CA Unpub Decisions

Scott Meyer appeals the trial court's order of June 1, 2011 requiring him to pay his former wife Martie Meyer $5,000 in attorney fees pursuant to Family Code[1] section 2030 (attorney fees order).[2] Scott also appeals a June 24, 2011 order increasing his child support obligation (child support order) from $2,000 to $4,132.
As we explain, we agree with Scott's contention that the court erred in awarding Martie attorney fees because there is no evidence in the record whatsoever proffered by Martie—including, by way of example only, billing records or statements and/or a sworn declaration from counsel—showing the work done and time spent by her counsel in opposing Scott's passport motion. We therefore vacate the attorney fees order based on the lack of (substantial) evidence in the record to support it.
As we further explain, we affirm the child support order because we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion when it made findings regarding the respective income and expenses of Scott and Martie, which findings we also conclude are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Defendant Tera Lee Nicholson pled no contest to unlawfully driving under the influence of alcohol and the enhancements of causing bodily injury to more than one victim and causing great bodily injury to one victim. Before sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw her plea. The court denied her motion and sentenced her to seven years four months in prison. On appeal, defendant contends the court abused its discretion by denying her motion to withdraw her plea because her prior counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Disagreeing, we affirm.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant Dennis Wayne Gunn pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); unless otherwise stated, statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code). At sentencing, defendant was denied probation and sentenced to state prison for three years, that term to be served in state prison because the probation report showed he had a prior conviction for first degree burglary committed in Oregon in October 1977.
On appeal, defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to establish that his first degree burglary conviction in Oregon also constituted a first degree burglary in California. We agree with defendant and shall reverse the trial court’s order that the three-year term be served in state prison.

A jury convicted defendant Billy Dewayne Williams of two counts of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); unless otherwise stated, all statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code; counts 1 & 2), two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 3 & 4), and one count of dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1); count 5). The jury found that defendant personally used a firearm in connection with all counts (§ 12022.53, subd. (b) (counts 1-4); § 12022.5, subd. (a) (count 5)).
The court sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate term of 30 years eight months.
Defendant appeals, contending the trial court committed sentencing error. We will vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

The mother, L.M., appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388 petition as to the child, Du. M. The mother argues it was an abuse of discretion to deny her section 388 petition seeking reinstatement of unification services and increased visitations with the child. We affirm the order.

D.G., the father of Z.G., appeals from a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 parental rights termination order. The father contends there was noncompliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California provisions. The Department of Children and Family Services agrees. We agree likewise. (In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 736-740; In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 471-472.) The parental termination rights order is reversed. Upon remittitur issuance, the juvenile court is to comply with the federal Indian Child Welfare Act requirements and related state provisions. If no tribe seeks to intervene, the juvenile court is to reinstate the parental termination rights order. (In re Gabriel G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1168; In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 708.) We leave the issue of what to do if a tribe asserts jurisdiction over the child in the good hands of the juvenile court.
The parental termination rights order is reversed. Upon remittitur issuance, the juvenile court is to comply with the requirements imposed by the Indian Child Welfare Act and related state provisions. If no tribe seeks to intervene, the juvenile court is to reinstate the parental termination rights order.

James Thomas Brennan appeals from a September 18, 2012 order revoking probation and sentencing him to concurrent three-year state prison terms in case numbers BA394829 and BA399400.
In Case No. BA394829 appellant pled to guilty possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and admitted suffering two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d))[1] and three prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Pursuant to an March 15, 2012 open plea agreement, appellant was conditionally released to enroll and complete a one-year residential drug treatment program at the Los Angeles Transition Center (LATC).

The issue presented in this insurance coverage action is whether a claim was “received” by an insured corporation within the meaning of a “claims made” insurance policy before the date on which the policy was cancelled. The trial court interpreted the term “received by the insured,” which was undefined in the policy, to mean that a claim letter was deposited in the mailbox at the insured’s place of business. Applying the presumption accorded by Evidence Code section 641, the trial court then found that two claim letters sent by first class mail to the insured’s address of record was received by the insured before the policy cancellation date, despite testimony by the insured’s sole employee that he did not see either letter until after the instant lawsuit commenced. The trial court concluded that the claim was covered under the policy and on that basis entered judgment against the insurer. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Wesley White was charged in an amended information with felony possession of methamphetamine for sale, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378 (count 1); felony possession of hydrocodone, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a) (count 2); and misdemeanor possession of a smoking device, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364.1 (count 3). The information further alleged that appellant had been convicted of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and that he had suffered prior convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), and within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c). After opening statements, the prosecutor moved to add a felony charge of transportation of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379, as a fourth count. The trial court granted the motion over the objection of defense counsel.

Marina Read appeals from judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining, without leave to amend, the demurrer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank)[1] to her complaint for cancellation and rescission of a mortgage deed. We affirm.

Stephen Loveman, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from (1) a postjudgment order setting permanent spousal support at $3,000 per month, (2) an order denying his request to set aside the support order, and (3) an order requiring him to pay the reasonable attorney fees of his former wife, respondent Maureen Loveman. We affirm the first and second orders and reverse the third order.

A modification decision.

Jaki Nelson, in propria persona, appeals from the judgment entered in favor of her former employer, Jones Day, following the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Jones Day. We affirm.

This case is before us on remand from the California Supreme Court. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s instructions, we have vacated our previous opinion in this case and reconsidered the cause in light of Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407] (Miller). We conclude that the outcome remains the same.