CA Unpub Decisions

The juvenile court sustained a dependency petition concerning J.O. and released the infant to his parents’ shared custody. Five months later, following reports of domestic violence between the parents, the court sustained a supplemental petition, removed J.O. from T.O.’s (Father) custody, and ordered both parents to undergo random drug testing as part of their case plans.
Father challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders on the supplemental petition. Specifically, he contends the court erred in sustaining the substance abuse allegations and abused its discretion by adding drug testing to his case plan. We disagree and affirm the court’s findings and orders.

In 1997, a jury convicted appellant Joe Julio Alcarez of attempted murder after receiving instructions that included the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In 2019, Alcarez filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, a statute enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437 (Sen. Bill 1437) which “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
The trial court denied Alcarez’s petition without appointing counsel since Alcarez was convicted of attempted murder rather than murder. Section 1170.95, as originally formulated, did not apply to attempted murder. We affirmed; the California Supreme Court granted review but deferred further action. The high court then issued People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) which focused on the procedural aspects of section 1170.95.

Ramona S. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights as to her four minor children (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26). On appeal, mother argues the juvenile court erred by declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant Leuth Sengsongkham previously appealed after he was convicted of murdering his wife and another man and was sentenced to 90 years to life in prison. On appeal, we remanded for the trial court to consider its newly granted discretion to strike the two 25-year-to-life firearm discharge enhancements pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 620) (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2018). On remand, the court declined to strike the enhancements.
Defendant appealed again, and his appointed counsel asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

While facing felony assault and battery charges, Curtis Price (appellant) was found incompetent to stand trial, unlikely to regain competency in the foreseeable future, and ineligible for a conservatorship. Based on these findings, the trial court ordered appellant released from confinement but denied his motion to dismiss the underlying charges.
On appeal, appellant contends the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss because he was found unlikely to regain competency and ineligible for a conservatorship. Respondent concedes the motion to dismiss should have been granted but contends the appeal should be dismissed as taken from a nonappealable order. We agree the order denying the motion to dismiss is not appealable, but in light of respondent’s concession, we elect to treat the appeal as a petition for extraordinary relief, and issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to grant the motion to dismiss.

Defendant Abraham VegaLopez was convicted by jury of four counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a)). On July 14, 2020, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 40 years as follows: the court imposed the upper term of 16 years on count 1; a consecutive middle term of 12 years on count 2; and two fully consecutive lower terms of six years each on counts 3 and 4. The court imposed a $300 restitution fine, a $160 court operations assessment, and a $120 court facilities assessment. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on August 18, 2020. On the prosecutor’s motion on August 19, 2020, the trial court amended the $300 restitution fine in September 2020 and imposed a $10,000 restitution fine instead.

A jury convicted Kevin Jay Light (appellant) of numerous offenses for the rape of his girlfriend’s 14-year-old daughter. The trial court sentenced appellant to 11 years in state prison.
On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction for rape by threat (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(6)), because there was no evidence the victim heard or was aware of his threats. We conclude the evidence was sufficient because appellant’s threats dissuaded the victim’s mother from attempting to stop the rape. In addition, appellant contends the trial court erroneously omitted an element of rape by threat in the jury instructions. We agree, but conclude any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for criminal threats (§ 422). Respondent concedes the evidence was insufficient.

B.B. (mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to her daughter, H.M. (the child), and freeing the child for adoption. Mother argues the juvenile court erred by not finding applicable the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), and by not adopting a less drastic permanent plan for the child, such as legal guardianship. We find no error and affirm.

Defendant and appellant R.V. (Father) and E.V. (Mother) are the parents of C.V. (female, born 2014), R.V. (male, born 2018), Ru.V. (female, born 2021), and Re.V. (female, born 2019; Minor.) Father appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying his petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and termination of his parental rights under section 366.26. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the juvenile court’s findings and orders.

Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, and Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath D. Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This dependency matter involves four children: K.C. (born June 2015), H.C. (born July 2017), B.C. (born July 2018), and J.C. (born May 2020). The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of defendants and appellants D.C. (father) and N.M. (mother), freeing the children for adoption. Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to advise her of her writ rights when it ordered her reunification services terminated, and that it applied the wrong standard in terminating her reunification services as to J.C. She also argues that the juvenile court erred by denying her petitions requesting reinstatement of reunification services as to all of the children based on changed circumstances. Father joins in mother’s arguments. We affirm the judgment.

Marco Antonio Barrera pled guilty to attempted murder in 2002 and was sentenced to 38 years in prison. In 2019, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended recalling his sentence and resentencing him based in part on his exemplary behavior while in prison. The trial judge did recall the sentence, but after hearing argument resentenced Barrera to the exact same term. Barrera appealed, and we initially affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Shortly after our decision, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1540) went into effect, which changed the procedure for recall and resentencing upon a recommendation from the CDCR. On rehearing, Barrera argues he is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of the changes to the law and the appropriate remedy is remand to the trial court for a new hearing on his petition. We agree, reverse, and remand.

After entering a no contest plea to felony assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, Michelle Diaz Duran failed to comply with a term of her plea agreement that required her to appear at her sentencing hearing. Although the parties agreed to a suspended sentence, because Duran failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, the court imposed the upper term of four years in state prison.
On appeal, Duran contends the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (Senate Bill 567), which amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) to make the middle term the presumptive sentence absent certain circumstances. Duran further contends the minute order and abstract of judgment reflect a conviction for the wrong offense, and she requests the documents be corrected to reflect the conviction is for assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury.
The Attorney General agrees with Duran on both contentions.

Vicki Hebert filed a putative class action against Barnes & Noble, Inc. (Barnes & Noble), alleging it willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.; hereafter, the FCRA, or the Act). The FCRA requires an employer like Barnes & Noble to provide a job applicant like Hebert with a standalone disclosure stating that the employer may obtain the applicant’s consumer report when making a hiring decision. (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(h), 1681b(b)(1)(A).) According to Hebert, Barnes & Noble willfully violated the FCRA by providing job applicants with a disclosure that included extraneous language unrelated to the topic of consumer reports.
Barnes & Noble filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that no reasonable jury could find its alleged FCRA violation was willful. It asserted it included the extraneous information in its disclosure due to an inadvertent drafting error.

In 2005, David Raynoha entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to testify against his codefendants. In return for his cooperation, Raynoha was allowed to plead guilty to second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The remaining charges and allegations were dismissed, and the parties agreed to a sentence of 15 years to life. Because of the nature of the plea agreement, Raynoha was required to testify to the details of the crime as the factual basis of the plea.
Raynoha was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement.
In 2020, Raynoha filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel, received briefing, and reviewed the record of conviction. The court denied the petition by written order without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC) and holding an evidentiary hearing.