CA Unpub Decisions

Following his conviction for receiving stolen property, Matthew Tomas Molina appeals from the judgment, contending the evidence is insufficient to support the victim restitution award. We affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Mario Ramos of stalking and making criminal threats. Appellant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for criminal threats, and (2) the court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threats. We affirm.

Plaintiff Aman Chaudhary filed a malpractice action alleging that Howard Bartnof negligently advised his father to transfer three properties from a family trust into a nonexistent sub-trust, thereby subjecting them to intestate succession. After Aman’s father died, his second wife filed a probate petition asserting a community property interest in the three properties. Aman, the sole beneficiary of the trust, settled the probate petition and pursued this action.
Bartnof filed a successful motion for summary judgment alleging that he owed no duty of care to Aman. The trial court granted the motion. We reverse.

A jury convicted Terrance Jordan of willfully inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subds. (a), count 1), [1] battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d), count 2), mayhem (§ 203, count 3), and assault with a deadly weapon (a knife) (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 4). In counts 1 through 3, the jury found Jordan had personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). As to all counts, the jury found Jordan had personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subdivision (e)).
In a bifurcated proceeding, Jordan admitted he had suffered a prior domestic violence-related conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (e)) and had served two separate prison terms for felony convictions (667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of eight years. On appeal, Jordan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for willfully inflicting injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) Alternatively, Jordan contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery on a cohabitant. We affirm.

The People charged defendant Ricardo Garcia with murder (count 1) and attempted murder (count 2), with enhancements alleged as to both counts that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664/187, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1).)[1] The charged offenses arose from a walk-up shooting. The prosecution theory was that Garcia aided and abetted the crimes by acting as a dropoff and getaway driver for the actual shooter.[2] A jury acquitted Garcia of first degree murder, convicted him of second degree murder, and acquitted him of attempted murder. As to the second degree murder guilty verdict, the jury found that the offense was committed to benefit a criminal street gang and that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death.
The trial court sentenced Garcia to a total term of 40 years to life in state prison comprised of a term of 15 years to life on the murder count and 25 years for the firearm enhancement. The court ordered Garcia to pay $7,280 in direct victim restitution through the Victim Compensation Board, and to pay a $5,000 restitution fine and corresponding $5,000 parole revocation fine (stayed). (§§ 1202.4, subds. (b), (f), 1202.45.)
Garcia appeals. We modify the terms of the restitution fines, and affirm.

Starpoint USA filed a breach of contract action alleging that Daewoo Motor Company was required to reimburse legal fees incurred in enforcing two indemnity agreements. Prior to trial, the court ruled that Starpoint could introduce extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of the agreements. The jury reached a verdict finding that the parties intended the agreements to require Daewoo to reimburse Starpoint’s claimed costs.
Daewoo filed a motion for new trial and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict arguing that: (1) Starpoint had failed to introduce any competent extrinsic evidence in support of its interpretation of the agreement; (2) under the plain language of the agreement, Starpoint was not entitled to attorney’s fees incurred in an action to enforce the agreement. The trial court granted both motions. We reverse the court’s order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and affirm its order granting a new trial.

Both parties in this title insurance coverage dispute ‑‑ Chicago Title Insurance Company (Chicago Title) and Liberty National Enterprises, L.P. (Liberty) ‑‑ appeal from the judgment awarding Liberty $1,083,292.38 in damages against Chicago Title. Chicago Title is the insurer and Liberty is the insured entity. The court trifurcated trial of this case. The first phase of trial determined that Chicago Title had a duty to defend Liberty in a third party lawsuit relating to the insured property. The second phase of trial determined Liberty’s damages for breach of the duty to defend (breach of contract). The third phase of trial resolved Liberty’s remaining cause of action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury found in Chicago Title’s favor on the breach of the implied covenant claim. Thus, the damages awarded in the judgment were solely those found by the court for breach of the duty to defend.
Chicago Title contends that the court erred in finding it breached the duty to defend. Liberty, for its part, contends that the court committed evidentiary and instructional errors in the phase three trial, and that it erred in ruling Liberty was not entitled to “lost opportunity” damages. We hold that Chicago Title had no duty to defend the third party lawsuit for which Liberty demanded the defense. This holding renders Liberty’s appeal moot, as explained below. We reverse the judgment against Chicago Title for $1,083,292.38 and direct the trial court to enter judgment for Chicago Title.

M.D. (father), the presumed father of M.A., petitions this court for extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating his reunification services and setting a selection-and-implementation hearing. He argues that reunification services were improperly withheld from him during his incarceration and that services were inadequate. We disagree and deny his petition.

Appellant Bradley Allen Wolfe pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of an assault weapon (former Pen. Code, § 12280, subd. (b))[1] after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his bedroom. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence. We affirm.

Appellant Echo Jie Liu and respondent Raymond Wing-Hang Li were married in August 2007, having lived together since January 1998. In September 2010, Raymond[1] filed a petition to dissolve marriage. Several hearings were held, including one on May 17, 2011, where both sides were represented by counsel. There, among other things, the trial court granted the petition for dissolution and approved the terms of a settlement between the parties.
Now representing herself, Echo appeals, asserting four “Assignments of Error” and requesting us to order eight specific things, including a “de novo review.” We reject Echo’s assertions and requests, and we affirm.

Appellant, David Dawson, as Trustee in pro. per., filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Order to Show Cause in the Fresno County Superior Court naming as defendant City of Fresno. The petition concerned the issuance of various administrative citations to appellant regarding violations of the City of Fresno Municipal Code. The City of Fresno filed an answer and a demurrer. On September 11, 2012, the superior court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend on November 7, 2012. According to the Fresno County Superior Court docket, no final judgment has been entered.
This court issued a briefing order granting appellant time to explain why this court should not dismiss his appeal for lack of a judgment or appealable order. Appellant submitted a letter brief arguing the merits of the appeal. The letter brief failed to address the issue of appealability.

Robert Roy Smith (defendant) was charged with one count of possession or control of child pornography with a prior. (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (b).) The information also alleged three prior serious felony “strikes.” (Pen. Code § 288, subd. (a) [two prior convictions]; Pen. Code,[1] § 288a, subd. (c)(1) [one prior conviction].)
Defendant eventually admitted the prior conviction allegations. Following trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged. The superior court struck one of the strikes and sentenced defendant to a prison term of 25 years to life.
Defendant appeals, contending that “late” disclosures by the prosecution constituted discovery violations and infringed on his right to a fair trial. Defendant further claims that the exclusion of testimony regarding his prior diagnosis and treatment as a sex offender was error. We reject both contentions and affirm.

Appellant, Benjamin J. Martinez, was charged in an amended information filed on July 21, 2011, with felony second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (b), count 1)[1] and one count of resisting arrest, a misdemeanor (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count 2). The information further alleged three prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On July 25, 2011, a jury found appellant guilty of both counts.[2] In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found the three prior prison term enhancements to be true. At the sentencing hearing on August 22, 2011, the court sentenced appellant to the upper term of three years on count 1 plus three consecutive one-year terms for each of the prison term enhancements for a total sentence of six years. The court imposed a restitution fine of $200 and granted custody credits of 111 days and conduct credits of 111 days for total custody credits of 222 days. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).

Sonia P. appeals orders summarily denying her petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] and terminating parental rights to her son, Jorge M., under section 366.26. Sonia contends the court abused its discretion when it summarily denied her petition to set aside the orders terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2011, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) detained Jorge, a newborn infant, in protective custody after he tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Sonia had a 20-year history of substance abuse. She was on parole for drug offenses and other charges. Sonia's two other children were in the care of their maternal grandmother.