CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant Jose Iniguez guilty on 14 counts of lewd and lascivious acts involving five victims. At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from an expert witness to explain the behavior of child sexual abuse victims, using principles of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erred in admitting this testimony because a number of courts in other jurisdictions have disapproved of CSAAS evidence, and it does not satisfy established requirements for admissibility. He further argues defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he elicited testimony from the expert witness about the frequency of false accusations in child sexual abuse cases. Finding no merit in defendant’s contentions, we will affirm the judgment.

This case arises out of a contract dispute between two Indian tribes, Yavapai-Apache Nation (YAN) and La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission Indians (La Posta). Over a decade ago, YAN and La Posta entered into an agreement that required La Posta to pay back tens of millions of dollars that it borrowed to finance the construction of a casino. Under the terms of the agreement, if La Posta failed to pay its debt, YAN’s sole recourse in most circumstances would be to seize La Posta’s casino revenues, casino equipment, and other casino-related assets. But the agreement also authorized YAN to pursue La Posta’s other assets too if a court made a “final determination” that La Posta committed any act of fraud in connection with the parties’ agreement.
Shortly after the parties entered into their agreement, La Posta failed to make payments on the loan.

The trial court granted a motion by defendants Perice Sibley and Capital Mailing Service, Inc. (CMSI) to set aside entry of default and default judgment against them. Plaintiff Eric Kozlowski appeals, contending (1) the motion was untimely, and (2) the trial court erred if it considered the evidence attached to the motion.
We conclude (1) the motion could be brought at any time because the entry of default and default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction, and (2) the record does not establish that the trial court relied on extrinsic evidence. We will affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant and appellant Olton Vernell Drake (defendant) appeals from the denial of his petition for vacatur and resentencing filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition without issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing. Finding defendant’s contention to be without merit, we affirm the order.

D.S. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over his three children. Father argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the children were suffering serious emotional damage or were at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c). We disagree and affirm.

Victoria Meador (appellant) purports to appeal from the denial of her motion to reconsider the trial court’s decision to sustain a demurrer in favor of respondent Elite Plastic Surgery, Inc. doing business as Hughes Plastic Surgery (respondent). Appellant provides no authority concerning whether such an order is appealable. However, we treat the matter as an appeal from the court’s final judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained respondent’s demurrer to appellant’s first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend.
The trial court sustained respondent’s demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), because appellant “fail[ed] to properly identify or allege recognized causes of action,” rendering “the entire pleading uncertain.” Appellant does not address the problems that formed the basis for the trial court’s ruling on demurrer, nor does she make any effort to articulate a cognizable cause of action.

Brittany H. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition seeking the return of her son, Xavier M., to her care or, alternatively, the reinstatement of her reunification services. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her petition; she further contends the court erred by denying her requests for a contested section 366.26 hearing and for a bonding study.
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying the section 388 petition because the evidence before the juvenile court did not compel a finding that mother’s circumstances had changed materially or that granting the petition was in Xavier’s best interests. We further conclude that even if the juvenile court erred by denying mother’s request for a contested hearing and a bonding study, any error was not prejudicial. We therefore will affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Appellants are media organizations reporting on the 2018 mass shooting at the Borderline Bar & Grill in Thousand Oaks. They challenge a preliminary injunction forbidding Real Party in interest County of Ventura (County) from releasing the autopsy reports of the eleven civilian victims. Respondents are family members of these victims and oppose disclosure.
Appellants contend the trial court erred by issuing a preliminary injunction based entirely on its belief that a bill pending in the California Legislature might later shield the autopsy reports from disclosure under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) We hold that while a trial court may consider a prospective change of law under narrow circumstances, such circumstances were not present here. The court erred when it issued the preliminary injunction without first assessing the probability of respondent families prevailing at trial under existing law.

The juvenile court sustained a petition against A.N. that alleged murder, a gang enhancement, and gang-related firearm enhancements. The prosecution relied on a gang member’s felony vandalism conviction to prove the enhancements. We reverse the enhancements because the Legislature recently amended the gang statute and omitted vandalism from the list of possible predicate crimes. We also remand for the court to recalculate A.N.’s custody credits.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

Lucas David Eddines (Eddines) appeals from an order of the superior court directing that approximately $84,000 in child support arrears be paid from his employer retirement plan. We find no error, and thus we will affirm the order.

Michael, Kristen, Tate, and Anabelle Bogdan (the Bogdans) sued their former landlord, Jacqueline Pace (Pace), alleging a variety of tort and contract claims. Pace died after the notices of appeal were filed. We granted the motion of her husband, Michael F. Polak, Sr., to substitute in for Pace in these proceedings. Because Pace’s death occurred after the conclusion of the trial court proceedings, we refer to the defendant in the trial court as “Pace,” but when discussing the appellate litigation, we refer to the defendant as “Polak.”
Some causes of action were disposed of by nonsuit, and others were rejected by the jury after trial. In case No. B306264, the Bogdans allege the trial court violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; denied them the right to make a fair opening statement; improperly denied two motions for mistrial; made erroneous evidentiary rulings; improperly granted nonsuit on multiple claims; and failed to give proper jury instruction

Codefendants Mahrad Mahjoob and Jason Tapia were tried together before separate juries. They appeal from judgments entered after their juries convicted them of human trafficking of a minor, in violation of Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (c)(1). Mahjoob asserts instructional error on the elements of human trafficking and insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Tapia asserts he was convicted of an offense with which he was not charged, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct his jury with the more inclusive instruction for circumstantial evidence, and the prosecutor committed misconduct.
We affirm both judgments.

Ralph Jordan (appellant) and three other men were charged with attempted robbery of a bank in violation of Penal Code sections 211, 664 and attempted murder during the failed robbery in violation of sections 664, 187, subdivision (a). One codefendant, Jeffery Brown, entered into a plea agreement and testified at trial against appellant and remaining codefendants Bryan Speight and Harold Johnson. Speight and Johnson had unsuccessfully sought plea agreements before trial; later, at the end of the People’s case-in-chief, they were able to reach plea agreements, but did not enter their pleas until after the trial. Jordan’s case was submitted to the jury, which convicted him as charged, and found true the allegation that a principal was armed with a handgun in the commission of both offenses. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).)
Jordan waived his right to jury trial on prior conviction allegations.

M.S. (Mother) and S.F. (Father) petition this court for extraordinary relief after the juvenile court terminated reunification services with their daughter, S.F. (Minor) and set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Both parents contend the evidence does not support the trial court’s findings, and Father additionally contends the court failed to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA); see also Welf & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) We conditionally grant Father’s petition as to his ICWA claim, and otherwise deny the petitions on the merits.