CA Unpub Decisions

The dispositive issue in this case is whether, under principles of collateral estoppel, a judgment in a federal lawsuit on federal civil rights claims based on police conduct bars state law claims brought in state court based on the same conduct. We conclude collateral estoppel bars the state court lawsuit.
Adolf Anthony Sanchez Gonzalez (Decedent) was shot and killed in an incident with two Anaheim police officers. His mother and minor daughter (by and through her guardian ad litem, David Vazquez) filed a complaint in federal court (the Federal Complaint) against the City of Anaheim and the two officers. The Federal Complaint asserted civil rights claims under 42 United States Code section 1983 and five state law claims. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the civil rights claims and concluded the police officers did not use excessive force, act unreasonably, engage in conduct that shocked the conscience, or engage in conduct amounting to an independent violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The federal court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

Contractor Integrated Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Integrated Artisan Builders, sued restaurant franchise owner Ying Kang (Kang), for damages incurred due to breach of contract and Kang cross-complained. The court awarded damages to Integrated Enterprises, Inc. and nothing to Kang. On appeal, Kang claims Integrated Enterprises, Inc. was entitled to nothing because it was unlicensed during the performance of the contract, the court erred in admitting into evidence an exhibit itemizing Integrated Enterprises, Inc.’s estimated damages, and the evidence did not support the damages award in any event.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the party who contracted with Kang was sole proprietor Paul Yakel (Yakel), doing business as Integrated Artisan Builders, and that Yakel was properly licensed at all times from the date of contract to the date of termination of contract. Yakel’s undisputed testimony shows that Integrated Enterprises, Inc. assumed the contract between Integrated Artisan Builders and Kang, and Kang has failed to show that Integrated Enterprises, Inc., having assumed that contract, cannot enforce it. We hold that to the extent of any error in the admission of the exhibit into evidence, the error was harmless error. However, we also hold that the trial court erred in awarding to Integrated Enterprises, Inc. an amount of damages exceeding the benefit of the bargain. Consequently, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

A jury convicted defendant Derrick Fields of two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and one count of street terrorism (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)). As to the robbery counts, the jury found true gang enhancements (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and firearm enhancements (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years eight months in state prison.[1] Defendant raises a variety of issues in this appeal, including the admissibility of a prior conviction and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting enhancements found true by the jury. Defendant also asserts sentencing errors occurred with regard to the imposition of certain statutory fines. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant John Carl Agnew has been committed as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) since 2004. In this appeal, he contends the law permitting his continued MDO commitment is based upon an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. We reject this premise and affirm the order for a one-year extension of defendant’s commitment for treatment.

On appeal, defendant Tyrell D. Dickerson asks this court to review the material disclosed at the in camera hearing following his Pitchess[1] motion. Next, defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for burglary. Additionally, defendant maintains his due process rights were violated when the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.15. Lastly, defendant asserts that the October 1, 2011, amendments to Penal Code[2] section 4019 must be applied to his case. We disagree with defendant and affirm the judgment in its entirety.

This case involves an appeal and a protective cross-appeal. The appeal is from a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding $230,685 to Sandstone Marketing, Inc., and awarding nothing to Mt. Whitney Farms, LLC, and Felger Farms. (In accordance with the parties’ practice in their briefs, we will refer to Mt. Whitney Farms, LLC, and Felger Farms, collectively, as “the growers” and to Sandstone Marketing, Inc., as “Sandstone.”) The growers contend the jury’s verdict was contrary to the law, precluded by the growers’ contract with Sandstone, and unsupported by sufficient evidence. In a protective cross-appeal, Sandstone contends an erroneous jury instruction on its breach of contract cause of action requires a new trial on that cause of action in the event that the verdict on another cause of action is reversed in accordance with the growers’ theory on appeal. We conclude there is no merit to the growers’ contentions on appeal and affirm the judgment. As a result, we do not reach the issue raised by Sandstone.

Defendant and appellant B.D. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders as to her two children, 11-month-old N.E. (N.) and six-year-old B.B (B.). Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s disposition order. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Bryce Allen Austin pled guilty to second degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.)[1] In return, the remaining allegations were dismissed and defendant was placed on probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions, including serving 270 days in county jail and paying the cost of probation supervision to be set by the probation department in an amount between $591.12 and $3,750.[2]
Defendant subsequently violated probation when he was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550) and a new case was filed.[3] Defendant admitted to violating probation, and was reinstated on probation on various terms and conditions, including serving his remaining 168 days in county jail, consecutive to the other terms of 90 and 10 days in custody. On appeal, defendant contends that the matter must be remanded to allow the trial court to set the amount of the cost of probation supervision and to determine his ability to pay the cost of probation supervision. We agree and will remand the matter to the trial court for a hearing on these two issues pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.

While trick-or-treating with his younger brother on Halloween night in 2011, E.B., the minor, approached Tomas R., asked if Tomas had some marijuana, and when Tomas turned around, punched Tomas several times in the face, causing a fractured nose, an orbital fracture, and two facial lacerations. The minor was charged by way of a delinquency petition with one paragraph alleging aggravated assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), with an enhancement allegation relating to the infliction of great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)), and a second paragraph alleging battery with serious bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d).) The petition was sustained following a court trial and the minor was placed on probation. The minor appealed.
On appeal, the minor claims the court erred (a) in permitting the victim to invoke his right to remain silent on cross-examination; (b) in not ordering count 2, the battery count, stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654; and (c) in making true findings on both the aggravated assault and battery counts based on the same acts. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant, James Jacques, Jr., of transporting more than 28.5 grams of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 1360, subd. (a)[1] and possessing marijuana for sale (§ 11359). He was granted probation and appeals, claiming that the defense of being part of a medical marijuana collective is unconstitutionally vague, evidence was improperly admitted, the evidence was insufficient and the jury was misinstructed. We reject his contentions and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant, Hector Rueda, III, of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)), during which he used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 664/192, subd. (a)), during which he used a knife and inflicted serious bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and carrying a dirk or dagger (§ 12020, subd. (a)(4)). He was sentenced to prison for 12 years and appeals, claiming evidence was improperly excluded, the jury was misinstructed and the sentencing court erred in imposing certain fees. We reject his contentions, while directing the trial court to correct errors in the minutes of the sentencing hearing and the abstract of judgment.

At the six-month review hearing in the juvenile dependency case of Matthew G., the juvenile court granted the modification petition of the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388, subd. (c)(3))[1] and terminated reunification services for Matthew's father, John M. John appeals, contending he was deprived of procedural due process because the petition did not allege that continued services would be detrimental to Matthew. John also contends the evidence is insufficient to support the detriment finding; the finding that he was provided reasonable services; and the finding that his action or inaction created a substantial likelihood reunification would not occur. We affirm.

In 1983, Ruben Wilfide Jimenez entered a negotiated guilty plea to possessing heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350) and was placed on probation for a period of three years. In 2012, Jimenez filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied the motion. Jimenez appeals, contending that the court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion. We affirm.

This appeal by Thomas Dean Jennings,[1] who previously was convicted in 2002 of four counts of residential burglary that qualified as strikes[2] under the Three Strikes law, involves two new criminal cases (SCD229068 & SCD236226) and seven new felonies he committed in 2010 during four more residential burglaries.