CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and respondent JMJ Financial Group[1] commenced foreclosure proceedings with respect to the multi-unit rental property of defendant and appellant Thomas Hewko. Hewko sought the assistance of defendants Denise Honc, Boyan Panajotov, and notary public Rita P. Thomas to gum up the works and delay the foreclosure. Hewko claims to have tendered payment of all sums due on his loan by delivering to JMJ Financial Group a “private registered setoff bond” in the amount of $1,150,000, issued by himself as underwriter, for the credit of JMJ Financial Group, and payable to the order of the United States Treasury, which was authorized to demand payment by presentment to Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner. Hewko and the other defendants, via their respective participation, signed, notarized and/or recorded, a variety of other documents including a reconveyance of all interests under the deed of trust of JMJ Financial Group.
JMJ Financial Group filed a lawsuit and obtained the appointment of a receiver with respect to Hewko’s property. Hewko and Honc, each appearing in propria persona, appeal from the order appointing a receiver and from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.[2] They have failed to meet their burden to show that the court erred in granting the application to appoint a receiver. In addition, because they have failed to provide any argument in support of their appeal from the order denying the motion for reconsideration, they have abandoned any challenge to that order. We affirm.

Dana S., the paternal grandmother and former legal guardian of Trinity S., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders made at the 18-month review hearing terminating Dana’s reunification services and the guardianship, and setting a review hearing under section 366.3. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.22, 728.)[1] Dana challenges the juvenile court’s findings of detriment if Trinity were returned to her care and that she was provided reasonable services, arguing there is insufficient evidence of both and the juvenile court failed to state a factual basis for its detriment finding. Dana further contends the juvenile court erred when, after terminating her reunification services and guardianship, it set a section 366.3 hearing instead of a section 366.26 hearing, and her trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

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Wife appeals from a judgment which set the amount of support to be paid by husband to wife as temporary child and spousal support during pendency of the dissolution action and as permanent post judgment child support. She contends the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by retroactively modifying the temporary support; alternatively, it abused its discretion by reducing the support amount retroactively. Further, she contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to take into account husband’s wealth and substantial assets, rather than just his income, in setting child support. We agree the retroactive modification of child and spousal support exceeded the trial court’s jurisdiction. As to post judgment child support, no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated.

The juvenile court terminated E.W.’s (Father) parental rights to his daughter, L.P. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)[1] and denied Father’s request to change a court order (§ 388). Father contends the juvenile court erred by terminating his parental rights because the court should have applied the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Father contends the juvenile court erred in denying his request to change a court order because Father proved his circumstances had changed and he had a strong bond with L.P. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Martin Reynada pled guilty to three counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 with force, fear or violence. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1).)[1] As to each count, he also admitted to engaging in substantial sexual conduct with the victim. (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).) In return, defendant was sentenced to a total term of 21 years in state prison with credit for time served. Defendant appeals from the judgment, challenging the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea, as well as the validity of the plea or admission. We find no error and affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Amida Ested Hasan guilty of two counts of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4), counts 1 & 2) and two counts of misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242, counts 3 & 4). The jury also found true that in the commission of count 1 defendant had personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a).)[1] After the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, defendant was sentenced to a total term of eight years in state prison with credit for time served. Defendant appeals from the judgment. We find no error and affirm.
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Ozel contends the trial court erred by entering judgment in the amount of $51,353.84 because (1) the jury awarded Freden compensatory damages for the failure to pay overtime, when statutorily, Freden can only be awarded the overtime wages without any further damages; and (2) the trial court miscalculated the wait time penalty. We reverse the damages portion of the judgment.

Brittany H. appeals judgments declaring her minor daughters, A.P. and Danielle P., dependents of the juvenile court and removing A.P. from her custody. Brittany challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings as to both minors and its dispositional order as to A.P. We affirm the judgments.

At Reed's first parole hearing, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) found him unsuitable for parole. The BPH found the commitment offense was particularly egregious under many indices and, considering numerous other factors (including Reed's prior criminal record, his disciplinary record while incarcerated, his failure to gain insight into the commitment offense, and his psychological evaluation), Reed was not currently suitable for parole. The BPH further concluded a 10-year denial of parole was appropriate under the circumstances.

A jury convicted defendant Scott Everett Papenhausen of selling or furnishing methamphetamine ("Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)" Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count I), possession of methamphetamine ( "Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)" Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) as a lesser included offense to that charged in count II (possession for sale, "Health & Saf. Code, § 11378" Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and misdemeanor resisting ( "Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)" Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) as a lesser offense to that charged in count III (resisting by means of threat or violence, "Pen. Code, § 69" Pen. Code, § 69). In connection with count II, the jury found that defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, to wit, a ceramic lamp ( l "Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)" Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In bifurcated proceedings, defendant admitted two prior prison term allegations ( "Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)" Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and a prior drug conviction allegation ( "Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)" Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)).
Sentenced to state prison, defendant appeals. He contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance and the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing. We will affirm the judgment. We do find errors in the abstract of judgment which must be corrected. Relevant facts will be recounted in our discussion of defendant’s contentions.

Defendant Raven Jones, Jr., was part of a group of young men who committed three residential burglaries on an October night in Folsom. They were caught attempting to break into a fourth house. When police arrived, defendant was in the front passenger seat of codefendant Perry Aquino’s car, which was parked in front of the house. Aquino was on the porch. Another man, Jeffrey Santos-Green, was alleged to have been part of the group. He was found about a mile away, walking through a parking lot in the rain, and was believed to have jumped the back fence when defendant and Aquino were arrested. Property taken during the three burglaries was found in Aquino’s car. Defendant and Aquino were convicted by jury of three counts of first degree burglary and one count of attempted first degree burglary. The trial court sentenced each man to state prison for an aggregate term of five years and four months.[1]
On appeal, defendant asserts: (1) there was insufficient evidence to prove that he either directly perpetrated or aided and abetted the commission of the burglaries and attempted burglary; and (2) the trial court prejudicially erred in declining his request to instruct the jury with certain language from CALJIC No. 3.01 on aiding and abetting. We disagree. As we explain, the record contains substantial evidence defendant aided and abetted the commission of the crimes. We also conclude the jury was appropriately instructed with CALCRIM No. 401 on aiding and abetting. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Justin Marcel Washington appeals from the judgment entered following
his plea of “no contest” to one count of attempted murder in violation of Penal Code[1] sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a). Defendant admitted a gang allegation under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) and an allegation under section 1170, subdivision (h)(3), which required him to serve his sentence in state prison due to serious and violent felony convictions. Pursuant to the plea bargain accepted by defendant, the trial court sentenced him to the high term of nine years for the attempted murder and a consecutive term of 10 years for the gang enhancement, for a total sentence of 19 years. The trial court granted defendant 306 actual custody days and 46 days of conduct credit
(15 percent) for a total of 352 days. (§§ 667.5, subd. (c), 2933.1.)
We appointed counsel to represent appellant on this appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief containing an acknowledgment that they had been unable to find any arguable issues. On January 2, 2013, we advised defendant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished us to consider. On February 4, 2013, we granted defendant an extension of time until February 15, 2013, to file his supplemental brief. No response has been received to date.

Appellant Miguel Sazo appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on count 1 – kidnapping to commit forcible oral copulation, sodomy, or rape (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)),[1] four counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2); counts 2, 6, 8, & 13) with findings as to each of counts 2 and 6 that appellant committed aggravated kidnapping (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)) and as to each of counts 2, 6, 8, and 13 that appellant committed an offense against multiple victims (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5)), count 4 – forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) with findings appellant committed aggravated kidnapping (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)) and an offense against multiple victims (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5)), count 5 – attempted forcible sodomy (§§ 664, 286, subd. (c)(2)), count 7 – criminal threats (§ 422), two counts of forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2); counts 10 & 14) with findings as to each count that appellant committed an offense against multiple victims (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5)), count 11 – second degree robbery (§ 211), and two counts of impersonating a public officer (§ 146a, subd. (b); counts 12 & 15). The court sentenced appellant to prison for 141 years to life. We affirm the judgment.

S.A. (Mother) appeals from the order made at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing (hereafter the .26 hearing)[1] terminating her parental rights to her three children: D.A., X.I., and G.I.[2] X.I. and G.I. were placed with a paternal aunt who wanted to adopt them. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying a motion to continue the .26 hearing, originally made by the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), when it learned the agency conducting the paternal aunt’s adoption home study had declined to proceed with it. SSA requested additional time to further assess whether the paternal aunt’s home study could be approved. Mother also contends the lack of an approved home study established the paternal aunt was unable to adopt the children, but because the paternal aunt could provide them with a stable and permanent home and removal of the children from her care would be detrimental, the juvenile court erred by not applying the relative caregiver exception to termination of parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(A).)
SSA has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot accompanied by a motion to take additional evidence and augment the record on appeal with a postjudgment status review report and the juvenile court’s minute order approving SSA’s recommendations contained in the report. SSA reported the paternal aunt’s adoption home study has been completed and approved, and her adoption of the children is ready to be finalized. Mother opposes SSA’s motions. We conclude augmentation of the record on appeal is appropriate, and in view of the subsequent events, Mother’s appeal is moot. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.