CA Unpub Decisions

In 2019, the Riverside County District Attorney charged Joaquin Joseph Flores with 10 counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a minor under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a), unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) The charges alleged that from 2009 to 2017 Flores molested the same individual multiple times. Flores proceeded to trial, where a jury convicted him on all 10 counts.
Prior to sentencing Flores requested, and the court ordered, that he be given a mental health examination under section 288.1. In order to facilitate this, the court continued the sentencing hearing. In the meantime, both Flores and the prosecution submitted sentencing briefs, with the prosecution’s recommending a 21-year prison sentence. The probation office also filed a report, recommending a sentence of 24 years.

Counsel for plaintiff Amanda Ramirez failed to respond to a series of orders to show cause (OSCs). As a result, her complaint was dismissed; thereafter, a defendant’s cross-complaint was also dismissed. Ramirez filed a motion to vacate. By mistake, however, she moved to vacate the dismissal of the cross-complaint, rather than the dismissal of her complaint. The trial court denied the motion for this reason. Ramirez filed another motion, this time to vacate the dismissal of her complaint, but the trial court denied it as untimely.
Ramirez filed a notice of appeal. However, again by mistake, she appealed from the denial of her second motion to vacate, rather than from the denial of her first motion to vacate.
The notice of appeal was timely with respect to both orders. In this situation, the rule is that, if only one of the orders was appealable, we may deem the appeal to be taken from the appealable order, even though the notice of appeal specified the nonappealable order.

Jose Luis Moreles’s father was killed in a traffic collision by a vehicle owned by Adalberto Alejandro Loo and driven by his son, Aram Loo Herrera. Moreles, along with other family members (collectively, Plaintiffs), sued Loo and Herrera as a result of the accident.
As to Loo, Plaintiffs asserted claims for permissive use and negligent entrustment. In a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court determined that Loo was not liable for negligent entrustment and that any remaining liability under the permissive use cause of action was statutorily limited to $15,000, pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17151. Likely referencing a prior offer to settle the case for that same amount, Loo’s counsel stated the parties had “agreed . . . to a figure to settle the permissive use cause of action.”

C.T., maternal grandmother (grandmother) of the minors, B.R., Y.T., L.W., and J.W., appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her request that the court place the minors with her. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.3, 388, 395; statutory section citations that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Defendant Donald Rhodes appeals the trial court’s denial of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (the Department) recommendation under former Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) (former section 1170(d)(1)) that the trial court consider recalling defendant’s sentence and resentencing him. His appointed counsel found no arguable issues and filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 asking this court to independently review the record to determine whether there were any arguable issues on appeal. Although properly advised of his right to file a supplemental brief, defendant did not file one.
While defendant’s appeal was pending, and after defense counsel filed the Wende brief, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719) came into effect on January 1, 2022, and moved the recall and resentencing provisions of former section 1170(d)(1) to new section 1170.03.

After a jury found defendant Dylan Paul Darling guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and found “true” a prior serious felony allegation, the trial court imposed a state prison sentence of 11 years. On appeal, defendant contends (1) there was insufficient evidence for his robbery conviction; (2) the trial court prejudicially erred when it misread a jury instruction to the jury; and (3) the trial court erred by providing a jury instruction for which there was insufficient evidence. We affirm the convictions.
We filed an unpublished opinion affirming the criminal judgment on January 25, 2022. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing arguing Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.; hereafter Assembly Bill 124), signed by the Governor on October 8, 2021, must be applied retroactively to defendant’s case under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada). We granted rehearing, vacated our initial opinion, and ordered supplemental briefing from the parties.

A jury found defendant Robert Willis Slavens guilty on four counts of felony resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69) and two counts of misdemeanor resisting a public officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court revoked defendant’s probation in two, unrelated cases and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 14 years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him on two of the felony convictions. He also contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences and asks this court to review the trial court’s ruling on his Pitchess motion. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Morgan Eastwood Eddy stabbed his friend to death with a kitchen knife. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder with personal use of a deadly weapon and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life plus one year in prison. On appeal, defendant contends (1) there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support a verdict of first degree murder; and (2) the jury instruction given for first degree murder did not accurately reflect the law. Finding no merit to defendant’s contentions, we affirm.

Defendant Michael Avery Hunt appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (unspecified statutory section citations that follow are to the Penal Code). Defendant contends the trial court incorrectly relied on the opinion deciding the direct appeal from his conviction without considering several items of evidence he wanted to proffer and lacked sufficient evidence to conclude he was ineligible for relief beyond a reasonable doubt. He also asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s failure to present the same evidence to the court. We find no prejudicial error and will affirm the trial court’s order.

This matter was transferred to this court to consider the merit of Tyrone A. Douglas’s claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus that he is eligible for early parole consideration under Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016. (In re Douglas (Mar. 9, 2022) 2022 Cal.LEXIS 1405, S268570.) Because Douglas has been released on parole, we will dismiss the petition as moot.

From 2001 to 2010, a water bottling company operated a plant in Siskiyou County (the County) that extracted groundwater and then used it to produce bottled water. A few years after the plant closed, Crystal Geyser Water Company (Crystal Geyser) bought the facility and sought to revive it. To that end, Crystal Geyser requested, among other things, a permit from the County to build a caretaker’s residence for the bottling plant and a permit from the City of Mt. Shasta (the City) to allow the plant to discharge wastewater into the City’s sewer system. Both the County and the City ultimately granted Crystal Geyser the permits it sought.
This appeal concerns one of two lawsuits challenging these approvals, both of which are now on appeal and both of which concern the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.).

Defendant Eddie Wayne Carmichael took about $200 worth of merchandise from a Placerville store, was found out by a store employee, and displayed a hunting knife at two store employees who tried to prevent him from escaping. He was convicted of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) with an enhancement for personally using a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) following a jury trial and pleaded no contest to obstructing an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant admitted three strike allegations (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and was sentenced to 25 years to life plus five years in state prison.

Aaron James Pierce appeals from the judgment entered after his guilty plea to second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)). Appellant pried open the front door of a business, entered the premises, and took $200 in cash and other property. The trial court dismissed a charge of attempted second degree burglary of another business. Appellant was sentenced to Ventura County Jail for the low term of 16 months. He was ordered to pay victim restitution of $2,980 for damage he had caused to three doors. The trial court denied his request “to modify sentence with Mandatory Supervision terms.”
We appointed counsel to represent appellant. Counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and requesting that we independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
On March 2, 2022, we mailed a notice to appellant at the Ventura County jail.

M.L. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights to her children, R.S., L.S., and R.L., (the children) and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding that the parental-benefit exception to adoption did not apply because the evidence demonstrated that the children would benefit from continuing the relationship and terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the children’s well-being. She contends that a legal guardianship or long-term foster care is the more appropriate permanent plan for the children. We affirm.