CA Unpub Decisions

Joshua E. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders assuming jurisdiction over his son, Josiah E. (Josiah, born Jan. 2017), and removing him from his care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 361.) He contends that (1) the jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the juvenile court’s removal order is not supported by substantial evidence.
Because the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and removal order are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

Defendant Arthur Leon Williams III appeals from a final judgment entered after a no contest plea to misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance under Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a), for which he was placed on one year summary probation, subject to credit for one day time served, narcotics conditions, and minimum fines. His sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his discovery motion filed pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (a Pitchess motion), in advance of his motion to suppress evidence. We agree, conditionally reverse the judgment, and remand for further proceedings as set forth herein.

C.W. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order assuming jurisdiction over her son, C.M. (born Aug. 2015) and removing him from her care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 361.) She contends that (1) the jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the juvenile court’s removal order is not supported by substantial evidence.
Because the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. In light of C.M.’s return to mother’s custody, her challenge to the juvenile court’s removal order is moot.

Defendant Y.S. (Mother) appeals jurisdictional and disposition findings as to her four children Chris, Michael, Nathan, and Jacob. Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that she failed to protect the children from substantial risk of harm due to father’s ongoing abuse of Mother and the parents’ minimization of the violence that occurred in the presence of the children.
Codefendant C.P. (Father) challenges the dispositional order removing Jacob (born Sept. 2018) from his custody based on domestic violence and alleged substance abuse, contending the court failed to consider the alternative of removing father from the family home, as required under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional and dispositional findings, reject the parents’ additional contentions, and affirm the orders as to all four children.

In this marital dissolution case, Petitioner and appellant Christopher Mowatt (Father) appeals from a post-judgment order changing the visitation schedule and requiring him to cooperate to obtain a new passport for the parties’ minor child. The sole issue raised on appeal concerns the family law court’s denial of Father’s oral motion to disqualify the family law judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. A determination concerning disqualification under section 170.1 is not an appealable order, however, and Father has not shown that his due process right to an impartial judge was violated. Therefore, we affirm.

W.C. was declared a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). On appeal he contends the juvenile court failed to make the required declaration of whether the current offense was a felony or a misdemeanor, nor was the requisite declaration made with respect to W.C.’s aggregated prior offenses. W.C. also seeks a recalculation of his maximum term due to a change in juvenile sentencing law. The People agree, as do we, that resentencing is required in light of the change in the law, and we therefore vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing.

Defendant Jiayi Zhang appeals from a judgment of conviction following a court trial, contending that the trial court erred by denying his request to withdraw his prior waiver of his right to a jury trial and that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We affirm the judgment as modified.

Defendant Elijah Kareem Shabazz Hall was convicted of one count of first degree murder, two counts of attempted second degree robbery, and three counts of second degree robbery. The jury found true gang enhancement allegations relating to all six offenses, and it also found true certain firearm enhancement allegations pertaining to the first degree murder and second degree robbery counts. The trial court sentenced Hall to a total state prison term of 23 years plus 75 years to life, which includes the gang and firearm enhancements, several of which were stayed.
On appeal, Hall claims the trial court erred in resuming his trial after suspending it for six months due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the gang enhancements, and claims the judgment must be modified to include an additional day of presentence custody credit.

Appellant Marcel Maurice Mackabee appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. In 2013, a jury convicted appellant of felony murder and found true a robbery-murder allegation under section 190.2 (the special circumstance statute). The jury was not instructed on the special circumstance statute’s requirement that the defendant at least have been a major participant in the underlying felony and have acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See § 190.2, subds. (b)-(d).) We affirmed the judgment. (People v. Mackabee (June 20, 2014, B250143) 2014 Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 4355 (Mackabee I).)

A jury convicted Dariion Daniel of murder, robbery, kidnapping and carjacking following a trial covering two incidents in 2015 and 2016. Daniel argues the trial court committed prejudicial error by denying his motion to sever the trial of the two incidents and his motions under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277 (Batson/Wheeler) following the People’s peremptory strikes of three Black prospective jurors.
We disagree. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daniel’s motion to sever, and joinder did not result in gross unfairness. In addition, Daniel failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination for one of the challenged strikes, and substantial evidence supported the court’s finding the other strikes were not motivated by prejudice.

This appeal involves a dispute arising from two commercial leases for properties formerly occupied by Art Works Studio & Classroom, LLC (Art Works) and Coffee + Food, LLC (collectively appellants). Appellants appeal from an order entered after the trial court partially granted a special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, “anti-SLAPP” statute) filed by defendants and respondents Massco Investments, Inc. (Massco) and Larchmont Place, LLC (Larchmont). While this appeal was pending final judgments were entered against appellants in unlawful detainer actions filed by Larchmont. Each of the causes of action struck by the trial court (and indeed every cause of action) in the operative complaint is premised on appellants having an ongoing possessory interest in the properties.

Defendant Marcos Navarez appeals a judgment convicting him of various charges arising out of his participation in a conspiracy to murder a rival gang member, including conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to receive a stolen vehicle, unlawful driving and taking a vehicle, participating in a criminal street gang conspiracy and participation in a criminal street gang. Defendant contends correctly that (1) there is insufficient evidence to convict him of participating in a criminal street gang conspiracy (Pen. Code, § 182.5) and (2) his conviction for conspiring to receive a stolen vehicle (§§ 182, 496d) must be reversed because the agreement regarding the stolen vehicle was part of a single conspiracy to murder the rival gang member.

Defendant Lee Warren Piola appeals from an order denying his petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(1), which provides for resentencing of military members or veterans suffering from certain mental health and substance abuse problems as a result of military service, if the sentencing court did not consider such problems as factors in mitigation. Defendant argues the trial court erred in summarily denying his petition for recall of sentence without holding a hearing to determine whether he satisfied the criteria in this subdivision for resentencing. We agree, and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Jennifer and Michael Blomquist petitioned for writ of mandate against the County of Santa Clara, a member of the board of supervisors, and several county employees, naming the San Jose Water Company and the San Jose Water Group as real parties in interest. The dispute relates to the approval and construction of a water storage tank near appellants’ property, and the associated relocation of an access road. The trial court sustained demurrers to the operative third amended petition, finding that the petition was fatally uncertain. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer and, alternatively, that the trial court erred by not granting leave to amend. We will affirm the judgment of dismissal because appellants failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and have not demonstrated a reasonable possibility that further amendment would cure that defect.