CA Unpub Decisions

B.S., defendant and appellant (hereafter father), appeals from the trial court’s order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] terminating his parental rights to his then seven-year-old daughter, K.F. Father contends the so-called beneficial parental relationship exception to parental rights termination applies in this case. We disagree and, therefore, we will affirm.

Defendant and appellant Kevin Terrell Lee pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and admitted that he had suffered one prior serious and violent felony strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2(A)). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to a total term of six years in state prison with credit of 464 days for time served.
Approximately one year later, in June 2012, defendant filed a petition to modify his presentence custody credits pursuant to amended Penal Code section 4019, which became operative on October 1, 2011. The trial court summarily denied that petition. Defendant appeals from the denial of his request to modify his presentence custody credits. We find no error and affirm. However, as pointed out by appellate counsel, the abstract of judgment incorrectly notes that defendant was convicted by a “jury,” rather than by a “plea,” and we will therefore order the abstract of judgment amended accordingly.

On October 7, 2011, the trial court entered the default of Chun K. Kim, D.D.S., and TMJ Head and Neck Pain Center, a business organization, form unknown;[1] default was entered in the sum of $350,000. On November 29, 2011, defendant’s request to set aside the default was denied. On February 17, 2012, an uncontested default hearing was held. After hearing the testimony of Plaintiff and Respondent Nancy Bryant, the court ordered judgment in the amount of $350,395. Defendant and Appellant Chun K. Kim appeals.

Plaintiff and appellant Anita Brandt (Brandt), a real estate lender, brought this action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and unfair business practices against real estate brokers and salespersons involved in a loan transaction. She also sued the borrowers for nonpayment.
Following a court trial, the trial court ruled that one person, Shannon Grant (Grant),[1] was the broker for the loan within the meaning of Business and Professions Code[2] section 10232.4.[3] The trial court further ruled that defendant and respondent Jeffrey Maas (Maas) and Earl William Dexter (Dexter)[4] were not brokers for the transaction within the meaning of the section. It also ruled that Maas and defendant and respondent National One Mortgage (National One) had “no broker/princip[al] relationship” with Brandt.
Brandt appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its application of the law to the facts. Maas and National One (collectively, respondents) respond by arguing that section 10323.4[5] does not apply because they only represented the borrowers and did not solicit the lender, Brandt.[6] Defendants and respondents Mary and Terry Epley did not file a brief.

On October 29, 2010, plaintiff and appellant Mary Bernadette Schwenn filed a third amended complaint against Riverside County Department of Animal Services (the County) and eight individual animal control officers[1] employed by the County.
On December 8, 2010, defendants filed a demurrer to the third amended complaint. On January 20, 2011, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment.[2]

Nazario Alonso appeals from the denial of his "nonstatutory" motion to withdraw his 2004 guilty plea to a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11358. His motion, and this appeal lumped together a request for nonstatutory relief, habeas corpus and a request for relief by writ of coram nobis. We will dismiss the appeal because Alonso has failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause in the trial court as required by Penal Code[1] section 1237.5. We also find we do not have jurisdiction to review the denial of a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court since such denial may only be reviewed by filing an original petition in this court, and not by way of appeal. Even if we were inclined to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which we are not inclined to do, we would still dismiss the petition because Alonso is not "in custody" in this case. Finally, there is no basis in the record for coram nobis relief.

Defendant Uriel Perez contends there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of a rifle and possession of ammunition. Perez argues that although he was arrested in a motel room where methamphetamine, indicia of drug sales, the rifle and the ammunition were found, it was unreasonable to infer that he possessed any of those items. We reject Perez's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. In light of Perez's incriminating behavior both before he was found in the motel room and after he was discovered there, a jury could reasonably infer his connection to the physical evidence found in the motel room and in turn Perez's culpability for the charged offenses.
Perez also argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences for his firearm and ammunition convictions. Because the two crimes were separate and distinct offenses, they were properly punished consecutively.

Franswa Shammam appeals a judgment entered following his jury conviction of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).[1] Although the murder was committed in 1994, Shammam was not charged with murder until 2008. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to dismiss the case because the 14-year pre-accusation delay denied him his state and federal constitutional rights to due process; (2) instructing with CALCRIM No. 362 on consciousness of guilt; and (3) not granting him an alternative remedy to dismissal of the case.

Plaintiff Midway Venture, LLC (Midway) appeals an order granting defendant Peter Luster's motion to disqualify Midway's counsel in its action against him for interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage. On appeal, Midway contends: (1) Luster did not have standing to move to disqualify its counsel; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding of a conflict of interest; (3) the court did not rule on its evidentiary objections; (4) the court erred by considering a witness's deposition testimony; (5) the court did not perform the required balancing analysis; and (6) the court should have considered options less drastic than disqualification of its counsel.

T.L. (father) and J.S. (mother), the parents of two-year-old Y.L., appeal from an order of the San Joaquin County Juvenile Court terminating their parental rights.
On appeal, father contends the juvenile court erred when it (1) entered a dispositional order bypassing his reunification services before it found the dependency petition was true, and (2) failed to inquire regarding his heritage as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). Mother joins in father’s arguments and asserts that, if the order terminating parental rights is reversed as to father, it must also be reversed as to her. We conclude that while the juvenile court may have entered its dispositional order against father prematurely, the court reaffirmed the order at a later hearing. In any event, any error was harmless. With regard to ICWA, we conclude there is no evidence an inquiry was made as to father’s Indian heritage. Accordingly, the matter must be remanded for ICWA compliance.

In August 2011 defendant Robert Charles Johnson pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and admitted he had served four prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). A strike allegation (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) was stricken on the prosecutor’s motion.[1]
In September 2011 defendant was sentenced to state prison for seven years. Execution of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for three years on the following conditions, among others: that he serve a period of incarceration and complete a one-year residential treatment program.
In December 2011 a petition was filed alleging defendant violated his probation by committing a robbery. (§ 211.) In February 2012 he pleaded no contest to misdemeanor battery (§ 242), and the trial court found him in violation of his probation. Probation was revoked and execution of the prison sentence was ordered. Defendant was awarded 174 days’ custody credit and 87 days’ conduct credit. Defendant objected unsuccessfully that recent legislation and principles of equal protection entitled him to an additional 87 days’ conduct credit.
On appeal, defendant claims recently amended section 4019, operative October 1, 2011, entitles him to a “bifurcated” award of conduct credit, and equal protection requires that current section 4019 be applied retroactively to this case. We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Tiersa Brown asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Oscar Alexander Barrientos asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error, we affirm the judgment.
In October 2008, Maria Cerna, her boyfriend, Hugo Enrique Garcia (Hugo), and her children lived in West Sacramento. Cerna and Hugo worked during the day, and the children were in school.
On October 23, 2008, as Cerna was leaving for work, an unfamiliar teenage girl knocked on the door and asked for Cerna’s daughter. After Cerna said her daughter was not home, the girl walked to a car, which Cerna had seen before parked nearby, and got into the driver’s seat; a young, slender Hispanic male (later identified by Cerna as defendant) was in the passenger seat.

Appellant Brian S. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders establishing dependency jurisdiction over his daughters B.S., Am.S., and S.S., and placing them in foster care. Father contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j).[1] Father further contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by removing Am. from his care and by not placing B. and S. in his care. We affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders.