CA Unpub Decisions

In 2008, appellant Taron Maddox was sentenced to an indeterminate life term for attempted murder. When he recently sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, the trial court denied his petition on the basis that section does not apply to the crime of attempted murder. That was true at the time the trial court made its ruling in 2021. However, as of January 1, 2022, new legislation makes section 1170.95 applicable to defendants who were convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting. As respondent concedes, this change requires that we reverse the trial court’s denial order and remand for further proceedings.

Nearly a quarter century ago, appellant Juan Alexander Montes was convicted of attempted murder and other crimes he committed with his fellow gang members. When he more recently sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, the trial court denied his petition on the basis that section does not apply to the crime of attempted murder. That was true at the time the trial court made its ruling in 2019. However, as of January 1, 2022, new legislation makes section 1170.95 applicable to defendants who were convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. As respondent concedes, this change requires that we reverse the trial court’s denial order and remand for further proceedings.

In 2010, appellant Albert Julian Juarez was sentenced to 30 years in prison as part of an agreement under which he pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder and other crimes. When he more recently sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, the trial court denied his petition on the basis that section does not apply to the crime of attempted murder. That was true at the time the trial court made its ruling in 2019. However, as of January 1, 2022, new legislation makes section 1170.95 applicable to defendants who pleaded guilty to attempted murder charges which were prosecutable under the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting. As respondent concedes, this change requires that we reverse the trial court’s denial order and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant Julio N. (Father) is the father of the child M.N. (the child), who is the subject of a dependency case. Father challenges the juvenile court’s orders terminating his parental rights at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Father’s sole claim is that the juvenile court and Kern County Department of Human Services (Department) failed to comply with the inquiry provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA).
The Department concedes that it failed to conduct further inquiry into the possible Indian ancestry of the child’s mother, Martha A. (Mother), and it does not oppose remand for the limited purpose of conducting further ICWA inquiry. We agree with the parties and conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and remand for proceedings to ensure ICWA compliance.

This is an appeal from the August 12, 2020 judgment resentencing defendant and appellant, Jason Aaron Arredondo, following a prior appeal and review in the California Supreme Court. In 2015, defendant was convicted of committing 14 sex offenses against four minors, and the jury also found one strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61) and other sentencing enhancement allegations true. On August 4, 2015, defendant was sentenced to 33 years, plus 275 years to life, in state prison.
Defendant appealed, and in 2017 this court remanded the matter for resentencing on counts 1, 12, and 14. (People v. Arredondo, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) Our state Supreme Court granted review, and in 2019 it reversed defendant’s convictions in counts 3, 4, and 5 and remanded the matter for resentencing on counts 1, 12, and 14 (as this court had ordered). (People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 712.)

This appeal arises from an automobile accident involving plaintiff Neco Moss, defendants Juan Manuel Orozco and Robert Henry Hartman, and two other motorists who aren’t involved in the litigation.
The accident occurred on May 15, 2013, on the eastbound 210 freeway in Fontana. According to Orozco and Hartman, Orozco crossed a double yellow line to enter the carpool lane at a relatively low speed in the path of Hartman’s truck. Hartman struck Orozco’s vehicle, which started a chain reaction—Orozco hitting Moss, Moss hitting a fourth vehicle, and the fourth vehicle hitting a fifth.
Moss sued Hartman and Orozco for, among other things, negligence, and represented himself at trial, as he does on appeal. A jury found Hartman was not negligent and found Orozco had been negligent but awarded no damages.
Moss appeals, arguing the trial judge committed several errors.

In 2009, Regina and LaRon Taylor were divorced by a judgment that disposed of community property and awarded child support for the couple’s then minor children, as well as spousal support for Regina. The marriage had lasted for 11 years and 4 months, but the spousal support continued, until, in 2019, the trial considered cross motions by the parties and ordered a gradual reduction in spousal support, with a goal of terminating it in due course. Regina, who has made no effort to seek or obtain employment or to apply for disability, appeals that judgment.
On appeal, Regina argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her most recent application to order an increase in spousal support, as well as in ordering a decrease of support with further reductions leading to termination of spousal support. We affirm.

In 2005, a jury convicted petitioner Sinque Morrison of, among other things, first degree murder and attempted murder for his involvement in the shooting death of 11-year-old Mynisha Crenshaw. In 2014, the California Supreme Court held that the natural and probable consequences doctrine is not a valid theory of liability for first degree murder. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu).) Morrison subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged the trial court impermissibly instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine in violation of Chiu.
After we summarily denied the petition, the California Supreme Court vacated our opinion and directed us to order the People to show cause why Morrison’s requested relief should not be granted. After receiving further briefing from the parties, we again denied Morrison’s writ petition for habeas corpus relief.

In 2006, Demetrius D. Gater was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), attempted murder and deliberate, premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664 &187, subd. (a)); various firearm enhancements, a personal infliction of great bodily injury enhancement, and an allegation Gater was an active member of a criminal street gang were found true. Gater was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 75 years to life plus a determinate term of 20 years in prison.
Gater appealed and this court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Gater (Oct. 15, 2008, D050723) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2021, Gater filed a motion to transfer his case to juvenile court for a fitness hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 707 & 707.5). Gater alleged he was 17 years old during some of the crimes and under subsequent legislation he is entitled to remand for a fitness hearing.
The trial court denied the motion by written order.

A.P. (Mother) appeals from juvenile court orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to reinstate reunification services and transition placement of her daughter G.T. and terminating her parental rights. Mother contends the juvenile court erred by applying a rigid best interest determination to the exclusion of factors that weighed in favor of granting her petition, including her positive and improving relationship with G.T. and the potential for a future sibling relationship with Mother’s unborn child. We reject Mother’s contentions and affirm the orders.

N.G. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders at a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing declaring her now six-year-old son, Sebastian M., a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a), and removing him from her custody. The hearing focused on allegations that Mother physically abused Sebastian. She argues the court violated her right to due process by limiting her time to present her case. We conclude, however, that the court acted within its broad discretion to control the proceedings and did not violate Mother’s due process rights. Accordingly, we affirm the orders.

murder, robbery, and burglary and found true robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances. On appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s murder conviction but vacated the robbery and burglary convictions because the charges were untimely brought. In January 2019, defendant petitioned the trial court for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 based on changes made to the felony-murder rule by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). The trial court denied defendant’s petition at the prima facie stage, finding the record established defendant was ineligible for resentencing on multiple grounds. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in summarily denying her petition. We disagree and affirm.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of defendant Frank Lee Dearwester’s request to resentence him pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91. Appointed counsel for defendant filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and asking this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant subsequently filed a supplemental brief contending the trial court improperly denied his petition. We affirm

G.N. and M.N., through counsel appointed by this court, appeal from the order denying petitions for guardianship filed by their paternal grandmother, C.G., and paternal uncle, C.N. (petitioners).
This action is governed by Family Code section 3041, which “prohibits a court from granting custody of a minor to a person who is not the child’s parent and over the parent’s objection without first finding that granting custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child and granting custody to the nonparent is required to serve the child’s best interest. (Fam. Code, § 3041, subd. (a).) Detriment to the child must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. (Fam. Code, § 3041, subd. (b).)” (Guardianship of Vaughan (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1059 (Vaughan).)
The trial court concluded that petitioners failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that leaving custody with their mother, K.V., would be detrimental to G.N. and M.N.