CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant and appellant Anthony James Medrano guilty of first degree murder, willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, aggravated mayhem, and simple mayhem, after he attacked two older men in a North Hollywood park, killing one and badly injuring the other. Medrano contends: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter; (2) his conviction for simple mayhem must be reversed because it is a lesser included offense of aggravated mayhem; (3) the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately reflect the jury’s verdict; and (4) he is entitled to one additional day of custody credit. Medrano’s second and fourth contentions have merit; his first does not. Accordingly, we order the simple mayhem conviction reversed, which moots Medrano’s third contention. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

Defendant Rolando Calderon appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Senate Bill No. 1437 and Penal Code section 1170.95 petition for resentencing. He contends the court erred in summarily denying his petition without appointing counsel to represent him or allowing briefing. We affirm.

Dimitri Roger appeals from an order denying his motion to set aside the default judgment entered in favor of Haikuhe Chichyan. Chichyan sued Roger for breach of contract and related claims arising from Roger’s lease of real property in Los Angeles (the property). After Roger failed to file an answer, the clerk entered a default, and the trial court entered a default judgment. Roger moved to set aside the default judgment under the court’s equitable powers, asserting he was not personally served and did not learn of Chichyan’s lawsuit until about four months after entry of the default judgment, after which he acted expeditiously to set it aside. The trial court rejected Roger’s argument he was not on notice of the lawsuit, and it denied Roger’s motion for relief from the default judgment, finding based on the process server’s declaration and video evidence that Roger deliberately avoided service of the summons and complaint.

Defendant Willie James Cooks appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. In his original trial, defendant was convicted of murder and attempted murder, after the jury had been instructed on theories of both malice aforethought and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury further found defendant in committing the murder intentionally inflicted death by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, and in committing the attempted murder intentionally inflicted great bodily injury by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. In denying defendant’s section 1170.95 petition, the trial court concluded the true findings on the firearm allegations established defendant was the actual killer and ineligible for resentencing.

Dustin S. (Father) appeals from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring 12-year-old Riley S. and six year old Dustin S., Jr. (Dustin) dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a), after the court sustained allegations that the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm because Father and Kari S. (Mother) engaged in domestic violence, including a physical struggle over Dustin in which both parents grabbed him. Father does not challenge the jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and Mother’s appeal from the same findings has been dismissed.
On March 7, 2022, during the pendency of the appeal, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and entered a juvenile custody order incorporating a mediation agreement under which Father has sole physical custody of the children. We dismiss the appeal as nonjusticiable and moot.

On January 30, 2020, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Joshua Pardue of three counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and one count of attempted second degree robbery (§§ 211, 664). The trial court found that he had two prior “strike” convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison.
Defendant timely appealed, asserting that prejudicial errors occurred during trial which require reversal of the judgment. Specifically, he asserts that (1) the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges to dismiss African-American prospective jurors; (2) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of defendant’s father’s out-of-court identification; (3) the trial court improperly excluded demonstrative evidence of defendant’s walk, tattoos, and teeth;

Salvador Trujillo, convicted of first degree murder in January 2018 after pleading no contest to the charge, appeals the superior court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, arguing the court either engaged in impermissible fact finding at the prima facie stage of the resentencing process or made an improper evidentiary determination of his ineligibility for relief based on uncited portions of preliminary hearing transcripts. Even if the procedures followed by the superior court in this case did not fully comply with the requirements subsequently established by People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 963 (Lewis) and Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) (Senate Bill 775), because the record of conviction demonstrated Trujillo’s ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law, any possible errors were harmless.

In 2001, defendant and appellant Anzylon Williams was charged with attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder. During her trial, the court instructed the jury that it could find the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated if it found the attempted murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the target crime of assault with a firearm. (See People v. Wilson et al. (Mar. 13, 2003, B156275) [nonpub. opn.] [2003 WL 1091052 at p. *2].) The jury convicted defendant of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The court sentenced Williams to 26 years to life in prison.
In 2019, defendant filed a petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 in the trial court claiming the trial court’s instruction on natural and probable consequences rendered her conviction for attempted murder invalid under current law.

Appellant Antonio Perez appeals from a postjudgment order denying his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition. Without appointing counsel for Perez, the trial court found him ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he was convicted of attempted murder, not murder. We affirmed the trial court’s order, and our Supreme Court granted review. Thereafter, People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) held that counsel must be appointed for a defendant upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition, and the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) which, among other things, expanded section 1170.95 to encompass attempted murder. Our Supreme Court has transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of Lewis and Senate Bill 775. We do so, and again affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition.

Defendant Markiques Peppers-Valdovina was sentenced to three years and eight months in state prison after he pleaded guilty to two counts of violating a prior domestic relations protective order and stay away order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(4)) and one count of resisting arrest by threats and violence (§ 69, subd. (a)). At sentencing, the trial court issued a post-conviction criminal protective order under section 136.2 requiring defendant to stay away from the victim, Jane Doe, and their one-year-old daughter. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court lacked statutory authority to include the daughter in the protective order. We shall reverse the criminal protective order as to defendant’s daughter because it is unsupported by the evidence.

Defendant appeals from the denial of a petition filed by the San Francisco District Attorney for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170. In 1993, defendant was sentenced to life without parole after she was convicted of robbery and felony murder. In 2018, her sentence was commuted to 30 years to life. In January 2021, the district attorney petitioned the trial court to recall defendant’s sentence under section 1170 based upon defendant’s rehabilitation while incarcerated. The trial court denied the petition. Defendant’s opening brief contends the denial was an abuse of discretion.
We do not reach the merits but, instead, remand for reconsideration under Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assem. Bill No. 1540), which moved and amended the recall and resentencing provisions to a new section (§ 1170.03).

Appellant was declared a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. He contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering his placement in a locked juvenile facility, Challenge Academy, rather than a less restrictive placement. We conclude the juvenile court acted within its discretion and affirm the placement order.

Defendant Ramon Fletes appeals from a judgment entered after conviction by plea. Appointed counsel for Fletes has filed a brief asking this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Fletes was advised of the right to file a supplemental brief but has not responded. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to Fletes, we affirm the judgment.

Petitioner Sensient Natural Ingredients LLC (Employer) filed a petition for a writ of mandate (Petition) to challenge the Stanislaus County Superior Court’s order overruling Employer’s demurrer to real party in interest Calvin Agar’s (Plaintiff) second amended complaint. We grant the Petition and direct the trial court to vacate its order and issue a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.