CA Unpub Decisions

K.G. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order removing her son, N.R. from her custody. Mother’s only contention on appeal is that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the inquiry requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b). We conclude that because the Agency failed to comply with its initial inquiry obligations, substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that ICWA does not apply. However, we affirm on the basis that such error was harmless.

In 1983, David Love pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder. As the factual basis for his plea, Love acknowledged he and two accomplices entered a residence with the intent to steal; they struggled with the occupant; and the occupant died as a proximate result of injuries inflicted during the struggle. The trial court sentenced Love to 15 years to life.
In 2019, Love filed a petition for resentencing under newly enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which narrowed the circumstances under which an individual can be convicted under the felony-murder rule (Pen. Code, §§ 188, 189) and provides a mechanism for resentencing of individuals whose convictions would not meet the new standard (§ 1170.95).

Plaintiff and appellant Raul Arellano, a self-represented litigant who is incarcerated in state prison, appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend demurrers by defendants and respondents City of San Diego (San Diego), City of El Cajon (El Cajon) and County of San Diego (County) to Arellano’s operative second amended complaint. The court ruled Arellano failed to allege compliance with claims presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act (at times the Act; Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), and that he had not demonstrated the so-called “prison-delivery rule” extended to those requirements. It entered judgment in defendants’ favor. Arellano challenges the court’s ruling, and asserts the court made other errors. We reject his challenge to the order sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend, and hold he has forfeited his remaining arguments. We affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Stephen Matthew Shepard guilty of forcible rape of his partner, among other charges, after he repeatedly shoved his hand down her throat during an argument and then asked her to have sex with him, to which she relented. On appeal, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding the victim did not consent to the sex. We affirm the judgment.

In 2002, defendant Leland Ervin Haynes was sentenced to two consecutive indeterminate terms of 15 years to life, and two concurrent terms of six years for crimes involving lewd acts and sexual assaults on a child. Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 1170.91 (statutory section citations that follow are to the Penal Code) to provide that individuals sentenced prior to January 1, 2015, are eligible for resentencing if they are or were members of the military and they suffered trauma as a result of that service that was not considered as a factor in mitigation when imposing a term under subdivision (b) of section 1170. Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing on the basis that the trial court erred in finding defendant was not eligible for resentencing and that his petition was moot.
Finding defendant’s petition is indeed moot, we dismiss the appeal.

Appellant Leah Chavez appeals from a trial court order bifurcating the issue of marital status and ordering termination of the same. Appellant contends the trial court lacked the authority to “bifurcate and terminate the parties’ marital status” on its own motion. In so doing, she argues, the trial court denied her due process right to “notice and . . . opportunity to prepare and argue against bifurcation.” We affirm the trial court’s order.

J.G., mother of now 11-year-old Raymond G., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to the child pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 . She contends, with respect to alleged father D.R.’s possible Indian ancestry, that the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to comply with their duties under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related state statutes and court rules. We conditionally reverse and remand for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with ICWA’s requirements.

Patrick B. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s order declaring his two daughters dependents under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and the court’s removal order. Father contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings. Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) contends the jurisdictional findings were supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Appellant Lisa Ann Spencer is the daughter of Leland Stanley Spencer (decedent), who died intestate. She appeals from an order characterizing assets in which decedent or his surviving spouse, respondent Martha A. Spencer (wife), had an ownership interest. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously granted wife’s motion for summary adjudication. The motion sought to characterize two residential properties as wife’s separate property. In addition, appellant claims that the probate court abused its discretion in bifurcating the characterization issue from other pertinent issues. We affirm.

Tashay Lenzy (plaintiff) was injured when an elevator door malfunctioned at the grocery store where she worked as a coffee barista. She obtained a workers’ compensation settlement and at the same time brought this civil action against Ralphs Grocery Company (Ralphs). The trial court granted Ralphs’ motion for summary judgment, finding plaintiff’s negligence action was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy rule. We consider whether a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the rule should apply, which in large part turns on whether there is a dispute about whether Ralphs or its parent, The Kroger Company (Kroger), was plaintiff’s employer.

A jury convicted appellant Clayton Ruben Addleman of numerous crimes committed when he was 24 years old, including attempted murder, and found a firearm enhancement allegation to be true. The trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison, plus 26 years. In his initial appeal, we affirmed appellant’s convictions, but remanded the matter for the trial court to consider exercising its newly granted discretion to strike the firearm enhancement under intervening legislation. On remand, the court declined to strike the enhancement. Appellant appealed this ruling, and we affirmed.
The California Supreme Court then granted appellant’s petition for review, and transferred the matter to this court, with directions that we vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of new legislation that made ameliorative changes to sentencing law: (1) Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021 2022 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 695) (AB 124);

In May 2015 the family court entered a judgment of dissolution of Arthur and Polina Tsatryan’s marriage and found their former marital residence in Santa Clarita (the Santa Clarita property) was community property. The court subsequently awarded Polina 100 percent of the property after finding Arthur breached his fiduciary duties to Polina by executing seven deeds of trust conveying security interests in the property to his relatives on the eve of the dissolution trial, substantially encumbering all equity in the property.
In January 2016 Polina filed a complaint for fraudulent transfer and declaratory relief against Arthur and the seven transferees, five of whom defaulted. After a bifurcated prove-up trial on Polina’s claims against the defaulting defendants, the family court entered a judgment voiding the deeds of trust. Arthur appeals from that judgment. However, because Arthur is not a party aggrieved by the judgment, he lacks standing to appeal. We dismiss the appeal.

Respondent Michael F. Cavanagh (Trustee) is the trustee and one of seven beneficiaries of the Francois and Mary Carmel Cavanagh 1988 Trust (Trust). The deceased grantors of the Trust are Trustee’s parents. Trustee’s brother, Peter J. Cavanagh, also a beneficiary of the Trust, appeals in propria persona (1) a judgment approving Trustee’s accounting and actions on behalf of the Trust and awarding Trustee his statutory costs of suit as the prevailing party, and (2) a postjudgment order requiring appellant to pay Trustee’s reasonable expenses and costs of litigation, including attorney fees, pursuant to Probate Code section 17211, subdivision (a). Appellant’s contentions are too numerous to list in this introductory paragraph. He filed a 93-page opening brief and a 92-page reply brief. We affirm.

Labor Code section 98.2, subdivision (a), authorizes parties to a Labor Commission wage proceeding to file an appeal to the superior court where the matter is heard de novo. Section 98.2, subdivision (c), provides, if the party seeking review by filing the appeal is unsuccessful, the court is to award costs and reasonable attorney fees to the other parties to the appeal. Subdivision (c) specifies, “An employee is successful if the court awards an amount greater than zero.”
Andrew Gantman filed a claim against his former employer, Stephan, Schreiber & Tabachnick CPA’s, Inc. (SST), with the Labor Commissioner for unpaid wages and violations of the Labor Code, including section 221, prohibiting an employer from collecting sums owed to it from an employee’s wages, and section 2802, requiring an employer to indemnify its employee for necessary expenditures.