sentence, the court improperly considered defendant’s conduct occurring after probation was granted. He claims that the failure of his attorney to object to this error below constituted ineffective assistance of counsel that was prejudicial. Secondly, he contends that he is entitled to 24 days of additional conduct credits under the latest amendment to Penal Code section 4019, which expressly provides that it applies to defendants whose crimes were committed on or after October 1, 2011.[1] He argues that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the latest amendment to section 4019 must be applied retroactively. He contends further that prospective application of the amendment to section 4019 would violate his constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
We conclude that defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim has no merit because the trial court did not improperly consider defendant’s post-probation conduct in its imposition of the sentence. Furthermore, even if counsel’s performance was deficient, any error was harmless. We also reject defendant’s claim of entitlement to additional conduct credits under the October 2011 amendment to section 4019. Last year, in People v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 385 (Kennedy), we rejected statutory interpretation and equal protection arguments identical to those raised by defendant here. We therefore will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jose Rene Hidalgo appeals from the order denying his petition to recall his 35‑year‑to‑life sentence pursuant to the procedures set forth under Penal Code section 1170.126, added by Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.) We appointed counsel to represent Hidalgo on appeal. Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed appellate counsel suggests we consider whether Hidalgo’s petition was properly denied. This court provided Hidalgo 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. The 30‑day time period has passed, and Hidalgo has not filed anything on his own behalf.
We have examined the entire record and appointed appellate counsel’s Wende/Anders brief; we find no arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.

Gregory Lee Bahr pleaded guilty to domestic violence with corporal injury (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), use of a deadly weapon within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), and two prison priors within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).[1] As part of a plea agreement, Bahr agreed to a three-year prison term, and the trial court awarded Bahr presentence custody and conduct credits totaling 393 days.
Bahr subsequently filed a motion contending that under the amended version of Penal Code section 4019 (hereinafter “amended section 4019”) he was entitled to additional presentence conduct credits. The trial court denied the motion and Bahr now appeals. He argues that amended section 4019 should be interpreted to apply to days he was in custody after the statute’s effective date of October 1, 2011 (§ 4019, subd. (h)) even though he committed his offense before that date (April 4, 2011). Bahr also contends that failure to interpret the statute in this way violates equal protection. We disagree and conclude amended section 4019 does not apply to crimes committed before the effective date of October 1, 2011, and the distinction does not constitute an equal protection violation. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.