CA Unpub Decisions

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) (FAA), “[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2, italics added.) But California Labor Code section 229 provides that certain actions “for the collection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.”

Defendant is currently serving 24 years to life in prison for attempted murder, aggravated mayhem, domestic battery, and child endangerment and abuse convictions. The trial court imposed an additional 8-year determinate term sentence which it stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Due to two pieces of newly effective legislation — Assembly Bill 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) and Assembly Bill 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) — we agree with the parties and defendant’s sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing to allow the trial court to exercise discretion under the relevant amended sentencing related statutes.

A jury convicted defendant Alvaro Aldair Lopez-Sanchez of one count of second degree robbery, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and found true that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the crimes. The court sentenced defendant to five years in prison.
Defendant argues his conviction must be reversed because the trial court refused to permit a defense witness to restate or clarify portions of her testimony after the trial court concluded the witness had been coached by defense counsel during a recess. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion and affirm.

In 2011, appellant Tenace Demond Knight was convicted of possession of a weapon in a custodial institution (Pen. Code, § 4502, subd. (a)) and sentenced to the third strike term of 25 years to life.
In 2015, the superior court denied Knight’s petition for resentencing, filed pursuant to Proposition 36 and section 1170.126, and found he was statutorily ineligible for relief. This court affirmed the order on appeal.
In 2020, Knight filed another petition for resentencing under section 1170.126, and it was, again, denied. On appeal, Knight’s appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.

This matter is back before us after a prior appeal that resulted in a remand for resentencing, for various reasons, including the enactment of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 620), which retroactively amended Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (c), to make the imposition of firearm enhancements under that statute discretionary. Appellant Eduardo Flores now seeks another remand for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1393), which took effect after his prior resentencing. Senate Bill No. 1393 amended sections 667 and 1385 to give trial courts discretion to dismiss a prior serious felony enhancement at sentencing. Flores further seeks remand for the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether he is eligible for mental health diversion under section 1001.36, which also took effect relatively recently.

Appellant M.P. (father) appeals from a juvenile court’s order terminating visits with his daughter, M.R. (the child). He argues the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that visits with him were detrimental. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant, William Douglas Mello, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, which the court summarily denied. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying his petition. We affirm.

In this appeal, plaintiff Kristen Barbier seeks reversal of a judgment of dismissal of her first amended complaint without leave to amend after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer filed by her half-brother, defendant Kurt Beier. The lawsuit alleged defendant cheated plaintiff out of her rightful share of the Doris and Lawrence Kleinfelter Family Trust. Defendant had demurred on the grounds plaintiff’s action was not timely brought within the applicable statute of limitations and that it was barred by res judicata following plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt to recover against him and her attorney in connection with the distribution of the trust estate of their mother and plaintiff’s stepfather. The trial court ruled that the first amended complaint was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 338. Plaintiff appealed.

Peter and Adele Stoll separately appeal a judgment in favor of Gerald Colapinto, plaintiff, for cancelation of an instrument and breach of contract. Boiled down to its essence, plaintiff arranged for the assignment of his promissory note and deed of trust held by his former attorney to defendant Peter Stoll (Peter) , a disbarred attorney who had advised plaintiff on legal and tax matters for many years. After re-assigning the benefits of the note and deed of trust to himself and his wife, Adele, Peter executed a full reconveyance of the deed of trust to plaintiff, which was not promptly recorded. Later, when defendant demanded from plaintiff, and was denied, funding for a business venture he claimed plaintiff had promised earlier, Peter and Adele commenced foreclosure proceedings against plaintiff. Following a court trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and each defendant appeals separately.

Plaintiff and appellant Dale Allen Peterson appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Los Angeles, LLC (Enterprise). Peterson rented a car from Enterprise at a Riverside location and returned it with body damage that neither Peterson nor any Enterprise employee observed when he rented the car. The damage to the vehicle was $564.80. Enterprise kept $340, which it claimed was a deposit paid by Peterson at the time he rented the vehicle. Enterprise then demanded the remaining balance, eventually turning the matter over to a collection agency.
Peterson filed a lawsuit claiming violations of Civil Code section 1750, et. seq., the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Business and Professions Code section 17200, the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) based on Enterprise requiring him to sign an electronic rental agreement and for automatically taking money on his credit card without resolution of the cause of damage.

James M. believed defendant and appellant David Hemsley was having an affair with his girlfriend. The two men engaged in a fistfight, leading to defendant firing two shots at James, one of which hit him in the chest.
Defendant appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a); count 2) , unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd (b); count 4). The jury also found true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) in the commission of the assault (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a)). The jury also found that defendant had a prior burglary conviction, which qualified as a strike and a prior serious felony enhancement (nickel prior) (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 1170.12).

Conservatee and appellant Ryan M. is a disabled adult who has been in a limited conservatorship over his person since he was 18 years old. He has speech and cognitive impairments that limit his ability to answer questions and express his needs and desires. In the fall of 2015, shortly after Ryan was married, his husband, Sean S., became his conservator.
Six months later, respondent—Ryan’s twin brother, Ronald M.—petitioned to remove Sean under Probate Code section 2650 for being unable to faithfully perform his duties as conservator. After a thirteen-day bench trial that included expert testimony under Evidence Code section 730, the judge granted the petition and removed Sean based on findings he was isolating and abusing Ryan and was unable to occupy the roles of spouse and conservator without creating a conflict of interest.
Ryan challenges this ruling on appeal, arguing the judge removed Sean for an improper reason and applied the wrong standard of proof in doing so.

Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
R.S. (Father) and his minor daughter, M.S., appeal from juvenile court orders denying Father’s petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to grant him reunification services after his release from incarceration. Father also appeals from the juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) did not apply. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) maintains the court did not err in denying the section 388 petition without a hearing or in finding ICWA inapplicable. We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s section 388 petition, but erred in finding ICWA did not apply, and conditionally reverse in part for ICWA compliance.

Plaintiff Jordana Bauman filed the underlying action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) and other defendants, based on Bauman’s allegations that Wells Fargo wrongfully foreclosed on her home. Bauman is appealing from two orders that the trial court issued in the underlying proceeding; Bauman seeks reversal of the trial court’s order declaring her a vexatious litigant and its subsequent order requiring her to obtain the approval of the court before filing additional litigation.
We conclude that the inadequacy of the record provided on appeal is such that Bauman cannot demonstrate reversible error. We therefore affirm the orders of the trial court.