CA Unpub Decisions

A.D. (mother) and H.Y. (father) appeal from a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their son, three-year-old Z.Y. Mother claims that the court considered improper factors in concluding she did not establish the parental-benefit exception to termination. This exception applies when there is “a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” because a parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Father argues only that if we reverse the termination of mother’s parental rights for this reason, we must also reverse the termination of his parental rights. We conclude that the court did not err in finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable to mother and therefore affirm.

After K.B. pleaded no contest to battery, he was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation subject to a number of conditions. In this appeal, he challenges two of these conditions: that he submit to warrantless searches of his person, property, any vehicle under his control, and residence, and that he not be on a school campus unless he is enrolled or has permission from school authorities. K.B. contends that both conditions are invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.), as well as unconstitutionally overbroad. We will affirm.

This is an appeal from a three-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) entered against R.H. in favor of his spouse, J.N. R.H. argues his due process rights were violated because the trial court did not continue the hearing for a sufficient length of time to allow R.H. to retain counsel. R.H. also argues that the DVRO is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.
On January 21, 2021, J.N. filed a request for a DVRO against R.H. J.N. alleged a recent incident of abuse during which R.H. grabbed her arm while she was holding their young child. She also alleged multiple prior incidents of abuse beginning in 2016. On January 21, 2021, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order against R.H. and set a hearing for February 11, 2021. R.H. did not file a written response to the request, but he appeared at the February 11, 2021 hearing and requested a continuance in order to seek counsel.

Defendant Abner Ceasar Castillo was found guilty of assault, making criminal threats, dissuading a witness, and three counts of felony vandalism. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his Romero motion to strike his prior strike conviction, and (2) we should vacate any remaining balance on the probation report fees imposed pursuant to former Penal Code section 1203.1b because they are uncollectable and unenforceable pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1896). The People disagree as to the first issue but agree as to the second issue. We vacate the portion of the judgment imposing probation report fees. As modified, we affirm.

A jury convicted John Davis Wright, Jr. of inflicting injury to Jane Doe (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 2), and found true an allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Doe (§ 12022.7). The jury acquitted Wright of charges of premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)) and false imprisonment (§ 236). Wright later entered a guilty plea to making criminal threats (§ 422; count 4) after the jury was unable to return a verdict on that count.
In a separate bench trial, the court found true allegations that Wright had two strike prior convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), two prior convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). It sentenced Wright to 25 years to life on count 2, struck the additional punishment for the great bodily injury allegation, and imposed a four-year midterm on count 4, which it stayed under section 654.

A petition charged minor R. G. with felony assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and assault of a safety and security officer while on school property. Subsequently, an amended petition added charges of possession of an assault weapon, possession of a concealed weapon, possession of a firearm in public, possession of a firearm in a school zone, and resisting, delaying, obstructing a police officer.
On the assault charges, the minor and D. T. approached the victim after school. The minor told the victim he heard the victim was disrespecting the minor’s friend. The minor punched the victim in the face several times. During the fight, the victim took the minor to the ground, but the fight continued. Then, D. T. took the victim to the ground. While the victim was on the ground, the minor, D. T. and others punched the victim and stomped on his head. School staff broke up the fight.

After pleading guilty to assault likely to produce great bodily injury in 2019, the trial court placed defendant Catelyn Elizabeth Knight on a term of probation. Defendant now appeals, purportedly from orders made at a hearing on a probation violation, and asserts her term of probation must be reduced based on legislative changes in Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 328). We conclude the trial court’s orders at the hearing are not appealable orders and the trial court’s reference to Assembly Bill No. 1950 was not a judgment, and we will dismiss defendant’s appeal accordingly.

Defendant Travis Mabson, along with accomplices Patrick Jerome McPherson and Patrick Joseph Godines, were all convicted of felony murder with special circumstances, attempted robbery, and burglary after their attempt to rob Michael Sanderson in his apartment ended in Sanderson’s death. We affirmed defendant’s convictions on appeal. (People v. Godines (July 25, 2018, C078214/C078601) [nonpub. opn.] (Godines).)
In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition after finding defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law given the jury’s true findings on the attempted robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances. Defendant appeals, arguing he demonstrated prima facie entitlement to relief, and that the trial court should have issued an order to show cause and conducted an evidentiary hearing. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant Sheldon Dale Williams originally appealed a judgment entered following a court trial wherein he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), infliction of corporal injury on a spouse resulting in traumatic condition (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and making criminal threats (§ 422). The court also found true as to counts one and two that defendant had inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances of domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and that he had suffered both a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). In accordance with a lid established in exchange for defendant waiving his right to a trial by jury, defendant was sentenced to prison for an aggregate state prison term of 15 years.
On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting several of his convictions and the domestic violence special circumstances.

Father appeals from an order terminating parental rights to his daughter under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Father contends the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with section 224.2, subdivision (b)—the California statute implementing the initial inquiry rules of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We conditionally reverse and remand for DCFS to comply with its statutory responsibilities.

Defendant and appellant David Martin Griffin appeals from the trial court’s order extending his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code section 2970. Defendant contends reversal is warranted because the trial court failed to properly advise him of his right to a jury trial at the recommitment hearing and the record does not otherwise affirmatively show he made a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right.
We affirm.

A.Y. (Mother) and Gerardo L. (Father) appeal from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring 13-year-old Lyla L., nine-year-old Aydin L., and four-year-old Aliyah L. dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (c), (d), and (j), after the court sustained allegations that the children were at substantial risk of harm because Mother and Father medically neglected and emotionally abused Lyla by failing to address her mental health issues; Father failed to protect Lyla from the paternal grandfather’s sexual abuse; and Father did not believe Lyla’s account of sexual abuse.

Marco Missinato sued his sister, Elisabetta Missinato, claiming a 50 percent ownership interest in residential property Elisabetta purchased with funds provided by their mother, Anna Rossi. Marco alleged that, although title to the house was in Elisabetta’s name, Rossi intended, and her children orally agreed, the property would be owned equally by Marco and Elisabetta. Following a court trial, the trial court issued an interlocutory judgment of partition declaring Marco and Elisabetta tenants in common and ordering them to sell the property.
Elisabetta appeals from the interlocutory judgment, arguing Marco’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. We conclude Marco’s cause of action for partition was barred by the statute of limitations. We also conclude that, although the trial court did not (as the parties seem to believe) impose a resulting trust, Marco’s claim for such a remedy was, in any event, barred by the statute of limitations as well. Therefore, we reverse

Westco Petroleum Distributors, Inc. (Westco) appeals from an order dismissing cross-defendants MCW Fuels, LLC, formerly known as MCW Fuels, Inc. (MCW), Aleksandr Blyumkin (MCW’s principal), Stan Boyett & Son, Inc. (Boyett), and Phillips 66 Company (Phillips) from Westco’s second amended cross-complaint. The trial court dismissed those cross-defendants after it granted MCW’s motion for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication, finding Westco’s assignment to MCW of five fuel distribution contracts for the delivery of Phillips’s fuel were valid. The trial court simultaneously denied, and found moot, Westco’s cross-motion for summary adjudication asserting the assignments were invalid.
Westco contends it presented admissible evidence demonstrating the five assignments were void for failure of delivery, failure of consideration, and/or cancellation.