CA Unpub Decisions

This case was brought by the homeowners’ association for the Mayfaire residential community in Bakersfield against an individual homeowner, Simranjit Deol. The homeowners’ association (Mayfaire) was governed by a board of directors (Board). Deol’s house within the Mayfaire community burned down on account of arson. A dispute arose between Mayfaire’s Board and Deol over Deol’s alleged failure to maintain and landscape his lot, or timely rebuild his home, in the years following the fire. Mayfaire filed the instant action to enforce the community’s governing declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). The matter eventually proceeded to a bench trial, in which Mayfaire prevailed. The trial court granted injunctive and declaratory relief to Mayfaire.

On August 17, 2017, defendant Andrew Roberson, an inmate at Sierra Conservation Center (a California state prison), was videotaped engaged in a group assault on another inmate, S.R., during a prison riot. Defendant and other inmates kicked, punched, and stomped on S.R., rendering him unconscious and causing him to be hospitalized. A jury convicted defendant of assault by an inmate likely to produce great bodily injury and battery resulting in serious bodily injury, and found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on S.R.
Defendant contends on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the video was not of sufficient quality to prove he was the inmate who participated in the assault and battery of another inmate,

On August 17, 2017, defendant Jose Frausto, an inmate at Sierra Conservation Center (a California state prison), was videotaped engaged in a group assault on another inmate, S.R., during a prison riot. Defendant and other inmates kicked, punched, and stomped on S.R., rendering him unconscious and causing him to be hospitalized. A jury convicted defendant of assault by an inmate likely to produce great bodily injury and battery causing great bodily injury, and found true the allegations that defendant personally caused great bodily injury on S.R. Defendant contends on appeal that (1) the jury’s finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury during the assault is not supported by sufficient evidence, (2) the trial court erred in not sua sponte instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault, and (3) the trial court erred in not sua sponte instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of simple battery.

Roland Bernard Campbell (defendant) was convicted by jury of robbery and aggravated assault. He claims the jury should have been instructed on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. He further contends two prior prison term enhancements have been invalidated by Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136). We reject the first claim. The second claim is appropriately conceded by the People. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.

In 2016, petitioner Jeanette Robles pled no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) as a lesser included offense of the charge of premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). She also admitted a gang enhancement. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) The trial court sentenced petitioner to an aggregate term of 21 years in state prison.
In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The court summarily denied the petition on the ground section 1170.95 does not provide for resentencing of defendants who were convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
During the pendency of this appeal, section 1170.95 was amended to expressly permit resentencing of certain persons convicted of manslaughter. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a); see Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill No. 775); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1-2.)

The District Attorney of Kern County filed an information on October 24, 2018, charging defendant Danny Lee Barham with unlawfully manufacturing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a).) Defendant pleaded not guilty.
On November 20, 2018, defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from a warrantless search of his residence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. The prosecutor opposed the motion, justifying the search based upon the search terms of defendant’s probation. The trial court heard evidence relating to defendant’s motion on December 6, 2018, and denied the motion thereafter. A jury convicted defendant on March 7, 2019, after a five-day trial.
On April 8, 2019, the trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to the upper term of seven years, with defendant serving two years in county jail and the remainder on mandatory supervision pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B).

In 2017, appellant Jesus Reyes and two codefendants were tried for the 2014 stabbing death of Roman Aguayo. The jury was unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. In 2019, appellant was tried alone and a subsequent jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), finding true that this crime was committed with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also convicted appellant of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 2). Appellant received an indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life.
Appellant raises claims of instructional error and insufficiency of the evidence. He also asserts the trial court erred in excusing a juror. We reject his claims and affirm.

Both mother, A.J., and father, M.J., appeal from a judgment terminating their parental rights respecting B.J., who was removed when a few days old after being born with methamphetamine in his system. When the dependency was initiated, father informed the social worker and executed a form indicating possible Native American ancestry, but because B.J. was the seventh child born to and removed from the parents’ custody, and freed for adoption, the juvenile court determined that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply based on findings in the sibling cases, denied reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 361.5, subdivision (b), and set a hearing to select and implement a permanent plan of adoption. After parental rights were terminated, both parents appealed.

On November 17, 2020, a felony complaint charged defendant and respondent Jacob Martin Camacho with possession of a firearm by a felon under Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) (count 1); unlawful possession of ammunition under section 30305, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2); and carrying a loaded firearm on one’s person or in a vehicle under section 25850, subdivision (a) (count 3).
On February 2, 2021, defendant filed a section 1538.5 motion to suppress the evidence giving rise to the charges. On March 4, 2021, a magistrate judge held a preliminary hearing on the motion and denied the motion. On March 30, 2021, defendant renewed his motion to suppress under section 1538.5, subdivision (i), and moved to dismiss the complaint under section 995. On April 20, 2021, the trial court held a special hearing on the renewed motion to suppress. The court granted the motion to suppress evidence and to dismiss the charges.

Defendant and appellant Kate Lyn Kent filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, which the court denied after holding an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to render defendant ineligible for relief. We reverse and remand the mater for reconsideration.

The house of Romualdo Rodríguez and Rosa Rodríguez (collectively, the Rodríguezes) was in a state of disrepair. Defendant and appellant U.S. Bank (the Bank) is the trustee for the deed of trust on the Rodríguezes’ house (the House). Plaintiff and respondent, the City of Fontana (the City) sent the Rodríguezes and the Bank a notice and order to repair or abate, but they failed to repair the House. On March 5, 2018, the trial court appointed a receiver for the House, movant and respondent Richardson C. Griswold (Griswold). On June 29, 2018, the trial court authorized the receiver to hire a real estate agent to list the House for sale in as-is condition. The Bank appealed the June 29, 2018, order to this court. We dismissed the appeal because an order authorizing the hiring of a real estate agent is not an appealable order. (City of Fontana v. U.S. Bank (Nov. 19, 2019, E070909) [nonpub. opn.].)

This appeal presents the question whether the trial judge properly entered summary judgment for respondent 21st Century Insurance Company (21st Century) on appellant Neco Moss’s cause of action for fraud.
This appeal arises from an automobile accident involving Moss, Juan Manuel Orozco, Robert Henry Hartman, and two other motorists. The accident occurred on May 15, 2013, on the eastbound 210 freeway in Fontana. Orozco crossed a double yellow line to enter the carpool lane at a relatively low speed in the path of Hartman’s truck. Hartman struck Orozco’s vehicle, Orozco hit Moss’s vehicle, Moss hit a fourth vehicle, and the fourth vehicle hit a fifth. Moss sued Hartman and Orozco and a jury found Hartman was not negligent and found Orozco had been negligent but awarded no damages. Moss appealed that verdict in a companion case, and we affirmed the judgment.

R.C., mother of the minor, appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court removing the minor from mother’s custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j). The challenged orders rest on a finding that the minor’s two infant half siblings had suffered physical abuse while in the care of mother and her husband, and that the minor was therefore at substantial risk of suffering serious harm in mother’s care. (§§ 300, 360, 395.) Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction and removal. She further claims the juvenile court abused its discretion when it awarded father sole legal and physical custody, dismissed the dependency petition as to the minor, and ordered that mother’s visitation with the minor be supervised. Finding merit in mother’s claims, we reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order and remand with directions to dismiss the petition as to the minor.

Appointed counsel for defendant Gregory Bontemps filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After examining the record and considering defendant’s contentions in his supplemental brief, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant and affirm. However, given recent legislative changes regarding the main jail booking and classification fees, we shall order those fees vacated.