CA Unpub Decisions

This appeal follows a defense verdict in a case brought by a passenger in a vehicle who sustained serious injuries after a tire blowout and collision. The passenger, Alex Novak, brought an action against the tire manufacturer and the mechanic who had previously serviced the vehicle. Novak stated causes of action for strict product liability and negligence against the tire manufacturer for failing to provide a warning that tires degrade with age and should be replaced after about six years even if the tire shows good tread depth. Novak sued the mechanic for negligence in failing to warn about the danger of old tires when rotating the tires and performing other maintenance on the vehicle.
Following pretrial evidentiary rulings that excluded some of Novak’s evidence, the court granted the tire manufacturer’s motion for a nonsuit on the strict liability cause of action and the jury returned a defense verdict for both the manufacturer and the mechanic on the negligence cause of action. Plaintiff appeals, contending that he was prejudiced by both evidentiary and instructional errors. We agree that the court prejudicially erred in excluding relevant and admissible evidence and in refusing a jury instruction necessary to the jury’s fair consideration of the case, and shall therefore reverse the judgment.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of appellants Joseph D. and Mary F. to their minor children, William and James D. Both parents appeal,[1] challenging the juvenile court’s determination and alleging that Joseph’s bond with the minors outweighed the benefits of adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[2] § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm the juvenile court orders.

On June 15, 2011, Reno Lucky Breschi pleaded no contest to all of the counts he was charged with and admitted the two prison prior convictions. He did so with the understanding that the court would sentence him to four years in state prison.
The charges were grand theft of an automobile in count 1, grand theft of a value over $400 counts 2 and 6, unauthorized use of motor vehicles counts 3 and 4, receiving a stolen motor vehicle count 5, passing bad checks counts 7 and 8, receiving stolen property counts 9 and 10, second degree burglary counts 11 and 12, and forgery counts 13 through 17. The information also alleged that he had served two prior prison terms.

A jury convicted defendant Frederick Brown of corporal injury upon a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))[1] and misdemeanor child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (b)). On appeal, defendant argues the child endangerment conviction must be reversed because the trial court inadequately responded to a jury question regarding endangerment of a child’s mental health. In the alternative, defendant contends the child endangerment conviction must be reversed because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request a clarifying instruction regarding endangerment of a child’s mental health. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.

Before the operative date of the Criminal Justice Realignment Act (Stats. 2011, 1st Ex.Sess. 2011-2012, ch. 12, § 1; Pen.Code, § 1170, subd. (h))[1] (hereafter the “Act” or “the Realignment Act”), defendant Casey Davidson pleaded no contest to the crime of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and the trial court placed him on probation with a suspended five-year prison sentence. After the operative date of the Realignment Act, defendant admitted a violation of probation, the trial court executed the five-year sentence, and the trial court ordered defendant to serve the sentence in prison. Defendant appeals the order committing him to prison. Defendant contends that, because his sentence was executed after the operative date of the Realignment Act, the trial court was required to commit him to county jail for service of his sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse the order committing defendant to prison.

Appellant Charles E. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s order issued at a contested 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f))[1] terminating his reunification services as to his three-year-old son, Christopher. Charles contends he substantially complied with his court-ordered services. Therefore, he further contends, the juvenile court erred in terminating rather than extending the time for him to complete them. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s termination order and affirm.

Appellant filed a quiet title action against respondent. Respondent’s demurrer was sustained with leave to amend. Appellant filed a first amended complaint that was substantially identical to the original complaint and did not file any opposition to respondent’s demurrer to the first amended complaint.[1] The court sustained respondent’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend. This appeal followed.

Petitioner K.S. (father) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court’s order denying reunification services as to his son, K.S. (the child), and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26 hearing. On May 21, 2013, this court stayed the section 366.26 hearing, pending further order. We lift the stay.
Father now argues that: (1) the petition failed to plead essential facts to support allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e); (2) there was insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction on the basis that father abused the child; (3) the juvenile court erred in denying the child’s mother (mother)[2] and him reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5); and (4) the child should have been placed with the maternal grandmother. We deny the writ petition.

This is an appeal by defendant and appellant Jonathan Gregory Hutter (defendant) from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty as charged of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)), count 1),[1] three counts of forcible oral copulation with a child under the age of 14 years, who was seven or more years younger than defendant (§ 269, subd. (a)(4), counts 2-4), two counts of rape of a child under the age of 14 years (§ 269, subd. (a)(1), counts 5 & 6), forcible sodomy of a child under the age of 14 years, who was seven or more years younger than defendant (§ 269, subd. (a)(3), count 7), and lewd conduct with a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a), count 8). The jury also found true a multiple victim special allegation. (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5).)

Cynthia Leigh Morrow appeals a judgment following her conviction of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))[1] and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). On appeal, she contends the trial court erred by imposing certain fines and fees. She also contends the probation order does not correctly reflect the number of days of presentence custody credits awarded by the court.

A modification decision.

In this appeal, plaintiff Leonardo Orozco seeks reversal of trial court orders granting the defendants' motion for nonsuit, denying his motion for leave to amend his prayer for relief to seek an equitable remedy, denying his motion for a new trial, and sustaining defendants' demurrer to one of the causes of action alleged in his original complaint. We discern no prejudicial errors in these orders and affirm the judgment.

Lori A. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders made on September 19, 2012, removing her son, Ethan H. (Ethan, born Dec. 2006), from her custody. The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction with an exit order giving Ethan’s father, Anthony H. (father), sole legal and physical custody of Ethan. The juvenile court ordered that mother’s visits with Ethan be monitored until she completed a drug treatment program, with random drug testing and individual counseling.
On appeal, mother claims: (1) the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in revising the existing custody order and fashioning the exit order.
We affirm.

Darius Gant appeals from the judgment following his conviction for willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187/664, subd. (a)), and possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5). The jury found that he personally used a firearm causing great bodily injury in the attempted murder (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)), that the attempted murder was gang related (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)), and that Gant had a prior drug conviction (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352). Gant was sentenced to life in prison with a 15-year minimum parole eligibility date for the attempted murder plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. He received an eight-year concurrent sentence for the drug offense.
Gant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the attempted murder conviction, the trial court erred in denying a mistrial after the victim suffered a seizure during his trial testimony, and that he was denied trial by a fair and impartial jury due to juror incompetence and misconduct. We affirm.