CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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Appellant Charles Holmes, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on count 1 – first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) with personal and intentional discharge of a firearm, and personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)) with a finding he committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang (former Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)), and on count 2 – dissuading a witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (a)(1)) with a court finding that he suffered two prior felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for 125 years to life. We affirm the judgment.[1] |
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Appellant Richard Mancilla appeals from the judgment entered in superior court case No. BA382452 following his plea of no contest to unlawful firearm activity (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and from the judgment entered in superior court case No. BA386152 following his plea of no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) with an admission in each case that he suffered a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d)), following the denial of a suppression motion (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) in each case. The court sentenced appellant to prison for 32 months in case No. BA386152, with a consecutive term of 16 months in case No. BA382452. We affirm the judgments.
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Defendant Hugo Eliseo Cabrera appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a); undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code), one of which was based upon rape in violation of section 261, subdivision (a)(2), and the other upon sexual penetration, in violation of section 289, subdivision (a); one count of committing a lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (a)); and one count of sexual penetration of a child under the age of 14 (§ 289, subd. (j)). Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated sexual assault on a child under the age of 14 and that the trial court erred by failing to give a unanimity instruction. We agree with defendant’s sufficiency of evidence contention and reduce his convictions in the those counts and strike the resulting duplicative count 4, which the parties agree was based upon the same act of penetration as count 2.
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John Anosike filed a complaint for damages against respondent Covenant Transport, Inc. (Covenant), alleging employment discrimination, wrongful termination, and violation of the medical leave law. Respondent moved for a stay of the proceedings, seeking to enforce a forum selection clause in a written employment agreement. The superior court granted the motion for a stay, finding the forum selection clause valid. Appellant appealed from the superior court’s order granting the motion to stay, contending the forum selection clause was unconscionable and violated California public policy. Finding no error, we affirm.
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Plaintiff and appellant Reba Aghchay (plaintiff) appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants and respondents U.S. Bank N.A., successor in interest to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver for PFF Bank and Trust, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and California Reconveyance Company (defendants), following the trial court’s sustaining of defendants’ demurrer to the original complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in concluding that her complaint was barred by res judicata and in denying leave to amend. We disagree and affirm.
In 2004, plaintiff borrowed $1,120,000.00 from Washington Mutual Bank, FA and executed a deed of trust (Deed of Trust) on the property located at 3784 Deervale Drive, Sherman Oaks, California (Property) securing payment of the loan. Washington Mutual Bank, FA was the lender and beneficiary of the Deed of Trust, and California Reconveyance Company was the trustee. In December 2008, a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust was recorded stating that plaintiff owed $65,810.79 in “past due payments plus permitted costs and expenses.†A trustee’s sale in connection with the deed of trust was held on August 25, 2009 at which JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. purchased the Property. In October 2009, an Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded assigning all beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank N.A. |
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Defendant Marcos Antonio Campos appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of committing a forcible lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 and continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14. Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. We affirm.
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Plaintiffs and appellants Doctor Osamu Kitajima and Yoko Kitajima appeal a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendants and respondents Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank), First Franklin, a division of National City Bank of Indiana (First Franklin) and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend. The gravamen of the FAC is that defendants commenced and conducted nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on plaintiffs’ residential real property in Woodland Hills (the property) in violation of certain statutes and in breach of the deed of trust plaintiffs executed. We shall reject all of plaintiffs’ arguments and affirm the judgment.
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Defendant and appellant, Anthony Jerry Cabrera, appeals his conviction for voluntary manslaughter with an enhancement for use of a deadly or dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 192, 12022, subd. (b)(1)).[1] He was sentenced to state prison for 11 years.
The judgment is affirmed. |
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Alexander Bermudez challenges the amount of restitution awarded to a victim who lost his home as a result of Bermudez’s criminal conduct. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating restitution based on an appraised value of the home at the time of the crime. We disagree and affirm the restitution order.
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Appellant was convicted of battery resulting in serious bodily injury. The victim of the crime testified that appellant hit her on the head and slashed her with a knife. Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it needed to reach unanimous agreement as to which of these acts constituted the battery. Appellant also contends that the trial court should not have permitted the victim to testify about having been hit on the head, because this evidence was not presented at the preliminary hearing. Finally, appellant contends that the trial court should have stricken a witness’s comments comparing appellant’s appearance to that of Charles Manson, because they were more prejudicial than probative. We find no error warranting reversal of appellant’s conviction, and therefore affirm.
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Defendant pleaded no contest to felony possession of a shotgun (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (e))[1] and misdemeanor participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)),[2] and was placed on probation for three years with gang conditions. This timely appeal, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress pursuant to section 1538.5, followed. We affirm. |
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First Community Bank’s (FCB) second amended complaint alleged a fraud claim against Bank of the West. The trial court sustained Bank of the West’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding FCB failed to allege facts showing it justifiably relied on Bank of the West’s alleged misrepresentation or failure to disclose information. In reaching this conclusion, the court took judicial notice of several documents, including deposition testimony, a contract between the parties, property appraisals, and a credit authorization memorandum. On appeal, FCB contends the court erred by: (1) taking judicial notice of and weighing extrinsic evidence proffered by Bank of the West; (2) concluding the second amended complaint did not state a cause of action for fraud; and (3) staying discovery pending Bank of the West’s demurrer to the operative complaint. We reverse. We assume for the sake of argument the court properly took judicial notice of the documents proffered by Bank of the West and the facts asserted within them (and, where relevant, the legal effect of the documents). We conclude, however, that the judicially noticed documents do not negate the allegations of the operative complaint. Because the operative complaint stated a cause of action for fraud, the court erred by sustaining Bank of the West’s demurrer without leave to amend. We therefore reverse the judgment in favor of Bank of the West. |
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