CA Unpub Decisions

After the trial court found a testifying eyewitness to a shooting in contempt of court for refusing to answer the vast majority of the prosecutor’s questions on direct examination, it determined the witness nevertheless had provided “evasive and untruthful” “implied testimony” inconsistent with earlier statements to police. Accordingly, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1235, the trial court permitted the prosecution to play to the jury the witness’s recorded prior inconsistent statement identifying defendant, Armani Sicilian Lee, as the shooter. On appeal, defendant argues (1) under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the contempt order barred the trial court’s later evidentiary ruling; (2) the erroneous evidentiary ruling violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness; and (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to strike all of an eyewitness’s testimony.

Defendant and appellant Danny Roberto Hernandez appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 as to his convictions for attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter. As explained below, we reverse and remand.

Erin Langes, as administrator of the estate of Elizabeth Langes, filed
a petition to establish the estate’s claim of ownership to property, elder financial abuse and related causes of action, and subsequently obtained judgment on the pleadings as to the claim of ownership of certain real property. Monique Collins, who sold the real property under a power of attorney from the decedent and claims ownership of the proceeds as beneficiary of a holographic will, appeals. She contends the trial court violated her right to due process by granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the underlying petition was not properly noticed, and abused its discretion by failing to require respondent to adhere to statutory notice requirements and refusing to allow her to amend her response before granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.

In 1996, defendant North American Company for Life and Health Insurance (North American) issued a universal life insurance policy that insured the life of Bernard Hagan to a family trust designated by Hagan as the owner and beneficiary of the policy. Before Hagan died, North American sent notice that the policy had lapsed. The successor trustee subsequently sued North American, alleging it had failed to provide prior notice under Insurance Code section 10113.7, subdivision (a) (10113.7(a)), which requires 20-day notice for an “increase of premium on an individual life insurance policy that provides for premium changes by the insurer.”

S.P. appeals from an order appointing the Public Guardian of Contra Costa County (public guardian) as his conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) for a one-year period. He asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider his failure to deny or explain the evidence against him in determining whether he was gravely disabled. Because his appeal is moot, we dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits

Petitioner J.B. (father) is the father of four children (together, the children), who are dependents of the Monterey County Juvenile Court. Father petitions for extraordinary writ relief from a juvenile court order entered after a contested 18-month review hearing. The order terminated father’s family reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.
Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding that returning the children to his care and custody would create a substantial risk to their safety. Father further asserts the department did not provide him with reasonable reunification services, including housing assistance and therapy. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion and consequently deny father’s petition.

On January 22, 2020, a young girl, M.N. (the minor), who was then 11 years old, was taken into protective custody after a reported domestic violence incident two days earlier. The minor had reported to the police on January 20 that her parents, E.M. (mother) and M.N. (father), had a domestic dispute at their San Jose home. In the minor’s presence, father verbally abused mother, struck her in the head, causing her to bleed, and discharged a firearm inside the home.
The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (i). The Department alleged that the minor’s physical and emotional health was at risk due to the parents’ ongoing domestic violence. The juvenile court ordered the minor detained. Mother subpoenaed the minor to testify at the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, and the minor filed a motion to quash the subpoena.

Petitioner, M.M. (mother), in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ (California Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested disposition hearing denying her reunification services on multiple statutory grounds, including Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her daughter S.R. (the child). Mother contends the juvenile court erred by failing to provide her reunification services and requests the juvenile court be directed to order reunification services to her. We find no error in the juvenile court’s orders and deny the petition.

In April 2020, petitioner Rogelio Trigueros filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits claiming injury to his upper extremities, shoulders, arms, hand and fingers through February 19, 2020, while employed as a farm laborer for respondent Gonzalez Ag., Inc. (employer).
On May 4, 2020, employer’s insurance carrier mailed a Notice Regarding Delay of Workers’ Compensation Benefits from Kansas City, Missouri, to petitioner in California. Sixteen days later, petitioner requested and obtained a panel of three chiropractic Qualified Medical Evaluators (QME panel) eligible to evaluate petitioner’s workers’ compensation claim pursuant to Labor Code sections 4060, subdivision (c) and 4062.2, subdivision (b). Employer challenged the timing of petitioner’s request for a QME panel and the matter proceeded to trial, resulting in the workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) concluding the panel was valid.

At a contested dispositional hearing in August 2021, the juvenile court adjudged then six-year-old D.P. and five-year-old J.P. dependents under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm) and (b)(1) (failure to protect) and ordered them removed from the physical custody of their mother Z.P. (mother). (§ 361, subd. (c).) Mother appeals from the removal order, contending there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that returning the children to her custody would pose a substantial danger to their physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. We affirm.

Plaintiff Christopher Ballard appeals from an order sustaining the demurrer of the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) without leave to amend. Ballard contends the court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by (1) not allowing him to cure the defect in his petition for writ of mandate and (2) granting the Secretary extra time in which to file an opposition to his motion for reconsideration.
To obtain a reversal of a superior court’s decision, an appellant must demonstrate two things—error and prejudice resulting from that error. Here, Ballard has not established that he was prejudiced by the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend or the denial of his motion for reconsideration because he has not shown a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the alleged errors.

H.E. (Mother) appeals following the termination of parental rights. Mother contends that the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the duty of initial inquiry imposed by statutory provisions implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).

On April 12, 2021, a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleged that minor and appellant A.M. (Minor) unlawfully possessed a firearm under Penal Code section 29610 (paragraph 1), and unlawfully possessed a loaded firearm while in a vehicle under Penal Code section 25850, subdivision (c)(6) (paragraph 2).
On May 6, 2021, the juvenile court denied Minor’s motion to suppress evidence under Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1. Thereafter, Minor admitted the truth of the allegation as to paragraph 1; the court dismissed the allegation in paragraph 2 pursuant to the prosecution’s motion. The court then continued the matter for the preparation of a probation report.
On May 11, 2021, the juvenile court adjudged Minor a ward and ordered him to serve between 32 to 64 days in juvenile hall; and awarded Minor credit for 32 days served. The court also imposed various terms and conditions of probation.

This is defendant and appellants Juan Enrique Rubio’s second appeal in this case. After this case was remanded following defendant’s first appeal (People v. Rubio (Sept. 19, 2019, E071145) [nonpub. opn.] (Rubio)), the trial court resentenced defendant to 26 years in prison for the convictions of continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 years of age on or about March 1, 2003 through July 1, 2003 (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a) ; count 1); sexual penetration with a child under the age of 18 years on or about July 2, 2003 through March 1, 2004 (§ 289, subd. (h); count 2); oral copulation with a child under the age of 18 years on or about July 2, 2003 through March 1, 2004 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1), renumbered § 287, subd. (b)(1); counts 3 & 4); and commission of a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age on or about July 2, 2003 through March 1, 2004 (§ 288, subd. (a); count 5).