CA Unpub Decisions

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Suzette Clover, Judge. Affirmed.
William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________

In 1995, Stephen Snow, a military veteran, was sentenced to an indeterminate term. Years later, he petitioned to recall his sentence under new legislation categorizing trauma-related conditions caused by military service as a mitigating factor. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the legislation did not apply to indeterminate sentences. Snow appeals. Agreeing with the trial court, we affirm.

Ventura Torres appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first degree willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189). The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison. Appellant raises claims of insufficient evidence and evidentiary, prosecutorial, and cumulative error. We affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and victim Kassandra Salvador began dating in 2010. In 2013 or 2014, appellant began living with Salvador and her parents Cecelia and Marido. Appellant was given his own keys to the residence, which is equipped with video surveillance cameras and a security door that required the use of two different keys.

Nathan Gregory Sessing appeals following his resentencing on charges of special-circumstance felony murder (Pen, Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 188, 190.2), two counts of residential burglary (§ 459), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). Sessing also admitted using a deadly weapon in committing the murder, i.e., a bat and a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and the jury found true an allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the assault victim (§ 12022.7). Sessing, who committed his crimes in 2006 shortly before he turned 18, was initially sentenced to life in state prison without the possibility of parole plus a determinate term of 8 years and 4 months. We subsequently affirmed his conviction on appeal. In 2017, he filed a habeas petition in this court requesting resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 [183 L.Ed.2d 407], which established the punishment for crimes committed when an individual is under the age of 18 must inclu

Nathan Gregory Sessing appeals following his resentencing on charges of special-circumstance felony murder (Pen, Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 188, 190.2), two counts of residential burglary (§ 459), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). Sessing also admitted using a deadly weapon in committing the murder, i.e., a bat and a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and the jury found true an allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the assault victim (§ 12022.7). Sessing, who committed his crimes in 2006 shortly before he turned 18, was initially sentenced to life in state prison without the possibility of parole plus a determinate term of 8 years and 4 months. We subsequently affirmed his conviction on appeal. In 2017, he filed a habeas petition in this court requesting resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 [183 L.Ed.2d 407], which established the punishment for crimes committed when an individual is under the age of 18 must inclu

Nathan Gregory Sessing appeals following his resentencing on charges of special-circumstance felony murder (Pen, Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 188, 190.2), two counts of residential burglary (§ 459), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). Sessing also admitted using a deadly weapon in committing the murder, i.e., a bat and a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and the jury found true an allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the assault victim (§ 12022.7). Sessing, who committed his crimes in 2006 shortly before he turned 18, was initially sentenced to life in state prison without the possibility of parole plus a determinate term of 8 years and 4 months. We subsequently affirmed his conviction on appeal. In 2017, he filed a habeas petition in this court requesting resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 [183 L.Ed.2d 407], which established the punishment for crimes committed when an individual is under the age of 18 must inclu

Jonathan Lang appeals a post-judgment order modifying child support and denying his request for spousal support. (Fam. Code, §§ 4053, 4320.) He contends the trial court erred by imputing income to him based on past earnings and by failing to consider whether the child support rulings were in his children’s best interests. He also contends the court failed to consider the statutory factors for modifying spousal support.
We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jonathan and Marina Lang stipulated to a status-only judgment of dissolution of marriage on December 19, 2019. They filed a settlement agreement on the same date in which Jonathan agreed to pay Marina $2,500 per month for both child support and childcare. A DissoMaster report attached to the Agreement reflected “Wages + salary” of $9,974 for Jonathan and $12,253 for Marina. The settlement reserved the issue of spousal support for future determination based on the noticed motion of either party.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lisa Brackelmanns, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Michelle E. Butler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the County Counsel, Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
In April 2021, the juvenile court sustained a petition brought by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), alleging that appellant mother T.H. had abused her 14-year-old daughter, C.C. The court sustained allegations that Mother had choked and slapped C.C., was unable to care for C.C. due to C.C.’s mental health issues, and had emotionally abused C.C. by calling her names such as “‘bitch,’” “‘whore,’” and “‘slut,’” and telling her she should have finished herself off after she had cut her wrists. After finding jurisdiction under Welfa

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Deirdre Hill, Judge. Reversed.
Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Robert D. Brugge, Barbara Ciolino; Law Offices of Stanley Denis and Stanley Denis for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Keesal, Young & Logan, David D. Piper, and Cheryl S. Chang for Defendants and Respondents.
This is a dispute between neighboring property owners concerning encroachments and the use of an easement along their shared property line. Defendants and respondents David Joseph Burton and his wife Sandee Burton (the Burtons), as trustees of the 2008 Burton Family Trust, own residential property (Burton property) in Palos Verdes. Plaintiff and appellant Jacob Dewitt owns the abutting property to the north (the Dewitt property).

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, John Kralik, Judge. Affirmed.
Arthur Edward Ezor, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Jaffe & Asher and Ray Mahdavi, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
_____________________________________________

INTRODUCTION
Respondents American Express Bank, FSB and American Express Centurion Bank sued appellant Arthur Edward Ezor to collect on his delinquent credit card balances, and appellant filed a cross-complaint, asserting two claims of unfair debt collection practices. The trial court subsequently granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment on their claims and sustained their demurrer to the cross-complaint, granting leave to amend as to one of appellant’s claims. After appellant filed an amended cross-complaint, the court sustained respondents’ second demurrer without leave to amend. Appellant moved for reconsideration, but the trial court entered judgment while his motion was pending. The court later denied app

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, John J. Lonergan, Jr., Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel C. Chang and Scott A. Taryle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
—————————— 
Billy George Johnson appeals from the order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).
Johnson raises several arguments on why the trial court erred. Most pertinent, Johnson contends the record of conviction cannot conclusively refute the possibility that he was convicted of second degree murder under a theory where malice was imputed based solely on his participation in a crime, which is no longer a valid theory following passage of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Judge. Affirmed.

McNicholas & McNicholas, Douglas D. Winter and Jeffrey R. Lamb for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Scott Marcus and Blithe S. Bock, Assistant City Attorney, and Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.

Greg McNamee (plaintiff) sued the City of Los Angeles (the City), alleging four employment-related claims against the Los Angeles Police Department (the Department). Two of those claims were dismissed on the pleadings; the other two, on summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its summary judgment ruling. We conclude there was no error, and affirm.

A.C. (mother), the mother of K.C., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother’s sole argument is that the juvenile court erred by terminating her rights notwithstanding the failure of the Del Norte Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) to conduct an adequate inquiry into her and father Steven W.’s Indian ancestry. The Department concedes that there were “inadvertent omissions in the inquiry,” and it does not oppose a limited remand for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA).

Plaintiff American Express Bank, FSB (American Express) brought a collection action against C.D. Rowsell and Rowsell’s company, Bosonda International Ltd. (Bosonda). In response, Rowsell and Bosonda asserted individual and class cross-claims against American Express and several related entities for allegedly unconscionable and unenforceable arbitration provisions in the bank’s cardmember agreements. Early in the proceedings, at a case management conference, the trial court ordered cross-complainants’ motion for class certification to proceed “before any adjudication on the substantive merits.” At a later case management conference, the trial court purportedly refused to sever the collection claims and set a date for trial.

In February 2021, this court issued an opinion affirming the denial of a motion by Thomas Michael Colt to vacate his 1990 judgment of conviction for murder. (People v. Colt (Feb. 2, 2021, A158424 [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court had treated the motion as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis and denied it based on Colt’s lack of diligence in raising his claims, and because he had previously raised the claims in unsuccessful petitions for writs of habeas corpus. We held that a prisoner may not file a “motion to vacate judgment” to avoid the diligence requirement for a writ of coram nobis. Colt then filed an amended motion to vacate the judgment in the trial court, adding a “due diligence” section. The court denied the amended motion. Colt filed a notice of appeal, but neither his appointed counsel nor he identifies any colorable issue, so the appeal will be dismissed.