CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Latham & Watkins LLP (Latham) deposed plaintiff Mauricio Chamat as a third party witness on behalf of its client Precision Development, LLC (Precision) in an accounting and real estate action filed by Precision against Yuri and Natalia Plyam (the Pylams) in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Judgment was entered in favor of Precision and against the Pylams in the amount of $10.3 million.
In this action, Chamat sues Precision for "abuse of process" seeking, based upon his deposition testimony, a share of Precision's $10.3 million judgment. Precision demurred to the complaint, and the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding that because Chamat was deposed as a percipient witness, he was not entitled to any compensation for his deposition testimony.
On appeal, Chamat, again acting in propria person, asserts (1) he has ownership rights in his work papers; (2) owed no duty to Precision in the underlying action; (3) Latham misrepresented that he was a servant of Latham in the underlying case; (4) Latham misrepresented that he performed accounting services instead of an audit; (5) Latham admitted that misrepresentation in court; and (6) the legal standard for sustaining a demurrer was not met. We affirm.

This appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ of mandate following the court's sustaining of a general demurrer without leave to amend, involves a disagreement between plaintiff American Federation of Teachers Guild, Local 1931, San Diego and Grossmont-Cuyamaca Community Colleges (the Guild) and defendants San Diego Community College District and San Diego Community College District Board of Trustees (together the District) regarding the District's exclusion of six categories of current and former nonacademic employees from the District's classified service─which confers certain statutory rights and benefits to classified employees─based on two exemptions set forth in the Education Code (undesignated statutory references will be to the Education Code unless otherwise specified).
Specifically, the District excluded from its classified service (1) lifeguards, tutors, art models, accompanists, and interpreters for the deaf under the personal services contracting exemption set forth in section 88003.1, subdivision (b)(7) (hereafter section 88003.1(b)(7)), under which such exclusion is permissible when the services "are of such an urgent, temporary, or occasional nature that the delay incumbent in their implementation under the community college district's regular or ordinary hiring process would frustrate their very purpose"; and (2) employees of the District's KSDS Jazz88.3 radio station under the professional experts exemption set forth in section 88003, which provides that "professional experts employed on a temporary basis for a specific project, regardless of length of employment, shall not be a part of the classified service."

Iraj Ameri obtained a residential construction loan from Washington Mutual Bank (WMB). Subsequently, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) acquired Ameri's loan. After Ameri defaulted on various provisions of the loan agreement, Chase instituted foreclosure proceedings. Ameri sued Chase for breach of contract. As tried under his third amended complaint, the lawsuit also included causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the duty of commercial reasonableness, wrongful foreclosure and financial elder abuse. Chase moved for nonsuit following Ameri's presentation of evidence. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in Chase's favor.
Ameri appeals, challenging a number of the trial court's evidentiary rulings and claiming he presented sufficient evidence to avoid a nonsuit. Ameri also asserts the court erred by forcing him to abandon his cause of action for unjust enrichment. We affirm.

In this action, plaintiff Grantville Action Group (GAG) sought to challenge, under the Community Redevelopment Law (CRL), Health & Safety Code (all undesignated statutory reference are to the Health & Safety Code) section 33000 et seq., decisions made by the defendants City, the Agency, and the County of San Diego (the County) (collectively referred to as defendants) arising from a settlement of the County's lawsuit challenging the GRP. Specifically, GAG asserts that the County's lawsuit, and the subsequent settlement agreement, improperly guaranteed the County would recapture 100 percent of its projected $49 million in lost tax revenue from adoption of the GRP. GAG asserts that this "revenue shifting scheme" is "exactly the type of action the Legislature sought to prohibit in enacting the [CRL]." Further, GAG asserts that these actions violated the legal doctrine that you "cannot do indirectly what the law (and Legislature) prohibits [you] from doing directly."
Following a court trial, the court issued a decision in the City, County and Agency's favor, finding the CRL does not "prohibit[] the transfer of monies in this manner."
On appeal, GAG asserts the court erred in its ruling because (1) the settlement of the County's lawsuit violated the CRL, which established a pass-through formula, offset requirements for such projects, and other requirements for redevelopment plans; (2) when approving the transfer and use of a redevelopment tax increment for public facilities, it was inappropriate to reference an entire redevelopment plan, with no identified project; and (3) the County's agreement to transfer and use the GLP's tax increment for construction/improvement of its County Administration Center (CAC) was in violation of the restrictions set forth in the CRL. We affirm.

Defendant Marc Lee Antonsen appeals from a judgment imposing a state prison sentence of seven years following the revocation of his probation. He contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and imposing the prison sentence, and (2) it was reversible error not to have the same judge who sustained the probation violation petitions also conduct the sentencing hearing. We reject both contentions.

Juan L. (the minor) was the victim of terrible acts of violence when he was seven years old. In reporting about the incident, which was of intense local interest, defendants (collectively “the media defendants”) published the minor’s full name. The minor, by and through his guardian ad litem, sued the media defendants for invasion of privacy and gross negligence for printing his name.[1] The trial court granted the media defendants’ motion to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.[2] The trial court found that the media defendants’ publications about the newsworthy incident were protected by the First Amendment and the privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d).
The minor contends (1) the media defendants failed to meet their threshold burden to show that they acted in furtherance of the right of free speech, because they did not establish that the minor’s name was newsworthy; and (2) the trial court erred in ruling that the burden then shifted to the minor and that the minor failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.
We conclude the trial court did not err in granting the media defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The minor’s lawsuit arose from acts by the media defendants in furtherance of the right of free speech in connection with a public issue, and the minor failed to prove a probability of prevailing on the merits.
We will affirm the judgment/order.

Appellant Alfonso P. (father) appeals a juvenile court order asserting jurisdiction over his step-daughter Andrea P. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)[1] and (d), and over his son Luis P. and daughter G.P. pursuant to subdivisions (b), (d) and (j). Alfonso P. also appeals the dispositional order removing Luis and G. from his physical custody. Father contends there was no substantial evidence supporting these orders. We affirm.
Andrea was born in Guatemala in 1994 and initially lived with her mother. In 2003, mother moved to the U.S. and left Andrea in the care of maternal grandmother. Mother met father in the U.S. and they had two children together, Luis in 2007 and G. in 2009. While Andrea was still in Guatemala, Father sent her money and she called him “papi.” In 2010, when Andrea was 15 years old[2], she came to live with mother, father, Luis and G. in the U.S. Father said he viewed Andrea as his step‑daughter.

Appellant Sophia C. (mother) appeals a juvenile court order terminating jurisdiction over her daughter, M.M., and awarding custody to T.M. (father). Mother contends the juvenile court erred in terminating jurisdiction without affording her an opportunity to engage in reunification services. Mother argues the court erroneously ruled under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 361.5(b)(10)[2] because subdivision (b)(10) only applies when the juvenile court previously ordered termination of reunification services for a sibling of the child. We affirm.

A jury awarded plaintiff Carlos Raymond Gomez $180,000, the stipulated amount of his past medical expenses, in this negligence action against the City of Los Angeles (the "City") based on an automobile accident involving plaintiff and an LAPD cruiser. No damages were awarded, however, for plaintiff's past pain and suffering, or for future medical expenses or future pain and suffering. Plaintiff relies on a line of cases including Dodson v. J. Pacific, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 931 to argue that, in a case such as this where the plaintiff incurs substantial medical expenses as a result of the defendant's negligence, the jury's failure to award any damages for pain and suffering renders the judgment inadequate as a matter of law. We agree, and so reverse the judgment.

Edward Holloway was charged with murder and convicted of three lesser offenses: involuntary manslaughter; assault with a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury; and battery with infliction of serious bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (b), 243, subd. (d), 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).)[1] The court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison on the assault count and stayed sentence on the remaining counts.[2] Defendant appeals upon contentions that the trial court erred in (1) refusing a special instruction on causation related to his claim that a superseding intervening cause was responsible for the victim’s death; (2) responding to jury questions during deliberations by referring the jury to the standard instructions on causation without further elaboration; and (3) refusing to give an adverse inference instruction based on the fact that police testing of drug residue found in the victim’s apartment consumed the residue and precluded testing by the defense. We shall affirm the judgment.

Emeritus Corporation and Emeritus at Westwind Gardens appeal from an order denying their petition to compel the arbitration of claims brought against them by respondents Joyce Root et al., as successors in interest to Geneva Benthin, a deceased former resident at Westwind Gardens. Appellants had based their petition on an arbitration agreement purportedly signed on Benthin’s behalf pursuant to a uniform statutory form power of attorney and a health care power of attorney in a California advance health care directive. Appellants contend the court erred in: (1) ruling that the powers of attorney, which were neither notarized nor acknowledged by witnesses, were invalid; (2) finding there was insufficient evidence that the arbitration agreement was signed by an ostensible agent; and (3) denying appellants’ request for a continuance of the hearing to conduct discovery on the validity of the powers of attorney.
We will affirm the order.

The Alameda County Superior Court issued a temporary restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527) at appellant Leuren Moret’s request, against respondents Edgar DeLoa and Shaymaa Mahmoud. Following hearing, however, the trial court denied Moret’s request for a protective order under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Elder Abuse Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.).[1] In these consolidated appeals, Moret, in propria persona, contends that the trial court violated her right to due process of law in denying the protective order. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order sustaining the demurrers of respondents/cross-defendants Squire Sanders L.L.P. (Squire) and Scott Harrington in a cross-action by appellant Hartford Casualty Insurance Company (Hartford) for reimbursement of allegedly excessive or otherwise inappropriate legal fees and costs billed by Squire to Hartford. Squire served as independent counsel for cross-defendants J.R. Marketing, L.L.C., Noble Locks Enterprises, Inc., Jane and Robert Ratto, Lenore and Germain DeMartinis, and Penelope Kane (collectively, insured cross-defendants) in a California tort action after Hartford disclaimed coverage for the action under the relevant insurance policy. Squire also served as counsel for certain of the insured cross-defendants in two non-California actions, and as counsel for the non-insured cross-defendants – to wit, Harrington, Wheatland Baking Inc., and Kane Processing, L.L.C. – in the California action or one or more of the non-California actions (collectively, uninsured cross-defendants). According to Hartford, some portion of the fees and costs billed by Squire and paid by Hartford were for legal services provided to cross-defendants outside the scope of Hartford’s contractual obligations as insurer under the relevant policy. For reasons discussed below, we affirm the order.

Anne F. Smith (Conservator), the conservator of the person and estate of Anne S. Anderson (Wife), appeals an order of the trial court denying her petition for substituted judgment, in which she sought authority to execute a new trust and will and to retain litigation counsel. We shall reverse the order.