CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and cross-complainant H.C. Makabe & Son, LLC (Makabe) appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and cross-defendant Sequoia Insurance Company (Sequoia). We affirm.

Plaintiff Randell Abney appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University.[1] We affirm.

Melvin Haynes, appearing in propria persona, appeals from a judgment dissolving his marriage to Carmen Haynes and dividing the parties’ property.[1] He contends that despite what he believed to be an agreement by the parties that the date of their separation was December 18, 1993, Carmen was allowed to surprise him at trial by presenting evidence and argument that the date of separation was actually “sometime in 2008” and that the court erred by prohibiting him from rebutting this new theory. He also argues that the court applied an incorrect legal standard to determine the date of separation and ignored relevant evidence that supported an earlier date of separation. Finally, he argues that the court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration, which relied on additional evidence not presented at trial. The record demonstrates, however, that Melvin was given sufficient notice of Carmen’s contention and that he did not object to her argument or evidence at trial or request a continuance to present additional responsive evidence. The trial court applied the proper standard in determining the date of separation and substantial evidence supports the court’s finding. For these reasons, among others, the court did not err in denying Melvin’s motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Ryan Andrew Schultz was charged under Health and Safety Code[1] section 11379.6 with manufacturing hash oil, a marijuana derivative, after his vehicle was found to contain cans of a chemical solvent and lengths of marijuana-filled pipe. He contends he should have been prosecuted under section 11358, which prohibits the cultivation and processing of marijuana. We affirm.

Defendant Michael Laurence Sands appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of carjacking, two counts of second degree robbery, two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and one count of making criminal threats. The jury also found Sands personally used a firearm in the commission of each of those offenses. Sands argues his convictions for assault with a semiautomatic firearm must be reversed because the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it must find the semiautomatic firearm that he used was loaded.
We affirm. The trial court properly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 875 on the offense of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. That instruction accurately informed the jury that before finding Sands guilty of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, it must find that at the time Sands acted, “he had the present ability to apply force with a semiautomatic firearm to a person.” Sands did not request that the trial court provide any further clarification to the jury and thus forfeited the argument that such clarification was required. Sands concedes substantial evidence supported the reasonable inference the semiautomatic firearm was loaded at the time of the offenses. We find no error.

The primary issue in this case is the admissibility of a 911 call implicating appellant in a residential burglary. Even though the caller did not testify at trial, we find her statements were admissible because they were nontestimonial and they fall within the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. We also find there was sufficient evidence of the burglary apart from appellant’s pretrial confession to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

Karen M. seeks extraordinary writ review (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested dispositional hearing denying her reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (11) and (13)[1] and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her seven-month-old daughter, N.B. Karen contends there is insufficient evidence to support the dispositional order denying her reunification services. We deny the petition.

Appellant, Ricardo Lucero Romero, was charged in an information filed on April 2, 2012, with assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 220, count 1),[1] forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A), count 2), and two counts of sexual penetration of a minor 14 years of age or older (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(C), counts 3 & 4). The information further alleged that appellant had two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On May 17, 2012, appellant entered into a plea agreement in which he would admit counts 3 and 4, as well as the two prior prison term enhancements, in exchange for the dismissal of counts 1 and 2. Appellant would be subject to a maximum prison sentence of 22 years. Appellant executed and initialed a felony advisement, waiver of rights, and plea form indicating he would admit counts 3 and 4, as well as the two enhancements. Appellant acknowledged and waived his constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin/Tahl,[2] stated he understood the consequences of his plea, and agreed the police reports constituted a factual basis for his plea.

Appellant, Noor Mohamed Memon, filed a complaint for fraud against multiple defendants including respondents, the Lemoore Police Department, Lemoore Chief of Police Jeff Law, District Attorney Ronald Calhoun, and defense attorney Laurence Meyer. Appellant alleged that the defendants committed fraud in convicting his son, Jonathon Dugan, of criminal charges and sending Dugan to prison. Appellant requested that Dugan’s conviction be overturned, all of Dugan’s records be sealed, and that all civil and constitutional rights be restored to Dugan.
Through demurrers, respondents argued the complaint should be dismissed for various reasons, including that: the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations; appellant did not have an actual and substantial interest in the subject matter of the action; and appellant did not comply with the Government Claims Act. In addition to his demurrer, Meyer filed a special motion to strike the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)
The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and granted Meyer’s motion. Appellant has provided neither argument nor citation to relevant authority regarding why these orders should be reversed. Moreover, respondents’ demurrers were properly sustained. Accordingly, the judgment will be affirmed.

Petitioner and appellant Julie Duepner-Dixson (Julie), was married to Tom E. Dixson (Tom), although they had separated and he had filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage before he died by his own hand in 2009. Tom's property was disposed of by a will and trust, whose trustees, Harley M. Dixson and Rosella Jean Pelzer, are the objectors and respondents on appeal (the trustees), concerning Julie's petition to share in Tom's estate as an omitted spouse pursuant to Probate Code[1] section 21600 et seq. Julie appeals orders that deny her standing to pursue such claims and that settle the trustees' account and report, and allow them compensation and fees.

In August 2005, Teledyne Investment, Inc. (TII) entered into a stock purchase agreement with RD Instruments, Inc. (RDI); the Rowe Family Trust; Francis Rowe; and Elaine Rowe to buy all of the stock of RDI. After the stock purchase, RDI was renamed Teledyne RD Instruments, Inc. (TRDI) and continued in the business of underwater acoustics technology. TII later assigned its rights under the stock purchase agreement to Teledyne Technologies, Incorporated (TDY). The stock purchase agreement contained provisions that prohibited the sellers or their affiliates from competing with TRDI/TDY and from soliciting its employees for five years (hereafter the noncompetition and nonsolicitation clauses).
In September 2005, TDY employed Steven Rowe, Daniel Rowe, Steve Maier, Mark Vogt, John Romeo, and Changle Fang. Each of them signed an agreement promising "promptly [to] disclose to TDY all inventions, computer programs, improvements, concepts, or discoveries which [he] may make, either solely or jointly with others, during [his] employment or within six months after termination of such employment that may be within the existing or contemplated scope of TDY's business" (hereafter the disclosure clause). Francis Rowe previously had signed an agreement with RDI that contained a similar disclosure clause.
In September 2009, Rowe Technologies, Inc. (RTI) was formed. RTI competes with TDY in the underwater acoustics technology business. By December 2009, Steven Rowe, Daniel Rowe, Steve Maier, Mark Vogt, John Romeo, and Changle Fang were all employees of RTI.

Gregory Eugene Moore pleaded guilty to burglary (Pen. Code,[1] § 459; count 1) and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 4.) In exchange, the People dismissed counts 2 and 3 for grand theft of personal property (§ 487, subd. (a)), count 5 for receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496, subd. (d)), and count 6 for burglary (§ 459). The People also declined to amend the complaint to allege a charge of failure to appear. During plea bargain, the court indicated a sentencing lid of four years eight months, but left open the possibility of imposing a split sentence under section 1170, subdivision (h). At sentencing, a different judge declined to impose a split sentence, and instead sentenced Moore to four years eight months in county jail, and ordered him to pay certain fines. Moore appeals. We affirm.
Appointed counsel has filed a brief summarizing the facts and proceedings below. Counsel presents no argument for reversal but asks that this court review the record for error as mandated by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, counsel refers to possible but not arguable issues of whether: (1) Moore's custody credits were correctly calculated under section 4019; (2) the consecutive terms for counts 1 and 4 violated section 654, assuming the claim is cognizable in the absence of a certificate of probable cause; (3) his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance; and (4) he was properly ordered to pay restitution to the victim affected by an underlying count although that count was dismissed.
We granted Moore permission to file a brief on his own behalf. He has not responded. Our review of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the possible issues referred to by appellate counsel and the circumstances surrounding the court's taking of the plea, has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues. Competent counsel has represented Moore on this appeal.

The San Diego County District Attorney filed two indictments against Harold Ernest Johnson (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2012, Nos. SCD227468 & SCD 235413), each charging him with selling cocaine base, and possession/purchase of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a); count 1) and selling/furnishing a controlled narcotic substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5; count 2.) The People also alleged in each indictment, as an enhancement to count 1, that he sold cocaine base (Pen. Code,[1]
§ 123.073, subd. (b)(7)), and he had suffered several previous convictions for drug-related offenses. Johnson pleaded guilty to all counts in both indictments.
The court sentenced Johnson to eight years four months in prison, imposed a $240 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and stayed the $240 parole revocation fine
(§ 1202.45). The court awarded Johnson custody credits of 205 actual days and 102 conduct credits under section 4019.
On appeal, Johnson contends (1) the trial court violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions in imposing the $240 restitution fine and the $240 parole revocation fine; (2) he is entitled to additional conduct credits under an amendment to section 4019 and constitutional guarantees of equal protection; and (3) the case should be remanded for clarification of his initial confinement date. We affirm the judgment, but remand for the limited purpose of clarifying Johnson's initial confinement date and determining custody credits.

A jury found Lymond Williams guilty of selling cocaine base and possessing cocaine base for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, subd. (a), 11351.5.) Williams later admitted the truth of allegations regarding a prior drug conviction (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a)), one prior strike (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and that he had served six prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd (b)). After dismissing the admitted strike in the furtherance of justice, the court imposed a 12-year sentence.
Williams's appellate contentions concern the disruptive conduct of his codefendant, Ricky Brooks, during trial. Williams contends the court erred by denying his mistrial motions and refusing to instruct the jury that it could not consider Brooks's disruptive conduct in evaluating Williams's guilt. We determine there was no prejudicial error and affirm the judgment.