CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant, K.T. (Mother), appeals from May 16, 2012, orders terminating parental rights to Mother’s fourth child, J.T., a girl born in July 2010, and placing J.T. for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] Mother does not challenge the propriety of the order terminating parental rights or placing J.T. for adoption. Instead, Mother claims that the juvenile court reversibly erred in failing to consider placing J.T. with J.T.’s maternal aunt, T.T. (Aunt), at the time of the May 16, 2012, section 366.26 hearing, or in June 2011 when J.T. needed a new placement. (§ 361.3.)
We reject Mother’s challenge to the order refusing to consider Aunt for placement or to place J.T. with Aunt because Mother has no standing to challenge that order. Mother does not claim that the failure to place J.T. with Aunt, at any time, had or would have had any bearing on the court’s decision to terminate parental rights. Thus, Mother is not aggrieved by the court’s refusal to consider Aunt for placement. (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 238-239 (K.C.) [parent lacks standing to challenge placement order on appeal when parent does not claim the order had any bearing on court’s decision to terminate parental rights].)

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered against plaintiffs and appellants, Salam Haddad et al., (hereafter collectively referred to as plaintiffs) in their action seeking damages, among other things, for wrongful death against defendants and respondents, Forbes Industries and The Winsford Corporation (defendants). Plaintiffs are the surviving wife and children of Nail Haddad, who was killed the morning of May 21, 2009, in a head-on collision with Rueben Michael Garcia (Garcia), who was driving the wrong way on a freeway off ramp. Garcia was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision and had a blood-alcohol level of 0.23. Defendants are Garcia’s employers, whom plaintiffs sued on the theory that Garcia was acting in the course and scope of his employment when the accident occurred.
Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting it was undisputed that Garcia had not come to work on the day of the accident. Therefore, defendants asserted it was undisputed that the accident that killed Nail Haddad had not occurred in the course and scope of Garcia’s employment. The trial court found there was no triable issue of material fact on that element of plaintiffs’ complaint and granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor.

Gregory Allen Spani appeals the order granting him probation[1] after a jury found him guilty of possessing and transporting methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11377, subd. (a), 11379, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1210.1, subd. (a).) Spani contends the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the methamphetamine because it was obtained as a result of an illegal search. We reject this contention and affirm.

A modification decision.

Melike Dewey Hershberger, whom the superior court has determined to be a vexatious litigant, appeals from the judgment of nullity of her marriage to Richard Hershberger.[1] We affirm.

Jose A. (Father) appeals from the September 26, 2012 order terminating his parental rights over L.A., contending that the juvenile court committed reversible error by failing to make a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father was an unfit parent. We disagree because the court made a finding of detriment based on substantial clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.

Minor Sergio M. appeals from the order of wardship entered following a finding that he committed attempted robbery. Minor contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that he committed attempted robbery because there was no evidence he used force. We affirm.

Richard Edmond entered a negotiated plea of no contest to two counts of second degree robbery and admitted a Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a) personal gun‑use allegation. In conformity with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 10 years in prison. Defendant’s plea pertained to robberies of employees of two different Rite Aid stores on Ventura Boulevard on September 21 and 26, 2011. According to the probation report, defendant and two accomplices committed the robberies, with one member of the group driving and remaining in the car and the other two donning masks, entering the stores with guns, pointing the guns at store personnel, and removing money from cash registers and the safe. A witness to the September 21, 2011 robbery provided a license plate number to the police, who kept the vehicle under surveillance. Police followed the vehicle to and from the September 26, 2011 robbery, arrested defendant and his accomplices, and recovered the money taken from the store.

Appellant Maria R. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing her son, Roger G., from her physical custody. The essential issue on appeal is whether there was substantial evidence supporting the order. We conclude that there was such evidence.

In an order dated August 3, 2012, the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over I.J. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),[1] and declared I.J. a dependent child of the court. The court found that the domestic violence between appellant Maurice L. (father) and Shelly J. (mother) endangered I.J.’s physical health and safety. Father argues that there was no substantial evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional finding. We reject father’s argument and affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Appellant Gary Brown challenges the trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of respondents UBS Financial Services, Inc. (UBS), and Barry Bayat. He argues that the court erred in granting respondents’ motion to compel arbitration. We affirm.

Melike Dewey Hershberger, whom the superior court has determined to be a vexatious litigant, appeals from an order entered in this conservatorship proceeding concerning Richard Hershberger.[1] The underlying facts are described in our opinion in a previous, related appeal and need not be repeated in detail here. (See In re Hershberger (Aug. 31, 2012, B236505) [nonpub. opn.].) In summary, Richard suffers from dementia, and two professional fiduciaries (Emily Stuhlbarg and Richard Norene) currently serve as conservators of his person and estate. In June 2010 (before the conservatorship proceedings were initiated), Melike picked up Richard from his residence, drove him to Las Vegas, married him there, and dropped him off at his residence a few days later, having charged all expenses for the trip to his credit card. (Ibid.)
In the previous appeal, Melike sought reversal of several orders, including the orders granting the petition for probate conservatorship and her petition for removal of conservator. (See In re Hershberger (Aug. 31, 2012, B236505) [nonpub. opn.].) On August 31, 2012, we filed our opinion affirming the orders. (Ibid.)

Mandell Jacques Evans appeals from a judgment following a jury trial. He contends the trial court erred in imposing a “minimum” restitution fine in the amount of $240 under Penal Code section 1202.4,[1] as the minimum amount was $200 when he committed his crimes. Because appellant did not object to the amount of the restitution fine in the trial court, we conclude appellant has forfeited this argument. Accordingly, we affirm.

An amended information, filed on March 12, 2012, charged William Wesley Garzon with five counts: (1) murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)); (2) driving under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)); (3) driving with a blood alcohol percentage of .08 percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23512, subd. (b)); (4) driving with knowledge of a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (a)); and (5) gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)). The amended information specially alleged that Garzon had prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol percentage of .08 percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23512, subds. (a) & (b)), once in 2008 and again in 2010, and a prior conviction for driving with knowledge of a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (a)). After trial, the jury found Garzon guilty on counts 2 through 5 and found true the special allegations regarding his prior convictions. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count 1, and the trial court dismissed that count without prejudice. The court sentenced Garzon to a state prison term of 16 years 348 days to life, consisting of 15 years to life for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, with prior convictions under Vehicle Code section 23512, plus a consecutive one-year term for driving with knowledge of a suspended license and 348 days for a probation violation. The court imposed one-year prison terms for the convictions for driving under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug and driving with a blood alcohol percentage of .08 percent or higher but stayed execution of those sentences pursuant to Penal Code section 654 (section 654).