CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Kenneth Don Nelson sued defendant Alaska Airlines in San Francisco County Superior Court, claiming that defendant was not entitled to charge him and similarly situated persons an approximately $22 “Mexican tourism tax” when selling them tickets for travel between California and Mexico. Defendant asserted by demurrers that plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (49 U.S.C. § 41713) (ADA), and had other defects.

Robert D. Rodriguez appeals an order for child support of his four-year-old daughter who lives with her mother, Margaretha Smit, in Nevada. He contends the court erred in determining the parents’ income and expenses when setting the amount of child support. We find no error and shall affirm the order.

Tanya Thompson (appellant), formerly known as Tanya Nemick, appeals from the trial court’s orders granting the motion of Brian Krippendorf (respondent) as to child support and denying the request of appellant to modify custody and visitation. We affirm the child support order but remand for reconsideration of appellant’s request regarding custody and visitation under the proper standards.

Plaintiff Regulo Sierra sued his former attorneys, defendants Paul H. Melbostad and his law firm, for legal malpractice. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint without leave to amend on the ground the malpractice claims were time-barred.
Plaintiff, in pro. per. both here and below, purports to appeal from (1) the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and (2) an order denying reconsideration of that order.
Neither order is appealable. (Nowlon v. Koram Ins. Center, Inc. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1440; Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1458–1459; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 154, pp. 230–231, § 165, pp. 241–242.) Accordingly, we hereby dismiss this appeal.[2]

In December 2011, appellant was convicted by a jury of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14, Jane Doe, then eight-years old. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on three years probation. Claiming that the trial court erred in admitting evidence from a witness concerning appellant’s wife’s statements to that witness, appellant asks that his conviction be set aside. We disagree with his contentions and hence affirm his conviction.

Appellant, Robert Lee Braman, was charged with possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and possessing a syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4140, a misdemeanor). It was also alleged that appellant suffered a prior strike (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled no contest to the possession of methamphetamine charge and admitted the prior strike. The misdemeanor and the prior prison were dismissed.
At sentencing, appellant’s motion to strike the strike was denied, as was probation. On the possession of methamphetamine conviction, appellant was sentenced to the low term of 1 year and 4 months, doubled for the strike, for a total of 32 months.
Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike appellant’s prior “strike” conviction. The prior was a 1984 robbery conviction. In exercising its discretion, the court stated: “. . . I looked at this very closely but I just simply don’t see it in the interests of justice under [Penal Code] section 1385 to grant the Romero[1] motion. In particular in light of what we have over the last 10 years where we have a repeated sentence to state prison, and the motion under Romero is denied.”

Plaintiff Caroline Mason (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment following its order sustaining, without leave to amend, the demurrer of defendant The Presbytery of San Francisco (respondent) to her first amended complaint. We affirm.

County of Marin (Marin County or the county) enacted an ordinance intended to encourage the use of reusable bags by banning single-use plastic bags and imposing a fee on single-use paper bags. The ordinance applies to roughly 40 retailers in unincorporated parts of the county. The county determined the ordinance was categorically exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) because it was a regulatory action designed to assure the maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or protection of natural resources and the environment.[1] Plaintiff Save the Plastic Bag Coalition (plaintiff) sought a writ of mandate directing the county to set aside its ordinance for failure to comply with CEQA. On appeal from a judgment denying the writ, plaintiff raises various arguments supporting its view that the challenged ordinance is not categorically exempt from CEQA. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Kenneth Dwayne Johnson appeals from a judgment of conviction for resisting an executive officer and three misdemeanor batteries, for which he received probation, subject to certain terms and conditions. He argues the judgment must be reversed because he was deprived of his rights to effective assistance of counsel and to present a defense, and because the trial court abused its discretion in denying his various Marsden motions. We affirm the judgment.

The two civil harassment proceedings underlying these appeals arise out of plaintiff Elizabeth Karnazes’s limited legal representation of defendants John Ferry (appeal No. A132500) and Kirsten Petersen (appeal No. A132501), and an arrangement to which the three agreed whereby Petersen worked for Karnazes, in part as a legal assistant, in exchange for Karnazes’s legal services. As the relationship soured, Karnazes, on the one hand, and Ferry and Petersen, on the other, made heated accusations against one another. Karnazes eventually obtained civil restraining orders against Ferry and Petersen.
Ferry and Peterson appeal from several orders issued during the proceedings: (a) orders issued May 24, 2011, granting Karnazes’s ex parte requests for a continuance of the hearing date on her restraining order applications; (b) orders issued June 30, 2011, denying Petersen’s motion to consolidate the two harassment proceedings and denying Petersen’s and Ferry’s motions to further continue the hearing date; and (c) the restraining orders issued July 1, 2011. For the reasons set forth, we affirm the challenged orders.[1]

After preparing an environmental impact report, respondent City and County of San Francisco (city) approved a project to rezone land along the Market Street corridor near Octavia Boulevard and to redevelop 22 vacant parcels created by the removal of the elevated Central Freeway. The city amended its general plan to include a new Market and Octavia Area Plan and conformed its planning code and zoning maps. Plaintiffs Coalition for Adequate Review and Alliance for Comprehensive Planning filed a writ petition in the trial court challenging the city’s amended general plan and environmental review of the project. The trial court denied relief and we affirm.

In this timely appeal, Aaron Frazier (appellant) challenges the trial court's refusal to reinstate him on probation following a contested probation revocation hearing. Appellant argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the court not to reinstate him on probation; he asserts that this abuse of discretion requires reversal of the judgment. For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.

B.A. (Mother) appeals after the juvenile court declared her five children, now 12‑year‑old R.A., 10‑year‑old N.A., eight‑year‑old M.A., four‑year‑old O.A., and two‑year‑old K.A. (collectively, the children), dependent children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and vested custody of the children with their father (Father). (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Mother argues the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders are not supported by substantial evidence and the court erred by providing her with enhancement services instead of reunification services.
We affirm. For the reasons we will explain, substantial evidence supported the court’s orders. The court did not abuse its discretion by providing Mother with enhancement services.

In this marital dissolution matter, Earl Stawicki appeals from a judgment after trial. He contends the superior court erred when it made two evidentiary rulings. Kellie Stawicki did not file a brief in this court.[1]
With regard to the court’s first ruling, Earl states: “On May 3, 2012, the second day of trial, Respondent’s counsel marked for identification Exhibit A . . . , Exhibit B . . . , and Exhibit C . . . . Exhibits A, B, and C were official written communications from the Internal Revenue Service, bearing the seal of the IRS. Counsel for Respondent moved the Court to allow Exhibits A through C into evidence, while counsel for Petitioner objected based on hearsay . . . . The Court sustained Petitioner’s objection . . . .” [Fn. omitted.]
The record on appeal contains no exhibits. The clerk’s transcript from the superior court, which was received by this court on October 3, 2012, contains a clerk’s note which states: “The Superior Court is not in possession of designated Respondent’s Exhibit Nos. A, B and C and all have been omitted.”