CA Unpub Decisions

Luis Antonio Robles appeals from a final judgment of conviction, based upon a
plea of no contest, for the following violations against a minor under the age of 14 years: sodomy by means of force (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2))[1]; sexual intercourse by means of force (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); two counts of oral copulation by means of force (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)); and residing with or having recurring access to a child under the age of 14 years, and engaging in acts of substantial sexual conduct or acts of lewd or lascivious conduct. (§ 288.5, subd. (a)). Appellant’s counsel raises no issues, and requests an independent review of the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Ca1.3d 436. Appellant was advised by counsel of his right to file a supplemental brief but he has not done so. Based on our review of the record, we find no arguable issues and affirm the judgment.

Defendant entered a plea of no contest to one count of sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and one count of possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378).[1] In accordance with the plea agreement, imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for three years, on the conditions, among others, that he comply with a drug treatment program, and refrain from use of medical marijuana if so directed by the program. He argues in this appeal that the proscription against his use of medical marijuana is invalid. We conclude that under the circumstances presented the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to abstain from marijuana use as a condition of his probation, and affirm the judgment.

Heather G. appeals from juvenile court orders taking jurisdiction over her two children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. She contends the court erred in overruling her demurrer to the petitions, and abused its discretion and violated her constitutional rights by unduly limiting cross-examination of her daughter. She further contends there was insufficient evidence to support the petitions.[1] We affirm.

Appellant Medic Ambulance Service, Inc. (Medic) had a contract (the Agreement) with respondent Solano Emergency Medical Services Cooperative (SEMSC), a government agency, that gave Medic the exclusive right to provide advanced life support (ALS) ambulance services in a specified geographical area. The Agreement obligated SEMSC to enforce Medic’s exclusivity rights, and provided for a contractual claims procedure in the event of a dispute. After Medic learned that some ALS ambulance transports were being handled by competing ambulance services, the parties engaged in informal communications and negotiations regarding the enforcement of Medic’s exclusivity rights. These efforts were unsuccessful, and Medic sued for breach of contract.
SEMSC demurred on the basis of Medic’s failure to follow the contractual claims procedure. Medic amended its complaint to allege that SEMSC was estopped from relying on Medic’s failure to comply with the contractual claims procedure as a bar to Medic’s damages claims. The trial court found Medic’s estoppel allegations insufficient, and sustained SEMSC’s renewed demurrer without leave to amend. On this appeal, we hold Medic’s fourth amended complaint pleaded sufficient facts to support Medic’s estoppel claim. We therefore reverse, and remand for further proceedings.

On the evening of October 29, 2008, Shivnesh Reddy was robbed and shot to death during a marijuana sale. Appellant Jimmy Nabong was charged with the killing and convicted by jury of robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c))[1] and first degree murder under a felony-murder theory (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). Nabong was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 50 years-to-life in prison, plus a concurrent term of 3 years, plus 25 years to life for the robbery.
On appeal, Nabong contends the trial court erred in: (1) admitting evidence of his gang affiliation; (2) sustaining a defense witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and (3) refusing to compel the prosecution to grant immunity to the witness. He argues that the errors should be assessed cumulatively. He also contends that the prison term imposed on the robbery count must be stayed pursuant to section 654. We modify the judgment to stay the sentence on the robbery count, but otherwise affirm.

Once again, we are presented with an appeal involving the dissolution of the marriage of Ester Adut and Joshua Sakov. It is a happening akin to the rites of Spring or the return of the swallows. Here, appellant Ester Adut, makes several arguments in this appeal. Appellant contends there was an absence of evidence presented to the trial court to support the amount of income imputed to her and used to determine a modified child support order. The Attorney General, appearing pursuant to Family Code section 17406 to “represent the public interest in establishing, modifying, and enforcing support obligations,” concedes on behalf of intervener and respondent that appellant’s claim is clearly meritorious.[1] While a trial court has authority to impute income to an unemployed parent, the calculation must be supported by substantial evidence. The case must be reversed and remanded for a proper evidentiary hearing allowing appellant to demonstrate her ability to earn income attributed to her. The ruling by the trial court commissioner was error and the prejudice requires us to reverse the order appealed. Because we reverse on this issue, we need not address the numerous other contentions raised by appellant.[2]

F.G. (father) and C.G. (mother) appeal from a juvenile court judgment terminating their parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)[1] concerning their son, F.G. (born 2001), and daughter, S.G. (born 2003). Father challenges the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s rejection of his evidence and argument that the case came with the exception to termination described by section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) (no termination if termination would be detrimental to the child because the parents maintained regular visitation and the child could benefit from continuing the relationship). Mother agrees with father’s argument and asserts that we must reverse the judgment as to her if we reverse the judgment as to father. We affirm the judgment.

Petitioner Angela M. in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested 18-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22, subd. (a))[1] terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her five-year-old son Jordan, three-year-old son Hunter and one-year-old son Brett. We deny the petition.

In March 2012, appellant, Alberto E., a minor, admitted an allegation set forth in a juvenile wardship petition that he committed the offense commonly known as active participation in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)). At the disposition hearing later that month, the juvenile court adjudged appellant a ward of the court; declared the offense to be a felony; placed appellant on probation, with various terms and conditions; and ordered him committed to the Kings County Juvenile Academy Alpha Program (Alpha Program) for a period of 90 days to one year.
In June 2012, it was alleged appellant violated his probation by failing to comply with the rules and regulations of the Alpha Program. At the hearing in July 2012, appellant admitted the allegation. At the subsequent disposition hearing held later that month, the court readjudged appellant a ward of the court, continued him on probation and ordered him committed to the Kings County Juvenile Academy Impact Program for a period of 180 days to one year. Appellant appeals from this most recent disposition order.

Defendant challenges the rate at which he was awarded conduct credits for time spent in county jail prior to commencement of his sentence. We find no error and affirm.

A jury convicted appellant, Damien Lee Davis, of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)),[1] and found true allegations that in committing that offense, appellant personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). In a separate proceeding, the court found true a prior prison term enhancement allegation (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that appellant had suffered six prior felony convictions, each of which qualified as a “strike”[2] and as a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a) (section 667(a)). The court imposed a prison term of 47 years to life.
Appellant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish the truth of two of the strike allegations and two of the section 667(a) prior serious felony enhancement allegations, and (2) the court erred in calculating appellant’s sentence under section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(iii). The People concede these points. We reverse true findings on two of the strike allegations, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.

Defendant and appellant Douglas Wayne Klein contends the trial court prejudicially erred in suggesting to the deadlocked jury that it might find helpful, among other things, asking for a readback of any trial testimony requested by any juror. We conclude the court’s comments were neutral and did not intrude into the jury’s deliberations. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Joshua Ray White contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for residential burglary and vandalism. He also contends imposition of concurrent sentences on the two offenses violated Penal Code section 654. We conclude the evidence was ample and that his sentencing contention is moot. We affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered after a jury trial. Defendant and appellant William Dean Farley contends the trial court prejudicially erred in ordering defendant shackled during trial. We conclude the trial court’s determination was supported by the record and that, in any event, any error was not prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.