CA Unpub Decisions

Helen H. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s finding that T. H. is a child described by Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivision (b). Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. We affirm.

In their appeals, Christina Williams (Williams) and Roger Meyer (Meyer) each challenge the trial court's award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717.[1] We reject their challenges. However, we remand so the trial court may consider whether to grant Williams's request for an offset.

C.H. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court after it sustained a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and found he had committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). We conclude, among other things, that: 1) substantial evidence supports the finding that C.H. used force to maintain possession of an item he stole from a market, 2) the evidence is sufficient to support the actus reus and mens rea components of robbery, and 3) there is sufficient proof in the record to identify C.H. as the perpetrator. We affirm.

Appellant Christopher Lee Alfred appeals from the judgment of conviction following a jury trial in which he was convicted of four felonies: Criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422)[1] (counts 1 & 2); first degree burglary (§ 459) (count 3); and threatening a witness) (§ 140, subd. (a)) (count 4). As to all counts, the jury found true the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). As to count 3, the jury also found true the allegation that another person other than an accomplice was present in the residence during the burglary (§ 667.5, subd. (c)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegations that appellant had suffered one prior “strike” conviction (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)).
The trial court sentenced appellant to a total of 23 years in state prison as follows: On count 3, the base term, the court selected the midterm of four years doubled to eight years for a second strike; plus five years for a prior serious felony conviction; plus 10 years for the gang enhancement. The court stayed the two-year midterm sentences on counts 1 and 2 and the three-year midterm sentence on count 4.
Appellant contends there was no substantial evidence to support his conviction for criminal threats against one of the victims (count 1) and that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threats. We disagree and affirm.

To aid his quest to become a United States citizen, defendant and appellant Pranav Natuarlal Patel filed, under Penal Code section 1203.4,[1] a motion to expunge his felony conviction for sexual battery by restraint. In support of the motion, Patel submitted his declaration and exhibits showing why the interests of justice, in the trial court’s discretion, justified relief. Because the record does not demonstrate that the trial court considered the merits of Patel’s petition and exercised its discretion, we remand this matter.

Plaintiffs filed this action against their former employer, alleging causes of action arising out of the termination of their employment. The employer filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision contained in a document entitled, “Dispute Resolution Process” (DRP). When plaintiffs were hired, they signed an acknowledgement form stating they agreed to submit disputes to arbitration. They opposed the motion to compel arbitration on the ground that the arbitration provision in the DRP was unconscionable. The trial court ruled in plaintiffs’ favor and denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
We conclude the trial court erred. Although the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable, none of its provisions is substantively unconscionable. We therefore reverse the order denying the motion to compel arbitration.

Karen Valle (Valle) appeals her felony conviction for attempted dissuasion of a witness by force or threat. We reject her challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the trial court's instructional and evidentiary rulings. We affirm.

Jayson Matheaw Schimmel (Schimmel) was charged and convicted of physically abusing and ultimately killing his 10-week-old son. He now challenges his convictions and his prison sentence of 37 years to life. We affirm his conviction and sentence.

Appellant Martha Vincent leased her house in Westlake Village, California (Premises), to respondents Dawn Christie and Johnny Pequignot for both residential and commercial purposes. In the ensuing unlawful detainer action (case No. B235672), Vincent succeeded in evicting respondents from the Premises and obtained a money judgment for unpaid rent. Thereafter, respondents filed a civil action (case No. B235047) against appellants Vincent and her husband Billy Ridge alleging various claims pertaining to the lease and eviction. Vincent cross-complained in the civil action.[1] We have consolidated the two cases for purposes of appeal.

Appellant Robert Carlos Ramirez was charged with 32 felony counts. He pled nolo contendere to two counts of using a device to defraud a telephone company (Pen. Code, § 502.7, subd. (a)(5))[1] (counts 1 & 3) and to three counts of identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)) (counts 5, 6 & 7). He also admitted the allegation that he took, damaged and destroyed property in excess of $65,000 within the meaning of section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court sentenced appellant to a total of three years in state prison, consisting of the midterm of two years on count 1, plus one year pursuant to section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(1). The same three-year sentences were imposed on each of counts 3, 5, 6 and 7 and ordered to be served consecutively, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court awarded appellant 561 days of presentence custody credit, consisting of 375 days of actual custody credit and 186 days of conduct credit.
Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that he should have received 375 days of “one-for-one” conduct credit, for a total of 750 days of presentence credit. The People agree, and so do we.

Defendants James Ha[1] (Ha) and Nam Kyung Cho (Cho) appeal from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff 139 S. Occidental Boulevard, LLC (the LLC).[2] We affirm the judgment as modified and dismiss Cho’s appeal.

Locker, LLC filed an anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16) to strike the complaint for wrongful eviction filed by Mark Harris. Although Harris filed no opposition, the trial court believed the matter authoritatively resolved by Clark v. Mazgani (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1281 (Clark), and denied the motion. We agree that Clark—and our own decision in a similar setting—are dispositive, and we affirm.

Plaintiff Richard Howard sought to certify a class of California consumers who allegedly received from defendant Trans Union, LLC, boilerplate descriptions of how it investigated complaints about credit reports—descriptions allegedly lacking the detail required by California’s Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCCRAA) (Civ. Code, § 1785.1 et seq.).[1] The trial court denied Howard’s motion for class certification on numerous grounds. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion, and affirm.

Eugene Richardson appeals from his conviction of first degree felony murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.)[1] The killing resulted from an armed robbery in which Richardson, then aged 16, participated and during which he personally used a firearm. Upon conviction, Richardson was sentenced to 35 years to life in prison.
In this court, he raises constitutional challenges to both his conviction and his sentence. Richardson claims his conviction offends the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because as a minor, he lacked the cognitive ability to form the necessary intent. Similarly, he argues that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, because it is based on the presumption he harbored the same intent as an adult offender.
We find neither of Richardson’s arguments persuasive. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.