CA Unpub Decisions

C.B. (Father) appeals an order terminating his parental rights to A.B. (Minor) at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing (.26 hearing). Minor is now age six. At the .26 hearing, the dependency court terminated both parents’ parental rights and chose adoption as Minor’s permanent plan.
Only Father appeals. The sole issue is whether the court erred in finding that Father failed to prove the applicability of the parental beneficial relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Both parties to this appeal, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) and Father, rely upon the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), which was filed just before the court held the .26 hearing.

Defendant Allen Jones appeals from a restitution order following his guilty plea to grand theft of property, in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (c). The trial court ordered defendant to pay $1,600 in victim restitution plus annual interest of 10 percent and an administrative fee of up to 15 percent of the unpaid obligation. Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering restitution in an amount that exceeded the value of the property damaged by his criminal conduct. Second, he argues that recently-enacted legislation requires us to strike the portion of the trial court’s judgment imposing interest and administrative fees. Respondent concedes the second issue, and we accept the concession. However, we reject defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the restitution amount. Accordingly, we strike the interest and administrative fees and remand for further proceedi

Appellant Hanan Shiheiber appeals from a post-judgment award of contractual attorney fees imposed against her after she lost at trial on all of her claims against lender JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase), which were premised on her theory Chase had wrongfully foreclosed on her properties. By separate opinion in her related appeal from the judgment, which was argued together with this one, we have affirmed the judgment entered against her. (Shiheiber v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (July 27, 2022, A159313) [nonpub. opn.].) Here, Shiheiber challenges the legal basis for the attorney fees award on two grounds. We reject her arguments and affirm the attorney fees award as well.

Appellant, Lemuel Wilson, speeding on a highway off-ramp, lost control of his vehicle and slammed into another car driven by a mother taking her three sons home from a drive-in movie. After Wilson’s car came to rest, he got out, refused help from several bystanders, and escaped on foot as the mother screamed over her children, two of whom died at the scene. The youngest child, an infant, survived serious head wounds and other injuries. Wilson was arrested after going to the hospital for his own injuries the following day, when a test of his blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) showed no alcohol in his system. A jury convicted Wilson of two counts of second degree, implied malice murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) causing great bodily injury to multiple victims within 10 years of a prior DUI conviction (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, subd. (a), 23558, 23560; Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subds. (a) & (b)), and leaving the scene of an accident

In February 2018, Mendoza-Heredia was charged with ten counts of child molestation pertaining to two victims. As to the first victim, M.L., he was charged with six counts occurring between May 3, 2011, and May 2, 2017. Five of these counts were for committing forcible lewd acts on a child under 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)), including touching her vagina over clothing (count one), touching her vagina on the skin (count two), touching her breasts (count three), causing her to touch his penis (count four), and putting his mouth on her vagina (count five). Count six was for aggravated sexual assault on a child involving oral copulation (§ 269, subd. (a)(4)).
Mendoza-Heredia was charged with four counts relating to the second victim, K.C., occurring between October 21, 2007, and October 20, 2013.

Early one morning, Jose Ramirez and his wife, Alberta, heard their car alarm sounding. Alberta saw a young man standing at the garage. Jose went to the garage and noticed Mejia was outside standing next to a black car talking on a cellphone. When Jose entered the garage, he saw the back passenger window of his vehicle was broken. He watched Francisco Rodriguez, who was inside the vehicle, attempting to remove the speakers. Jose tried to leave the garage when Rodriguez turned and pointed a shotgun at him. Mejia, who was now holding a pistol, ordered Jose back into the garage.
Alberta, who was standing nearby, was holding a cellphone in her hand. Mejia pointed his pistol at her and grabbed her phone. At this point, the apartment complex manager arrived and told the two culprits, “Lower your weapon. Don’t be a fool. Think about what you’re doing.” Rodriguez pointed his shotgun at Jose and pulled the trigger three times, but the weapon did not fire.

A jury convicted appellant Andrew Steven Trevino of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) for the shooting death of Alfonso Alvarado. The jury found true a special-circumstance allegation that this murder was committed while appellant was an active participant in a criminal street gang, and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). In count 1, the jury found true a gang enhancement and three firearm enhancements. Finally, the jury convicted appellant of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 2). In part, appellant received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
Appellant raises a number of claims which we reject. However, one claim has partial merit. While this appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, §§ 1–5) (Assembly Bill 333), which went into effect on January 1, 2022.

G.D. was born in 2004 and was 15 years old at the time of trial. Throughout the summer of 2018, when G.D. was 13 years old, G.D. and defendant would see each other a least three times a week. Prior to that, defendant had been a friend of G.D.’s parents and would spend time at G.D.’s house. G.D.’s parents were unaware G.D. was spending time with defendant. Defendant would pick G.D. up from his house, and they would either clean fish tanks at a barber shop or do gardening work. Over time, G.D. and defendant became friends and would talk about fish tanks and remote control cars.
In May 2018, defendant and G.D. began having conversations about alcohol, drugs, and sex. Defendant told G.D. he was bisexual and did sexual things with other men. These conversations occurred in person and over the phone. G.D. told defendant he like to vape, so defendant got him a vape pen because G.D. was not old enough to purchase one.

In November 2011, Elizabeth Renee Vasquez was in a relationship with Zamora. Renee’s brother, Emmanuel Joe Donez (Joe), saw Facebook posts about incidents between Zamora and Vasquez which angered Joe, as he believed the relationship was abusive.
The Murder of Isaac Donez
On November 28, 2011, shortly after Thanksgiving, Joe went to find Vasquez and Zamora at the residence of Joe’s cousin Danny Gaytan, so that Joe could talk to Zamora, although it crossed his mind that the encounter might come to blows. Cynthia Donez (Cynthia), Joe’s wife, drove a white Dodge with Joe, Joe’s stepbrother Isaac Donez (Isaac), and another of Joe’s cousins, Timothy Young, to Gaytan’s house.
When the group arrived at Gaytan’s residence on Meadow Place, in Lemoore, Cynthia parked the Dodge next to the passenger side of a black SUV, with the front of the Dodge lined up with the passenger door of the SUV, both facing the front of Gaytan’s house.

Two witnesses testified they heard loud noises and observed defendant and Vaielua (described in testimony as the “Hispanic” or “Mexican” man) in the street circling and going back and forth towards each other like they were going to fight. Defendant was holding a baseball bat and Vaielua was holding a long metal pole. Both witnesses saw defendant hit Vaielua with the baseball bat, causing him to fall to the ground. One witness noted defendant hit Vaielua in the head with the baseball bat. The other witness observed Vaielua raise the metal pole and swing it at defendant first. Defendant caught the pole and continued to hit Vaielua with the bat while he was on the ground.
Two video recordings of the incident from two different angles were played for the jury. Both videos show defendant and Vaielua moving around each other and going back and forth towards each other.

Jane Doe 1 was “around 18 or 19 years old” in 2009. She had two children with defendant’s son, Arturo Arevalo, Jr.
When she was 15, she moved in with Arevalo, Jr., defendant, and defendant’s wife. Defendant was like a father figure to her.
By 2009, defendant had gotten divorced and moved out. Jane Doe 1 continued to live with Arevalo, Jr., and his mother. Defendant would still come to the house often and give Jane Doe 1 rides places.
At one point, after giving Jane Doe 1 a ride, defendant “sexually abused” her. When asked to clarify how defendant sexually abused her, Jane Doe 1 explained he had intercourse with her. Jane Doe 1 asked defendant to stop. Jane Doe 1’s hands were behind her back so she could not push defendant off of her. Jane Doe 1 was in shock because she had known defendant for many years and had trusted him.
A month after this incident, Jane Doe 1 called law enforcement to report it.

On May 6, 2015, C., a former Norteno gang member, went to a grocery store with his girlfriend and two of his five children. He got out of his car and saw a Hispanic male later identified as Castro urinating in the parking lot. Because he was with his girlfriend and children, he said to Castro, “Come on, man.” Castro responded, “Oh, my bad.”
Castro looked C. up and down and asked for a cigarette, and C. told him he did not smoke. C. was wearing blue sandals at the time. Blue is the color of the Sureno gang, a rival of the Norteno gang. Nortenos wear the color red. However, because C. was a dropout, he believed he could wear whatever color he wanted. C. knew that Nortenos were supposed to react, often with violence, when they encounter Surenos. Castro asked C. if he “banged” and if he was a “scrap,” which is a derogatory term for a Sureno. C. smirked and told Castro he was not a scrap and said he was with his kids. C. kept walking and saw Castro reach toward his waistban

On December 2, 2016, plaintiff filed a civil complaint against defendants. Plaintiff alleged she was terminated from her employment as an instructional aide on September 16, and defendants used a false accusation of child abuse as a pretext for her termination. As a result, plaintiff alleged causes of action for (1) wrongful termination due to disability discrimination; (2) whistleblower retaliation; (3) denial of a name clearing hearing regarding a false accusation of child abuse; (4) breach of contract; and (5) defamation.
On December 28, 2016, plaintiff received a phone call from defense counsel. Defense counsel requested that plaintiff dismiss her suit and indicated that defendants had possession of a CANRA report in support of their position that plaintiff was terminated as the result of a report of child abuse.

In November 2021, the Agency petitioned the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b), on behalf of newborn baby W.D. The Agency alleged that Mother was incapable of providing regular care for W.D. because that month, Mother presented with a psychotic disorder and was placed on a psychiatric hold, and also had tested positive for methamphetamine. The petition included a statement on Judicial Council form ICWA-010(A) that a social worker had not yet asked about W.D.’s Indian status because Mother was mentally unstable and presented with psychotic thinking, paranoia, hallucinations, and delusions.
At the detention hearing, the court deferred making a finding under ICWA due to its inability to communicate with Mother and her refusal to accept court-appointed counsel.