CA Unpub Decisions

Telesforo Romano appeals from the judgment entered after he pled no contest to charges of kidnapping and rape and admitted personally using a gun in committing both offenses. His appointed counsel filed a Wende brief. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) On November 1, 2012, we directed appointed counsel to send the record and a copy of counsel’s brief to Romano and notified Romano of his right to respond within 30 days. We received no response.
The notice of appeal states that the appeal is based upon the sentence or other matters occurring after entry of the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4).) We have reviewed the whole record under People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, focusing upon matters that arose after entry of the plea. Our review revealed that the minute order and abstract of judgment do not reflect the amount of the sexual offender fine under Penal Code section 290.3,[1] or the amount and statutory bases of penalty assessments on the fine. We invited the parties to brief the issue of penalty assessments. After considering their briefs, we modify the judgment to reflect penalty assessments on the sex offender fine in the amount of $780. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Minor K.L. appeals from the court’s judgment sustaining the allegation that he committed residential burglary of Graciela Tinoco’s home. Because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the allegation, we reverse.

Appellant Paul Joseph Holquin was charged with one count of possession of child pornography. (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a).)[1] A jury convicted appellant after trial and he was placed on three years probation, the conditions of which included a prohibition against residing near, visiting or being within 100 yards of places where minors frequent or congregate. On appeal, appellant challenges the imposition of this condition arguing that the registered sexual offenders residency restriction requirement in section 3003.5, subdivision (b) applies only to parolees, and does not apply to probationers such as appellant, and that the trial court was under the mistaken belief that section 3003.5’s residency restriction applied and was mandatory. Appellant further argues that the residency requirements of section 3003.5, subdivision (b), constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Respondent agrees that the residency requirements of section 3003.5, subdivision (b), apply only to parolees, argues that the trial court recognized and properly exercised its discretion, and contends that appellant lacks standing to challenge the alleged unconstitutionality of the residency requirement.
We affirm.

Appellant Ayrianna Davis was charged with a single felony count of attempting to dissuade a witness from prosecuting a crime. (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (b)(2).) On Friday, February 24, 2012, during voir dire of prospective jurors for her trial, the court denied Davis’s motion to represent herself in pro. per. Midday on Monday, February 27, the jury was sworn, and that afternoon it heard the testimony from two prosecution witnesses and Davis’s testimony in her own defense. On February 28, the jury was instructed and commenced deliberations. On the morning of February 29, 2012, it rendered its guilty verdict.
Davis appeals from the judgment on a number of grounds, including her contention that the trial court erred in denying her motion to represent herself at trial. Because we conclude that this error requires reversal of her conviction, it is unnecessary to discuss her other contentions.

DNAM Apparel Industries, LLC, appeals from an order denying its motion for attorney fees. It argues the trial court erroneously ruled that Civil Code section 1717 barred the motion. We agree and reverse.

David Walter Caramanis appeals a judgment following conviction by plea to manufacturing gamma-hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), and possession of GHB, with findings that he suffered two controlled substance convictions and that he served a prior prison term. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6, subd. (a), 11377, subd. (a), 11370.2, subd. (b); Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to sentence Caramanis to a "split-sentence" pursuant to the Criminal Justice Realignment Act (Act) (Stats. 2011, lst Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, ch. 12, § 1; § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B)), and affirm. (People v. Griffis (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 956, 963, fn. 2 [defining "split-sentence option" in terms of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h)(B)(5)].)

Appellant Vincent Mendoza appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of kidnapping, attempted premeditated murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and conspiracy. He contends the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he had the specific intent to kill during his participation in the events underlying the charges, as required for attempted murder or conspiracy to commit murder. We find sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s verdict and affirm the judgment.

Fidel Garcia appeals a judgment following conviction of first degree robbery, dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (two counts), and making criminal threats (two counts), with a finding that he acted in concert with others in committing residential robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 136.1, subd. (b)(1), 422, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A).)[1] We order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect Garcia's conviction of first degree robbery, but otherwise affirm.

Stephen Loveman, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from (1) a postjudgment order setting permanent spousal support at $3,000 per month, (2) an order denying his request to set aside the support order, and (3) an order requiring him to pay the reasonable attorney fees of his former wife, respondent Maureen Loveman. We affirm.

In this appeal from a restraining order, our affirmance is compelled without reaching the merits of the challenged order. The record on appeal contains the order and the notice of appeal, but nothing showing the grounds on which the order was sought, nothing showing the evidence supporting the order, and nothing showing the grounds on which the trial court relied in granting the order.
The appellant’s presentation in this court more resembles an affidavit of facts and denials than an appellate brief. It contains no citations to the record or to the law, and it identifies nothing constituting error on the face of the record. Respondent’s brief, and the appellant’s late-filed reply, too, offer a narrative version of assertedly relevant facts. We therefore address only the issues that appear from the meager record.

Defendant and appellant Douglas Leon appeals from his conviction of first degree murder and attempted extortion.[1] He contends the trial court erred in (1) denying his Batson-Wheeler[2] motion; (2) excluding evidence that would have impeached the prosecution’s gang expert; (3) allowing the prosecutor to pose an improper hypothetical; and (4) imposing large fines without submitting the underlying factual issues to the jury. He also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of premeditation. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Napa County Superior Court after a jury trial extending the commitment of defendant pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5. His commitment now terminates November 23, 2014. His appellate counsel has reviewed the file in this case and has determined there are no meritorious issues to raise on appeal. He has complied with the relevant case authorities, assuming People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and its progeny apply here. He has also notified defendant of his right to file a supplemental brief, but Snyder has not done so. Upon independent review of the record, we conclude that no arguable issues are presented for review and affirm the judgment.

San Mateo County Human Services Agency Children and Family Services (the agency) filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code[1] on behalf of E.A. The petition alleged that Y.A. (mother) was unable to care for E.A. because of mother’s alcohol abuse. The petition also alleged that E.A.’s father, M.A. (father), lived in Palestine. Father informed the agency that he wanted custody of E.A. and at the dispositional hearing the court removed E.A. from mother and ordered E.A. to be placed with her father in Palestine. The court stayed the order until the necessary documents and arrangements could be made for E.A. to travel to Palestine. The court also ordered visitation with mother and E.A. to be arranged by the parents.

Lisa Mackin Ainsworth challenges the trial court’s order granting her certain relief but declining to set aside various orders in this marital dissolution action. Because Lisa’s[1] notice of appeal was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of her appeal and therefore dismiss it.