CA Unpub Decisions

In 2015, defendants Mohammed Zarin Khan and Manuel Trujillo were convicted by a jury of first degree murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter. In 2019, following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437, they filed petitions under Penal Code section 1170.95 to vacate their murder convictions. Over the People’s opposition, the trial court found defendants had established a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show cause, and held an evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, which was conducted by a judge who did not originally sentence defendants and at which no party introduced new live testimony, the court denied the petitions. Both Khan and Trujillo appeal. We affirm.

In 1993, a jury convicted defendant Edward Miller of first degree felony murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189), robbery (§ 211), and kidnapping (§ 207), finding true the felony murder special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during a robbery and a kidnapping (Former § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i), (ii)) and the allegation that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon during the commission of the murder and the robbery (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The superior court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole. This court affirmed the judgment in 1994 in case No. H011204.
In 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, which was enacted by the Legislature through its passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)

Appellant Miriam Broumas appeals a judgment of the probate court after a court trial in an action brought by respondent Stephen J. Sturm (Sturm). Miriam Broumas was the wife of decedent Robert Broumas, Sturm’s uncle. Sturm successfully petitioned the court to deem Miriam as having predeceased Robert pursuant to Probate Code section 259 on the ground that she had engaged in financial elder abuse of Robert. The judgment effectively disinherited Miriam from the sale proceeds of Robert’s estate’s only remaining asset, real property referred to by the parties as the “five-plex.” The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court properly applied section 259. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.

In 2003, a jury convicted defendant Jaime Valenzuela of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) under alternate aiding and abetting theories including the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury also found that defendant committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The superior court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life consecutive to a 10-year determinate term for the gang enhancement. In 2004, this court affirmed the judgment in case No. H025810.
In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, which was enacted by the Legislature through its passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017 2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)

There is an old saying that comes to mind in reviewing the present case: “Never buy a pig in a poke.” This saying refers to something that is bought without being first inspected and thus is of unknown authenticity or quality.
San Francisco real estate investor Luke Stickney decided to roll the dice one day in July 2017 and purchase a 40-acre parcel, sight unseen, from an eBay auction site for $25,000. He was told by the seller, who heretofore had been unknown to him, that the sale had to close immediately, and there was no time to pull a title report. Within one week of the bid, Stickney’s company, appellant Luxury Estates Group (LEG), received a deed to a property he knew nothing about.
As these stories so often go, things did not go smoothly for Stickney from there, as he soon found himself on the receiving end of a lawsuit from the respondent, Elizabeth Young. It turns out the seller from whom Stickney had purchased the parcel did not actually own it.

Appointed counsel for defendant Frederick Wright asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

In April 2021, defendant Dakota Wallace Simpson pled nolo contendere to committing an assault with the use of force likely to cause great bodily injury. Soon thereafter, the trial court suspended the imposition of the sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years. In this appeal, defendant challenges fines imposed under Penal Code section 1203.1b, which were later repealed by the Legislature. Defendant also challenges a condition of probation that provides his probation officer with the unlimited ability to search all his electronic devices. Defendant believes the condition is overbroad and unconstitutional. The People acknowledge the repeal of the section 1203.1b fines, and further acknowledge a remand is necessary to allow the trial court to narrow the probation condition on searches of defendant’s electronic devices. We agree and remand this matter for further proceedings.

In 1989, a jury convicted petitioner Derrick Carson of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with the special circumstances the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i), (a)(17)(vii)). (People v. Carson (July 26, 1991, F013403) [nonpub. opn.] (Carson).) Petitioner was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole.
In 2020, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing on his murder conviction pursuant to section 1170.95. The court summarily denied the petition at the prima facie stage on the ground the special circumstance findings established he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
On appeal, petitioner contends the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent petitioner and engaged in improper factfinding at the prima facie stage.

In 1982, a jury convicted petitioner Joe Nunez, Jr., of conspiracy to commit murder for financial gain (Pen. Code, § 182; count I), and first degree murder (§ 187; count II) with the special circumstance the murder was committed for financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)). In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found petitioner had served one prior prison term for a violent felony (§ 667.5, subd. (a)). The trial court orally sentenced petitioner to a three-year term for the prior prison term enhancement, followed by a term of life without the possibility of parole on count II. Although the court did not orally pronounce sentence on count I, the judgment of commitment reflects petitioner was sentenced to a concurrent term of life without the possibility of parole on that count. (See People v. Nunez (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 214, 217 (Nunez I), disapproved on another ground by People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 861, 867.)

In 2005, petitioner Reyes Escobedo pled no contest to the second degree murder of Christopher Stoner. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of 15 years to life.
In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court summarily denied the petition without providing a statement of reasons.
On appeal, petitioner asserts he established a prima facie claim for resentencing eligibility and the court therefore erred in denying the petition without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing. The People concede error. We accept the People’s concession and reverse.

In October 2015, appellant Brian David Thacker (appellant) pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to the second strike term of 30 years to life plus five years, pursuant to a negotiated disposition.
In 2020, appellant filed a petition in the superior court for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91, that provides “[e]ffective January 1, 2015, sentencing courts must consider any trauma, substance abuse, and mental health problems caused by a defendant’s service in the United States military as mitigating factors weighing in favor of a low-term sentence,” and allows “people sentenced before January 1, 2015, to petition for a resentencing hearing in which the court takes into account mitigating factors related to military service.” (People v. Bonilla-Bray (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 234, 238.) The court denied the petition.

In 2009, petitioner Kevin Dixon pled no contest to the second degree murder of Kisasi Baltrip. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) For this offense and a related enhancement, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of 25 years to life.
In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court summarily denied the petition without providing a statement of reasons.
On appeal, petitioner asserts he established a prima facie claim for resentencing eligibility and the court therefore erred in denying the petition without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing. The People concede error. We accept the People’s concession and reverse.

In 2016, petitioner Lisandro Mendoza pled no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) as a lesser included offense of the charge of premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). He also admitted a gang enhancement. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) The trial court sentenced petitioner to an aggregate term of 16 years in state prison.
In 2020, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The court summarily denied the petition on the ground petitioner was not convicted of first or second degree murder under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory.
During the pendency of this appeal, section 1170.95 was amended to expressly permit resentencing of certain persons convicted of manslaughter. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a); see Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill No. 775); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1-2.)

On August 17, 2017, Josue Echeverria, an inmate at Sierra Conservation Center (a California state prison), was videotaped engaged in a group assault on another inmate, S.R., during a prison riot. Echeverria and other inmates kicked, punched, and stomped S.R., rendering him unconscious and causing him to be hospitalized. A jury convicted Echeverria of assault by an inmate likely to produce great bodily injury and battery causing great bodily injury, and found true the allegations that Echeverria personally caused great bodily injury on S.R. Echeverria contends on appeal that (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing argument when she vouched for the correctional officer witnesses by arguing that they would lose their jobs if they lied, and (2) the trial court erred in determining Echeverria had the ability to pay a $10,000 restitution fine.
We affirm the judgment.