CA Unpub Decisions

Vincent R. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his and Monique G.’s (mother) parental rights to their son, V.R., who was removed from their custody only a couple of months after he was born. Father argues the court erred in terminating his parental rights because he had regular visitation with V.R., and the court considered inappropriate factors when it found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply. We affirm.

Father D.A. appeals the court’s jurisdictional findings based on his conduct but does not challenge the findings as to mother. Father also argues the court’s dispositional order requiring him to drug test is not supported by substantial evidence. We find father’s appellate challenge is nonjusticiable, and substantial evidence supports the court’s the dispositional order. We affirm

Plaintiff and appellant Ahron Zilberstein sued Michael Petersen for false impersonation (Pen. Code, § 528.5) and cyberpiracy (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17525) after Petersen created a website portraying Zilberstein as a fraudulent businessman and slumlord. In an earlier unpublished decision, we reversed in part the trial court’s order denying an anti-SLAPP motion filed by Petersen in response to the suit. (Zilberstein v. Petersen (Oct. 23, 2020, B301779 [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the trial court followed our directions to grant the anti-SLAPP motion with regard to the Penal Code cause of action and struck that claim from the complaint. Petersen then moved for attorney fees, as a partially prevailing party, and was awarded $38,825 in fees and costs.

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) initiated juvenile dependency proceedings concerning A.M., F.M., Vi.M., M.M., and Va.M. on the grounds that their mother (mother) and the biological father of A.M. and F.M. (G.R.) had physically abused A.M. and F.M. At the outset of the proceedings, the juvenile court declared that A.M. had two presumed fathers—(1) G.R. and (2) A.S., who is the biological father of Vi.M., M.M., and Va.M. The court also found that A.S. is the sole presumed father of F.M., Vi.M., M.M., and Va.M. The court later sustained an amended version of the initial petition, which included an allegation that A.S. had exposed F.M. to A.S.’s domestic violence against mother. The juvenile court declared all five children dependents of the court, removed them from their parents, and ordered DCFS to provide family reunification services.

Michael Sanchez worked for CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC as a service manager. When his employment was terminated in February 2011, he sued CarMax for wrongful termination, alleging several causes of action. Based on an arbitration agreement signed by the parties at the time Sanchez was hired, CarMax moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied that motion, but on CarMax’s prior appeal we reversed. (Sanchez v. CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 398 (Sanchez).) The dispute was arbitrated, Sanchez prevailed, and then filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award (with a cross-motion to vacate filed by CarMax). Sanchez’ motion to confirm was granted, CarMax’s motion to vacate was denied, and CarMax again appeals, this time contending the arbitrator erred. We reject CarMax’s claims of error and affirm the challenged orders.

Defendant and appellant Patricia Bellows (defendant) appealed from the summary denial of her petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. After we affirmed the trial court’s order the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter to this court with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis). We have reviewed the parties’ supplemental briefs and hereby vacate our prior decision. After reconsideration of the issues, we again affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant Aileka Pennewell appeals a judgment revoking her probation and imposing a four-year prison sentence. Her court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Defendant has submitted a letter brief arguing that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the probation violation findings, (2) the prison term should be reversed because her felony conviction upon which it was based should have been reduced to a misdemeanor prior to the filing of the probation revocation petition, and (3) the court made unspecified errors in calculating her credits. Having reviewed the supplemental briefing and the record, we conclude no issue warrants further briefing. We have identified an error in the calculation of custody credits and with the Attorney General having no objection, we shall remand for the limited purpose of allowing the court to recalculate defendant’s custody credits.

Defendant Ian Czirban appeals from a victim restitution order imposed as a condition of probation following his conviction for several business-related crimes. Czirban’s crimes came to light after a July 2016 accident that killed Robert Reagan III, while he was operating Czirban’s bulldozer in aid of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) at a wildfire in Monterey County. A postaccident investigation revealed that Czirban did not have workers’ compensation insurance.
The trial court convicted Czirban of procuring or offering a false or forged instrument, tax evasion, failure to collect, account for, or pay taxes, and misdemeanor failure to secure payment of workers’ compensation insurance. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed Czirban on felony probation for three years, and reserved the issue of victim restitution. Czirban appealed the judgment of conviction to this court.

In July 2007, Claude Wilkes (Wilkes) obtained a loan of $960,000 from Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WaMu), memorialized by a note secured by a deed of trust encumbering a condominium unit located at Santana Row in San Jose (the Property). Wilkes defaulted on the loan in 2010, and he filed for bankruptcy protection in 2011.
Wilkes filed this action on March 21, 2017, against WaMu’s successor, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase Bank or the Bank) and the trustee, Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality). He twice amended his complaint. The court sustained with leave to amend Chase Bank’s demurrer to the first amended complaint. Wilkes filed a second amended complaint (the Complaint), which included causes of action for promissory estoppel, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., the Unfair Competition Law (UCL).

Scott Davis, Daniel Mitchell, Christian Schneider, and Schneider’s company Pivotal Campaign Services, LLC, appeal from an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion to strike appellants’ defamation suit, a motion made by respondents Joseph Moses, Archie Warren, and Mark Caldwell. In essence, the trial court granted the motion because appellants Davis and Mitchell had failed to present sufficient evidence of malice and the suit of the other two appellants was barred by the interested-person privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c).
The analysis on appeal is complicated by the appellants’ differing status for defamation purposes. Davis and Mitchell are public figures. They must therefore present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Schneider and Pivotal Campaign Services, however, are private figures. They have a significantly lesser burden of proof when it comes to malice.

This case disproves the old adage that good fences make good neighbors. Brett Murdock and Veronica Murdock (the Murdocks) discovered that the fence between their property and the property of their neighbors, Setsuko Mori Ogino and Hiroshi Ogino (the Oginos), was not on the property line, but rather was encroaching on the Murdocks’ property. The Murdocks built a new block wall on the property line, and the Oginos sued to quiet title to the disputed land. After a bench trial, the trial court created an equitable easement in the disputed land—approximately 15 square feet. The Murdocks appealed. We affirm.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings regarding the equitable easement, and the creation of the easement was within the court’s authority and jurisdiction. Further, the trial court did not err in denying the Murdocks relief from their waiver of a jury trial.

At a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court (1) terminated parental rights to John P.’s now eight-year-old son, L.P., and four-year-old daughter, M.P., and selected adoption as their permanent plan, and (2) continued his now six-year-old daughter, Li.P., in foster care, and suspended visits with her parents pending the next review hearing. On appeal from the order suspending his visits with Li.P., father contends the order must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence visits are detrimental to Li.P.’s physical or emotional well-being. Finding no merit to father’s contention, we affirm.

The People of the State of California, through the Kings County District Attorney, petitioned for a writ of prohibition and/or mandate, seeking to compel respondent trial court to vacate its dismissal of the prosecution of real party in interest, Alfredo Paramo Solorio, who was charged with offenses including driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), and with a blood-alcohol content over 0.08 percent (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), both alleged to be felonies due to having occurred within 10 years of three or more qualifying prior convictions (Veh. Code, § 23550). We previously issued an order to show cause and now grant the writ petition.

Following a jury trial, defendant Steven Guillen, was found guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The same jury also found true allegations he committed the crime to benefit a street gang, caused great bodily injury, and personally used a deadly weapon. In his appeal, defendant initially challenged the evidence supporting the conclusion the crime was committed for the benefit of a street gang. Defendant also challenged the use of a prior prison term enhancement and various fines and fees imposed by the court. Due to recent legislative changes, defendant now contends he is entitled to a new trial on the street gang enhancement and a new sentence. The Attorney General agrees these changes require defendant be retried and resentenced, and we agree. We, therefore, vacate the sentence imposed and remand for further proceedings.