CA Unpub Decisions

The trial court found Darald Albert Dickerson was a sexually violent predator (SVP) and ordered him to be committed indefinitely to Coalinga State Hospital pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 6600 et seq. On appeal, Dickerson contends the judgment must be reversed because (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move for dismissal of the petition; and (2) the order for indefinite commitment violates his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process, and the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment. We find no violation of Dickerson’s constitutional rights, and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Henry Glover seeks reversal of the judgment below, in which he was found guilty of possessing a concealed firearm, on the ground the police conducted a patdown search of him that violated his federal constitutional rights against improper search and seizure. We affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury convicted defendant Alan Nusser of second degree robbery. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation with a condition that he serve 10 months in jail. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of third-party culpability, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Mark Steven Simmons appeals from an order extending his involuntary commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, §§ 2970, 2972.)[1] He claims the court erred in failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial, failing to obtain his personal waiver, accepting counsel’s jury waiver, and conducting a bench trial.
We affirm the extension order.

S.A. (Mother) appeals from the order made at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing (hereafter the .26 hearing)[1] terminating her parental rights to her three children: D.A., X.I., and G.I.[2] X.I. and G.I. were placed with a paternal aunt who wanted to adopt them. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying a motion to continue the .26 hearing, originally made by the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), when it learned the agency conducting the paternal aunt’s adoption home study had declined to proceed with it. SSA requested additional time to further assess whether the paternal aunt’s home study could be approved. Mother also contends the lack of an approved home study established the paternal aunt was unable to adopt the children, but because the paternal aunt could provide them with a stable and permanent home and removal of the children from her care would be detrimental, the juvenile court erred by not applying the relative caregiver exception to termination of parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(A).)
SSA has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot accompanied by a motion to take additional evidence and augment the record on appeal with a postjudgment status review report and the juvenile court’s minute order approving SSA’s recommendations contained in the report. SSA reported the paternal aunt’s adoption home study has been completed and approved, and her adoption of the children is ready to be finalized. Mother opposes SSA’s motions. We conclude augmentation of the record on appeal is appropriate, and in view of the subsequent events, Mother’s appeal is moot. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

James Roy Glenn was adjudged a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA),[1] and was placed in involuntary commitment for an indeterminate term. Glenn was 82 years old at the time of trial in early 2008. He appealed, and later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus also challenging the order of commitment. We issued an order to show cause and consolidated the writ petition with the appeal. We later issued an opinion affirming the order of commitment and denying the writ petition. (People v. Glenn (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 778, review granted Feb. 10, 2010, S178140 (Glenn I).)
The California Supreme Court granted Glenn’s petition for review and deferred further action in the matter pending consideration and disposition of People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I). After issuing its opinion in McKee I, the California Supreme Court issued an order transferring this case back to us with directions to vacate our opinion and to reconsider the cause in light of McKee I. The Supreme Court further ordered: “In order to avoid an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings, the court is additionally directed to suspend further proceedings pending finality of the proceedings on remand in McKee [I] [citation], including any proceeding in the Superior Court of San Diego County in which McKee may be consolidated with related matters.”
Division One of the Fourth Appellate District of the Court of Appeal subsequently issued its opinion in People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325 (McKee II). After the California Supreme Court denied review of McKee II, we issued an order lifting the suspension of proceedings in this matter and inviting the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs addressing the effect of McKee I on Glenn’s equal protection claim. Having considered the supplemental letter briefs, we now reject Glenn’s equal protection claim. Our opinion includes issues and arguments addressed in Glenn I because the California Supreme Court ordered us to vacate that opinion. We again affirm the order of commitment and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Amanda G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders and findings at the jurisdiction and disposition hearings that it has jurisdiction over her daughter, Savannah C., born in March 2012. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence at the jurisdiction hearing to sustain allegations in the petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j).[1] We disagree and affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Defendant challenges the rate at which he was awarded conduct credits for time spent in county jail prior to commencement of his prison sentence. We find no error and affirm.

Defendant Iscander Francisco Madrigal was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) following a seven-day jury trial. The jury further found true the special allegations that the murder was committed to further the activities of a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), and that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). On appeal, defendant contends his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was violated when the trial court allowed a gang expert to testify as to hearsay statements regarding contacts between defendant and other law enforcement officers. In addition, he claims this same testimony violated his due process rights, and further argues that any failure to preserve these issues constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We find that any error in admitting the contested testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, we conclude defendant has not demonstrated his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to additional testimony. Consequently, we affirm the judgment.

Petitioner B.C. (mother) is the mother of a baby boy, I.L. (the child), who was born in July 2012 and immediately removed from mother’s care based on her substance abuse and mental health issues and failure to reunify with the child’s sibling born fifteen months earlier. In this writ petition, mother challenges the juvenile court’s decision to take jurisdiction of the child under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300, subdivision (b).[1] Specifically, mother argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s true findings that mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues constituted a substantial risk of detriment to the child. However, mother does not address the other bases for the jurisdictional order, that is, the court’s true findings on failure-to-protect allegations that mother failed to reunify with the child’s year-older sibling and failed to obtain prenatal care for the child. As discussed below, because these two unchallenged true findings adequately support the court’s jurisdictional order, we deny mother’s writ petition.

Defendant Nolan James Lockwood induced his wife and his approximately eight-year-old nephew to have sex with each other while he watched. The nephew so testified; he said it happened twice, and that defendant also induced them to orally copulate each other. The wife also so testified, though she said it happened only once. Finally, defendant admitted it to the police. Defendant also admitted downloading child pornography.
A jury found defendant guilty on two counts of nonforcible lewd acts with a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and one count of possession of child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)). Defendant was sentenced to five years in prison, plus the usual fines and fees.
Defendant now contends:
1. The trial court erred by failing to instruct that defendant’s wife was an accomplice as a matter of law.
2. The trial court erred by calculating the restitution fine and the parole revocation restitution fine based on the minimum fine in effect at the time of sentencing, rather than at the time of the crimes.
We find no reversible error. Hence, we will affirm.

Defendant and appellant Mitchell Feliciano Moreno entered a plea agreement and pled no contest to one count of corporal injury to a spouse. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).)[1] A court placed him on probation for a period of three years. Defendant subsequently admitted that he violated his probation, and the court reinstated him on probation. Defendant then admitted that he violated his probation a second time. The court sentenced him to a total term of two years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant argues that the court failed to advise him of his probation revocation due process rights, pursuant to People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 (Vickers), and that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waive those rights before admitting his probation violation. We disagree.

Robert Pruitt testified that he saw defendant shoot one of the two victims in the head; while fleeing, Pruitt heard more shots.
Sheila Chapman testified that she saw defendant driving toward the site of the shooting. Chapman resembled one of the victims; defendant made a U‑turn to take a closer look at her before driving on. Minutes later, she heard shots.
Michael Newell told police that defendant had admitted to him that he shot the victims. A few months later, defendant beat Newell with a brick, “for snitching.”
A strong case, one would think. And, indeed, a jury found defendant guilty on two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), as well as unlawful possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), unlawful possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 12316, subd. (b)(1)), and threatening a witness (Pen. Code, § 140), with various enhancements.

Jennifer D. and Joseph S. appeal orders terminating their parental rights to their daughter, Y.S., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] We affirm the orders.